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INTRODUCTION  
This thesis has as its objective an analysis of the domestic and 
foreign policy of the Hittites during the Old Kingdom. 	It is not iossible 
of course to make an arbitrary distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy since each inevitably modifies the other. 
By domestic policy I mean the practices of internal government and 
politics as they pertained to the Hittite homeland proper and, more 
specifically, to the Hittite capital. 	An understanding of their domestic 
policy in this sense entails the study of political institutidns and 
public affairs of an internal nature. 	Law, society, religion, economics, 
art and literature are considered relevant if it is thought that they 
in any way explain the domestic political practices of the Hittites. 
The term foreign policy has as its scope an exposition of the 
expansionist tendencies of the Hittites. 	This will involve a study of 
why and how these people extended their domain of rule. 	It will also 
treat the way the Hittites governed their conquered territories. 	This 
essentially means the history of the Hittites in relationship to the 
other states of the ancient near east with which they came in contact during 
the period of the Old Kingdom. 	It is also necessary to give a definition 
of feudalism because of the feudal structure of the Old Kingdom. By 
feudalism I basically mean the granting of land by the king to the members 
of the nobility. 	In return the nobility was expected to render stipulated 
services, such as supplying military contingents, to the king. The nobility 
retained people on this land and it was they, who in return for a livelihood, 
owed services to the nobility who in turn owed them to the king. 1 
The problem of the order of the presentation of the material is not 
the least with which this thesis has had to contend. O.R.Gurney in his 
book"The Hittites"2 has as his first chapter an outline of Hittite history. 
His second chapter consists of a study of the Hittite state and society. 
This chapter is divided into five sectionwhich deal with the king, the 
queen, social classes, the government •and foreign policy. Chapters III and 
1. In connection with feudalism I have found Feudalism in History, edited 
by R.Coulborn, (Princeton,New Jersey; Princeton University Press;•1956) 1 
extremely useful as a basis of comparison. 
2. Gurney,O.R.;The Hittites,(2nd ed, Harmondsworth,Middlesex,Penguin Books Ltd., 
1954.) 
IV treat Hittite life and economy, and law and institutions respeciVel -Y!, 
Chapter V deals with warfare and thus the scheme of presentation continues. 
Such mechanics of presentation have much to recommend them. 	For 
example, one can easily find the specific topic one is looking for. 
The chief criticism I have to make of such an ordering of the material 
is that it does not make manifest to the fullest extent the fact that 
the Hittites were essentially a developing, progressive people. This 
method of presentation does not allow the sequential plotting of the 
develc?ment of this remarkable people. 	At least it certainly does not 
allow one to do so with facility. 
The Hittite state and society has a marked bearing on Hittite 
history just as Hittite history explains much of the Hittite state and 
society. 	The two are not separable. 	Therefore if one is to gain a 
clear picture of the development of Hittite domestic and foreign policy 
such topics as the kingship, social classes and foreign policy must be St;an 
in their historical framework. 	That is, the monarchlmust be seen as 
it was in the earliest period of Hittite history and then as it was in 
the various phases of the Old Kingdom. 
Gurney does indeed attempt to show the development of Hittite government 
and foreign policy. 	But the fact that his first chapter is devoted to 
an outline of Hittite history makes repetition necessary in those sections 
dealing with government and foreign policy. 	And being aware of repetition, 
even though the mechanics of presentation demand it, an author tends to 
guard against it. 	Hence the line of progress is hard to realise to its 
fullest extent. 
I do not mean to recommend facility to the exclusion of more important 
considerations. 	But if facility in tracing the growth of the political 
and imperial life of the Hittites can be gained by employing a different 
method of presentation of material which does not exclude other factors, 
such as accuracy, then I see no good reason for not attempting to realise 
a clearer picture of Hittite development. 
Thus I have decided to use as a skeleton framework for this thesis the 
chronological order of Hittite kings. 	That is, those events and activities 
which are to be assigned to Labarnas will be treated in a chapter devoted 
to that king. 	Similarly with Hattusilis I and Mursilis I. 	The Hittites 
possessed a very acute sense of historical process, of the past affecting 
the present and the present dictating the course of the future. One 
of the most characteristic traits of reigning Hittite-Icings is to 
hark back to the activities of their predecessors. 	It is perhaps 
not altogether fruitless to speculate that the Hittites would be 
happiest having their story presented in the manner I propose. 
Probably the greatest pitfall to be avoided in any work to do 
with an incompletely documented period of history is to claim irrefutable 
_truths and patterns from the material available. 	Even when all the 
surviving material has been brought to light a resignation to incompleteness 
and uncertainty must still prevail. 	This is quite obviously the case 
with the Hittites and always shall be. 	Where the inevitable lacunae 
occur one may reasonably Infer, on the basis of what is known, what 
was most likely to have happened. 	But I believe that it is possible• 
to do even better than that. 	More richly documented periods of history, 
modern and ancient, often offer likely analogies. 	These can be of 
inestimable value in the attempt to fill lacunae. 
At the end of the thesis I have appended a note on the chronology 
of the Old Kingdom. 	The problems associated with Hittite chronology 
are of an especially difficult nature because of the dearth of evidence 
directly related to chronology. 	A great deal of reliance has to be 
placed on outside evidences of a synchronistic nature. 
I feel that it is necessary to offer an explanatory note in respect 
to the first two chapters of this thesis. 	Much of what is contained 
in these chapters is the result of employing what we might well call 
the principle of retrospective probability. 	That is, many of the state- 
ments, especially those concerriingthe origins of the Hittites, are in- 
ferred from a study of the Hittites in Anatolia. 	It is really a question 
of many of the statements in the first two chapters resulting from an 
analysis of the evidence of the Hittites when they became an historical 
people. 	Asa result, these statements concerning Hittite origins and 
geography being based in the way they are may be justifiably employed to 
help explain the nature of Hittite political forms and imperial practices. 
The statements must not be seen as being mere assumptions which explain 
various characteristics of Hittite domestic and foreign policy. 	They 
are ideas arising from the knowledge of the Hittites as a reasonably well 
(v ) 
documented people in historical times. I believe that it is scholastically 
reasonable to work on the basis that historical knowledge suggests the 
geographic origins of the Hittites and that the likelihood of these 
origins permits one to try and determine what possible bearing they 
may have had on the Hittite achievement. 	But because this thesis is 
arranged chronologically in so far as it has been possible it has been 
thought best to place these two chapters at the beginning of the thesis. 
Finally, it is hoped that in the future this thesis will be 
extended to include the New Empire. 	The Old Kinijdom is to be seen 
as an historical unit or entity in itself but much of what occurred in 
the Old Kingdom undoubtedly made possible, in many respects, the Hittite 
political and imperial achievement under such kings of the New Empire 
as Suppiluliumas, Mursilis II, Muwatallis and Hattusilis III. 
GEOGRAPHY 
(A) Natural features. 
This section does not propose to enquire exhaustively into the 
geography of Anatolia. 	But it is of vital importance that geographic 
factors which may modify and help to explain the political and imperial 
attitudes of the Hittites be set forth. 	As Buchanan has well written: 
"Probably the history of no area in the world has been more condi-
tioned by its geography than that of Asia Minor. 	Its coastal plains 
and central plateau are separated and sub-divided by enormous mountain 
.ranges which both direct and limit the play of historical forces. War, 
trade, social organization, cultural influences and ethnic movements 
all have been to varying degrees affected by this factor."' 
But while this is true it is the problems associated with Anatolian 
geography that have helped to retard and limit our knowledge of the 
Hittites. 	Any Hittite specialist will readily admit to the fact that 
there are still many place names, and even areas, mentioned in Hittite 
texts, which cannot be definitively pin-pointed on a modern map. 	The 
importance of the positions of places and their geographic relation to 
each other is obvious. 
The authors of the most recent book dealing with Hittite geography 
do not claim their results as being final. 2 	This problem is clearly 
illustrated by comparing the different conclusions that Garstang-Gurney 
and Goetze reach in respect to the localization of place names derived 
from one document. 	The particular document concerns itself with the 
N "Festival of the Road of Nerik" (Garstang-Gurney) 3  or "Festival of the 
Voyage to Nerik" (Goetze). 4 
1.Buchanan,B; A review of "The Geography of the Hittite Empire", American  
Journal of Archaeology,vol.64,No 2,(April 1960) p.194. (The American 
Journal of Archaeology will be hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation 
AJA.) 
2.Garstang,J - Gurney,O.R; The Geography of the Hittite Empire, (British 
Institute of Archaeology at Ankara. London,W.1.,1959) p.109. 
4. Goetze,A; "The Roads of Northern , capp.adOb in Hittite Times", Revue  
Hittite et Piianigue, XV(1957),p.91-99. 
The two resulting tabulations of places have considerable agree-
ment for places in the near vicinity of Hattusas, but one B. forcibly 
impressed by the margin of disagreement for the localization of places 
which would seem to be further removed from Hattusas. 
Since I am not familiar with the Hittite language, which is essen-
tial for making possible equations of Hittite place names with their 
classical and modern versions and which partially enables the likely 
relation between different places being plotted, I have been compelled, 
by and large, to rely on the specialized attempts of others to fix the 
position of place names and areas. 
As a guide to the probable location of areas and places I have re-
produced the map compiled by Garstang and Gurney 5 (see page 1). 	My 
choice fell in this quarter for three reasons. 	Firstly, it is the most 
recent geographical proposition of a reasonable nature of which I am 
aware; secondly, the two authors have had a sustained interest in the 
problems associated with Hittite geography, thirdly, their approach to Hittite 
9-gogr4ONseems likely to bear results of a permanent nature 6 . 
5. Garstang—Gurney; op.cit.plate 1 
6. Garstang,J; "The location of Pakhuwa", Annals of Archaeology and  
AnthYopology, XXVII (1948),p.48. 	In his attempt to locate Pakhum 
Garstang consciously sets out to avoid the snares of name resemblances 
and the textual association of names without evident geographic 
relationship. 	He has taken as his basis the route marches and 
boundaries that are described with adequate precision. He then 
attempts to correlate these with all available material factors 
such as the dispositions of the known imperial monuments and especially 
"the physical immutability of the main lines of road upon the Anatolian 
plateau". 	In The Geography of the Hittite Empire,p.109, the authors, 
with good reason, believe that by including in their survey the whole 
of Asia Minor they have been able to avoid the contradictions which 
may have been latent in any paktial treatment of the material. 
The Hittite homeland, ensconced on the Anatolian plateau, enjoyed 
a natural protection rarely afforded by nature; and the natural defensi-
bility of the area is basic to an understanding of the Hittite achieve-
ment. 	Indeed the most immediately distinctive feature of the Anatolian 
plateau is its encirclement by ranges of high mountains. 
The Armenian mountains, to the east of the plateau, are really the 
westward extension of the Ellburz chain whose northerly slopes front the 
Caspian Sea. 	This chain reaches its final extension in a maze of water- 
sheds around the sourdes of the Euphrates. 	The upper reaches of the 
Euphrates River may be seen as the eastern limit of Anatolia proper. 
Now the valleys running through the Armenian mountains proceed from east 
to west. 	Although these valleys are shut in and lamb-locked they have 
been throughout history a way of approach for migrations of people moving 
in an east-west direction. 7 Thus while the communications of the Hittites 
with their eastern neighbours were by no means devoid of barriers they 
were relatively numerous and accessible. 
The Anti-taurus mountains run in a south westerly direction from 
the Armenian mountains in which their beginnings are merged. 	Then the 
Taurus range continues this process of encircling the plateau, running in 
a westerly direction and separating Cilicia from Anatolia. 	The Roman 
name Taurus is indication enough of the formidability of this particular 
mountain range. 
But in the west the physical frontier is less continuous and the 
valleys of the Hermus, Maeander and Caicus Rivers give ready access to 
the plateau of Asia Minor. 	In the north-west also the Hellespont and 
Bosphorus were like open doors inviting rather than restraining invasions 
from the Balkans and Danube area. 	Throughout history the Hellespont 
and the Bosphorus have served to link rather than divide Asia and Europe. 
This is proved by the migrations of the Phrygians and Galatians from 
Europe to Asia Minor. - Then Darius, and more especially Xerxes, indicated 
the feasibility of invading Europe from Asia Minor by taking this avenue 
of approach. 
7. Lloyd,S; Early Anatolia(Harmondsworth, Middlesex. Penguin,1956)p.7-8 
The main physical feature to the north of the plateau is the so-
called Pontic arc which consists of high parallel mountain ranges which 
run steeply down to the shores of the Black Sea. 	Apart from this pro- 
tection the region was heavily afforested in ancient times. It will 
later be seen that for various reasons the Hittites were persistently 
troubled by the tribes living in this mountainous region. 
Hence we may conclude, that apart from the west and north west, 
the Anatolian plateau was ringed by a mountainous barrier giving a 
physical isolation which was of considerable advantage to the Hittites. 
It is worthwhile noting at this early stage, that the forces which were 
to destroy the Hittite Empire arrived from the north west. 
Turning again to the ranges of Anti-taurus and Taurus we note their 
obvious importance to the Hittites. 	This natural wall of mountain 
terminated Mesopotamia and Syria to the north. 	Indeed this mountain wall 
effectively barred all waves of people from the south except of course 
the fervent physically transcendent Islamic wave in the seventh century AD. 
But on the other hand the Hittites of Asia Minor menaced the fertile 
plains of Mesopotamia and northern Syria. 	This factor is one of the 
most consistently fitting keys to an appreciation of the history of the 
Ancient Near East, and more particularly of the Hittites. 
There are, I believe, two reasons which help to explain this histori-
cally proven fact. 	Firstly, the Hittites gained control of the easily 
held passes of Anti-taurus and Taurus which give access to Mesopotamia and 
Syria from the north. 	Secondly, as Garstang8 contends, highland peoples, 
such as the Hittites, may in time adapt themselves to the easier but en-
ervating life of the plains, but for those who have only been schooled to 
resist heat the rigours of ice and snow spell death. 9 
8. Garstang,J; The Hittite Empire (London,Constable, 1929),p.38 
9. Egyptian sources allege that Hattusilis III accompanied his daughter, 
who was to marry Ramses II, to Egypt. 	But it is very unlikely if an 
Egyptian pharaoh ever visited Hattusas. 	No doubt there were other 
reasons as well which explain the apparent lack of Egyptian state 
visits to Hattusas. 
Thus the plateau of Asia Minor was denied to the Semitic monarchies 
of the plains, as it was to Egypt. 	But the Hittites for a time established 
themselves firmly in northern Syria and pushed even further east and south. 
Other history bears this out. 	The Assyrians, like the Arabs in more 
recent times, failed to hold their hard won footing on the Anatolian 
plateau. 	Even while they were there their political existence was of a 
most precarious nature. 
Those who between the Hittites and the Turks have ruled Anatolia for 
any length of time, Phrygians, Persians, Macedonians and Romans, all had 
a marked affinity with the linguistic group termed Indo-European, and 
they have all been familiar with mountainous terrain. 	That is, they 
have been readily amenable to the climate of Anatolia which is prone to 
contrasting 'extremes of temperature with a dearth of rain in the late 
summer and long winter months of snow. 
But more to the point, perhaps, is the fact that these people who 
have held Anatolia successfully had all experienced the administrating of 
regions of a mountainous, sub-divided nature. 	But the peoples of the 
plains, forced by necessity to have a centralized form of administration, 
have failed to appreciate the political modifications necessary for 
survival as rulers in such an area as the Plateau of Anatolia. 	I believe 
that it is the nature of the geography and climate of Anatolia which in 
many ways explains the distinctive political and imperial achievement of 
the Indo-European Hittites. 
The Hittites penetrated beyond, and governed areas beyond, the en-
circling mass of mountains. 	But they were, more often than not, able 
to beat a retreat to the security of their 'mountain fastness' as for 
example after Mursilis I swept down upon Babylon. 	Hittite controlled 
territory beyond the mountain walls often shrank in size, but this people 
had the capacity, afforded by geography, to contain themselves within 
the protecting mountains until such a time as the next outside endeavour 
appeared likely to succeed. 
However, this was not the only form of geographic containment that 
the Hittites possessed since the Hittite homeland proper was circumscribed 
and delimited by the Halys River on three sides. 	The Halys has its 
source in the Armenian Mountains. 	It flows in a south westerly direction 
until it is turned westwards by a ridge of mountains. 	This causes the 
river to bend in loop fashion, completely reversing its original course 
until it finds its way through the northern mountains, running finally 
in a north easterly direction to reach the Black Sea. 	Within thls 
riverine confine lay the Hittite capital of Hattusas. 
The Halys naturally lends itself to a division into three sections 
each with its dictinctive geographic quality and this itsr -value for 
defence purposes or. otherwise. 	In the uppermost reaches as far as the 
most southerly point of the river there is no noteworthy interruption 
to normal river communication, both along the valley and between its banks. 
Thils the easternmost section of the Halys did not afford complete immunity 
to the Hittites from contact in that area. 	This factor is important in 
relation to one of the Hittite problems in this eastern quarter : the 
threat from the people of Azzi-Hayasa. 
The middle sector of the river includes the great loop of the river 
between the extreme southerly and westerly points of its course. 	In this 
sector fords become rare and increasinly difficult. 	Garstang reports 
that there are only three in a distance of 150 miles, namely those of 
Kesik Keupri, Chesme Keupri and Yaksi Han. 10 The advantagesof defence 
accruing from this factor are obvious. 
In the lower course the river breaks through the northern ranges 
and descends from the plateau through a series of defiles, forming a 
barrier across which communication must at all times have been difficult. 
We also find that when the river turns north it is fed by a variety of 
small streams. 	The flood of water is then great and the Halys becomes 
a torrent. 	In this section fords are a rarity. 	Thus although there 
is little mountain protection given to the north west of the plateau the 
river in this quarter offered a natural line of defence. In fact the 
lowest section of the Halys has always marked a boundary. 
10. Garstang,J ; The Hittite Empire (London, Constable,1929)p.51 
7 
The territory surrounded by the HalySis a geographic entity, 
sharply limited on all sides by mountains sloping towards the river. 11 
These we may refer to as the inner circle of mountains in distinction to 
the outer circle of mountainranges already discussed. 	Finally,the area 
enclosed by the Halys is divided by moderately fertile valleys which some-
times debouch Onto plains. 
The emergent truths resulting so far from this geographic survey 
are as follows. 	The Hittites had, especially to the south and south-east 
of their capital, zelften as many as three lines of defence. 	These con- 
sisted of the outer circle of mountains, the inner ranges and the Halys 
River. 	Secondly, the plateau of Asia Minor was sub-divided to a very 
great extent) making possible the establishment of relatively isolated 
political units. 	Physical barriers divide Anatolia into a great number 
of pockets, each one surrounded and made fast by natural walls possessing 
few gateways. 	The people who occupied these fortresses ruled the whole 
country. 	Such a people were the Hittites. 	This is one of the considerations 
which explain why a minority ruling caste such as the Hittites could dominate 
so large and diversified an area. 
It is also these geographic facts which partially explain, at least, 
the Hittite political flexibility and sense of political adaptability in 
relation to the conquered tribes of the plateau who, until the coming of 
the Hittites and for some time after their arrival, had experienced a 
political isolation and independence practically unique in the history 
of the Ancient Near East. 	Although the Hittites were to give a coherent 
political pattern to Asia Minor it was a pattern which obeyed the natural 
geographic dictates of Asia Minor. 
11. Osten,H.H. von der; "Explorations in Hittite Asia Minor", The American  
Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures,vo.XLIII,(Jan.1927.No.2) 
P.83. 	(The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures 
will hereinafter be referred to by the ,,abbileViation AJSL.) 
The same may be said of the Hittite attitude towards northern Syria and 
Mitanni which lay respectively beyond the Taurus and Anti—taurus ranges. 
Later Hittite history clearly demonstrates that the Hittites were capable 
of political improvisation which was in many ways determined by the 
nature of the geographic situation. 
The difficulties which the Hittites experienced in their attempts 
to absorb the native population of Anatolia are very largely geographically 
based. 	The physical features of Asia Minor tend to emphasize racial 
and cultural differences, especially between the coastal plains and the 
high, rugged interior. 	In retired, virtually inaccessible areas a spirit 
of independence was fostered which under the stimulus of racial fervour 
often developed into opposition to the ruling power. 	This point is 
demonstrated by the opposition which the native kings of Pontus offered 
to Roman authority. 	Indeed the Gasgans in their mountainous home leading 
down to the southern shore of the Black Sea were a perennial problem to 
the Hittites. 
Ty contrast, the open estuaries of the western coast seemed almost 
to invite invasion, and the Achaeans(textuallyi the people of AhhiyaWa) 
took full advantage of these openings. 	In this connection, it can hardly 
be without significance that the Hittites, who were essentially an inland 
and alpine folk, developed and maintained a high road from their capital 
to the western coast." 12 
At this juncture it is relevant to discuss an interesting idea set 
forth by Frankfort. 13 	He sees Palestine, Syria, Anatolia and Persia 
as peripheral regions of the Near East which were overrun by foreign 
peoples on many occasions, and, he continues, the new comers succeeded 
in taking charge. 14 These peripheral regions lacked cultural individuality, 
and once immigrants had asserted their power their mastery was complete. 
This) he contends, explains the Hittite mastery of Anatolia. 
12. Garstang,J;"Hittite Military Roads in Asia Minor",A.J.A.,XLVII,(1943),p.36 
13. Frankfort,H; Kingship and the Gods(Chicago,University Press,1955),p.337ff 
14. This statement is too general. See Supra.p.5 for a discussion of the 
exceptions. 
Frankfort then extends his thesis by stating that foreVgners 
could rise to power in Egypt, but on the condition that they were 
culturally assimilated. 	Further, when large groups of immigrants 
—Amorites, Kassites — were absorbed by Mesopotamia, they insinuated 
themselves into the traditional fabric of Mesopotamian culture which 
henceforth determined their behaviour. 
What Frankfort seemingly means is that a culturally superior people 
will prevent the less cultured invaders from attaining complete dominance, 
and in fact will finally assimilate the latter. 	That is, inferior 
peoples, from a cultural point of view,will attempt to emulate the 
superiority with which they come in contact and this they will be in 
a sense dependent on those whom they have physically conquered. 	India 
and China have so far won the ultimate victory over invaders largely 
because of cultural superiority. 
Frankfort is right when he claims that the autochthonous culture 
of Anatolia was feeble when the Hittites arrived. 15 The relevant question 
we must ask is this: does the geography of the Anatolian plateau to - any 
extent explain the absence': of a highly developed culture? Because of 
the following considerations I would suggest that it does. 	Firstly, 
Anatolia was isolated from the great riverine civilizations of Mesopotamia 
and Egypt with their highly developed cultures. 
15. But Frankfort should surely go further and state that the Hittites 
themselves did not achieve any great cultural status. However, 
that is another matter. 
10 
Secondly, the physical variation of the plateau did not encourage 
centralization and thus the interchange of ideas was retarded. 
Thirdly, the very independence of political units led to time—consuming 
wars. 16 Lastly, and most important, the nature of the climate of the 
Anatolian plateau rendered existence precarious. 	The equation of 
leisure time with cultural achievement is self evident. 	Seton Lloyd 
writes as follows of the plateau of Asia Minor: 
"What the traveller sees is an austere upland, arid and thinly 
populated, inhospitable in character by comparison with the natural 
amenities of the coastal fringe." 17  
He later completes the picture of this uninspiring setting : 
"Climatically, in the fourth millenium B.C., the plateau may have 
been evenLless inviting to potential farmers than it must appear today 
to its hardy Turkish cultivators." 18 
In conclusion it is suggested that the geography of the highlands 
of Asia Minor helps to explain the absence of a highly developed culture. 
This paucity of culture in its turn is to be seen as one of the explana-
tory factors in the Hittite political mastery of Anatolia. 	This is so 
16. It might be objected that these last two considerations apply to 
Greece. 	But it should be remembered that the cultural achievement 
of Greece was largely an Athenian achievement whilst the Ionians of 
the river valleys of Asia Minor did not have these geographic limita-
tions with which to contend. 	The Greek achievement was much later 
in history and hence there may have been a greater chance of over-
coming the handicaps of physical environment. 	Finally, the plateau 
of Asia Minor did not lend itself to the use of sea communication to 
alleviate isolation as did mainland Greece. 
17. Lloyd.op.cit.p.2 
18. Ibid.p.10 
11 
because the Hittites were not culturally dependent to any great extent 
on the indigenous peoples of Asia Minor. 19 
(B) The Site of the Hittite'Capital. 
A survey of this type would not be complete unless something were 
said about the topography of the site of the city of Hattusas, since it 
was there that the ultimate control of the Hittite Empire later resided. 
Hattusas was situated in the north—east of the Anatolian plateau. 
More specifically, the ruins of Hattusas lie on the northern slope of 
a steep hill which rises sharply from a river valley. 	The capital lay 
in the vicinity of one of the small streams that feed the Cappadox River 
which is one of the main tributaries of the Halys. 	The Cappadox itself 
lies within the loop of the Halys and so provides yet another line of 
defence for the capital. 
The northern slope of this hill is a low divide where rise two 
sources of the Kara Budak Su, the small stream mentioned, which flows 
north and west to join the Cappadox. 	The two streams, the sources of 
the Kara Budak Su, descend steeply on either side of the hill. In places 
19. I do not mean to assert dogmatically that the Hittites were completely 
independent of the culture of the natives of Anatolia. 	Indeed the 
survival of the Hattian language in religious texts illustrates some 
form of dependence on the natives. 	The real point at issue is that 
the indigenous inhabitants of Asia Minor were not of a cultural 
standing sufficient to impair Hittite control of the area. See 
Goetze,A. "The Cultures of Early Anatolia" from Proceedings of the  
American Philosophical Society,vol.97, No.2,(Apri1,1952)p.220, where 
he speaks of the vigour of the new Hittite culture in contrast to 
the indigenous culture. 
12 
the descent is through deep gorges. 	They have their point of con- 
fluence at the foot of the hill just below the modern village of 
Baghazkeui. 	From the point whence these two streams rise to the 
joining of the main streams two miles away the fall is approximately 
one thousand feet. 	Thus their descent is very rapid and winter 
rains and snow heighten the rate of descent 	This is especially 
true of the stream flowing down the eastern side of the hill, the 
Beuyuh Kayouin, which was worn down its rocky bed so deeply that its 
banks have become precipitous cliffs requiring little or no artificial 
defence. 	The Yazir Daresi, on the western side, flows through more 
alluvial grounds, and has there scooped for itself a gorge, in the 
steep banks of which the harder rocks are left protruding, thus making 
assault on that side also a precarious enterprise. 
• 	The main reason for choosing this site for the Hittite capital was 
its natural defensibility. 	The Hittite sappers who would have been 
responsible for the planning of the city's defences exploited to the 
full the natum-given advantages of the position. 	For example, the 
slopes were banked up, and the enclosing city walls were brought, wherever 
practicable, to the edge of the rocks, in which possible footholds were 
eliminated by filling them up with masonry. 
On the northern side the line of defence is less clear. 	Here the 
ground is broken by a third small stream. 	There is evidence of more 
artificial defence on this side than on the western or eastern sides. 
The most assailable point appears to have been the high ground to the 
south and here man-made fortifications were proportionately stronger.The 
wall on the southern side was built upon a great earthen rampart revetted 
with stone which in its turn followed the line of a natural ridge. 20 
20. These topographic details have in the main been derived from Garstanj's 
The Hittite Empire, (London, ConStable,1929),p.79-82._ 
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The topography of this locale which afforded such an easily 
defensible acropolis undoubtedly contributed to the political 
and imperial success of the Hittites. 	It is of interest to note that 
the Hittite capital was not transferred to this site until towards 
the end of the reign of Hattusilis I. 	There must have been good 
reason for changing the capital from Kussara to Hattusas and the above 
description of the site indicates the intelligence of the transfer. 
This move from Kussara to Hattusas will be dealt with at greaterlength 
in the section devoted to the reign of Hattusilis I. 	In that section 
the strategic considerations in relation to the geographic complex of 
Asia Minor, which must have been part of the motivation for the move, 
will emerge. 
It will suffice to say for the present that the geography of 
Anatolia greatly assisted the Hittite rise to ascendancy in that area. 
But not only may geographic factors be held to partially explain the 
achievement of political mastery; they also helped to determine the 
nature of that mastery. 
1 4 
HITTITE ORIGINS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO POLITICAL PRACTICES. 
The Hittites were obviously a people familiar with mountainous 
regions. 	This is so because they were able to survive successfully in 
the demanding mountainous climate of Anatolia. 	Secondly, they were 
able to control and govern this' mountainous area for many centuries. 
In short, •the Hittites felt comfortable and at home in Asia Minor. 
They had knowledge of the requirements of the conditions of Anatolia. 
If the Hittites did not originate from a mountainous region their sense 
of adaptability in Asia Minor was truly remarkable. 
Giles, when speaking of the Indo-European invasion of Asia Minor, 
which he claim's had a northwesterly line of approach, says that it is 
impossible to believe that so many languages, with so complicated a 
grammar, could_ have developed on so closely similar lines, unless the 
speakers had spent a long time in contact with each other, and shut off 
from their neighbours, as in the Danube area they were, by mountains 
which offer comparatively few means of access. 1 This development of 
many languages is interesting. 	It presupposes that related Indo-European 
tribes were sufficiently isolated from one another to develop different 
dialects. 	The Balkans and the Danube area foster tribal isolation because 
of the markedly sub-divided nature of the terrain. 2 
That the Hittites,. at such an early stage in history (about 2000 B.C.) 
moved from one mountainous area to another indicates that when they arrived 
in Anatolia their condition was perhaps more nomadic than it was sedentary. 
The relevant question which arises is as follows:- To what extent 
does a nomadic -canton origin explain Hittite political forms ? 
1. Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge University Press,1924)Vol.II,Chap.II 
p.29. (The Cambridge Ancient History will hereinafter be referred to by 
the abbreviation C.A.H.) 
2. See Gurney,O.R The Hittites.(2nded, Harmondsworth,Middlesex,Penguin Books, 
1954.)p.117-123 for a description of the different Indo-European dialects, 
discovered among the cuneiform texts from Boghazkeui. 
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The mountain-nomad would belong to a small tribe which attempted to move 
on to different pockets of fertility as soon as others had been temporarily 
exhausted. 	There would of course be considerable opposition from similarly 
existing tribes in the area who had the same object in view. The cold 
climate and rugged nature of the mountain terrain made the gaining of a 
livelihood difficult. Thus competition and the resulting conflict for 
the most favoured pastoral and agricultural areas was perhaps inevitable. 
To survive under such conditions of competition demanded a high 
degree of skill in such related activities as leadership, warfare and 
organisation. 	Because of the precarious nature of existence the person 
most skilled in these activities would become the chieftain of the tribe. 
The greater the threat to survival the greater the effort to guard against 
extinction, and man's instinct to survive would be intensified by the 
very precariousness of his livelihood which pertained under these moun-
tainous conditions. 	One may, I think, justifiably claim that the threat 
to survival heightens intelligence and makes very real demands on man's 
ingenuity. 
Thus it follows that the_members of the tribes, living under the 
above mentioned conditions, -would be determined that only the most skilled 
in the relevant survival activities would lead them. 	The potential 
chieftain would have had to prove his capabilities in these activities 
before his fellow tribesmen would entrust him with the responsibility of 
keeping them alive. 	Hence the office of chieftain of the tribe would 
have been essentially an elective one. 	The old maxim, 'like father like 
son', would hardly have sufficed these nomads living under such threats 
of catastrophe. 	It:is only when life has become sedentary, and thus 
more assured, that the hereditary factor in leadership can become operative, 
since with greater security one can afford to widen the margin of possible 
error often concomitant with the hereditary principle. 3 
3. This is, of course, not the only reason for the establishment of the 
hereditary principle. 	The reason given is the relevant one for the 
above discussion. The other reasons are given in the chapters concerning 
Labarnas, Hattusilis I and Telipinus when it was attempted to make the 
kingship hereditary. 
Now because the leader of the tribe was elected to his position he 
must have been in many ways dependent upon the electors. 	It was to 
them that he owed his position and should he fail them they no doubt re- 
moved him from office. 	Sincetthe tribe was so dependent on the ability 
of their chieftain for survival a watchful and critical eye would have 
been cast over his activities; hence the coming into existence of a council 
which had power over the king. 	It was, I believe, these nomadic—mountainous 
. conditions which give the reasons for the existence of the historical 
Hittite council which was such an important political feature dui-ing the 
centuries of Hittite rule in Anatolia. 	Further to this, it was the 
strife engendered by friction between the council of nobles and the king 
which greatly undermined the stability of the Hittite state and this in 
turn had imperial manifestations of an unfortunate nature. 
This close scrutiny of the king's activities prevented any great 
detachment on his part from those'whom he led. 	This accessibility to, 
and familiarity with, the mountain chieftain precluded him gaining a 
transcendent status such as the pharaohs of Egypt and the Mesopotamian 
kings, the latter to a lesser degree, gained. 	The very nature-of the 
chieftain's position demanded a close contact with the people he ruled 
and a responsibility to them. 	This is one of the most pronounced features 
of the Hittite kingship. 	Thus the Hittite king was never conceived of 
as a god during his lifetime. 	The nomadic—mountainous origin of the 
king led to too many real contacts with people and day to day situations 
for any deification to be possible while he still lived. 	The Hittite 
king was seen as being basically as other men and hence there was little 
likelihood of divinely sanctioned and thus legalized irresponsibility 
emanating from the Hittite throne. 
The value which the Hittites accorded to the individual is also 
inherent in Hittite origins. 	We have already noted the mutual dependency 
between tribe and chief. A one—sided dependency has the manifest danger 
of making the person or institution with depend;hts contemptuous of them 
and hence irresponsibly disposed towards them. But mutual dependency 
leads to a mutual respect by the dependent parties. 	That is, owing 
they are owed. 	There appears to have been an awareness of kinship amongst 
the Hittites which derived itself from a shared nomadic past. The smallness 
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of the tribal unit dictated by the confines of the mountain cantons 
must tiave fostered a familiarity and an intimacy amongst tribal members. 
This awareness of kinship is no where more apparent than in the importance 
that the -Hittites attached to the family or clan. 	Indeed Hittite history 
is in many respects the history of leading families or clans. 	The 
same is,in many respects, true of Roman history.Hittite consciousness 
of the importance of the clan must be explained by geographic isolation 
of the clans from each other.? The competition referred to would have 
also fostered an awareness of belonging to . one clan rather than to a race 
or any of the other clan s . 4 Among the Hittites membership of leading 
clans or families was the basis of wielding political power. 	It is in 
the institution of family more than in any other institution that respect 
for individual members is accorded. 5 This sense of the importance of the 
individual is not explainable in terms of Hittite origins alone. Other 
factors, such as the juxtaposition of a ruling caste in relationship to 
subjects of a different race, will be treated later. Moscati, speaking 
generally of the peoples of the Ancient Near,East who had a mountain origin, 
says that they brought - with them a social structure based on the power of 
a limited noblelclass. 	Outstanding among the nobles) primus inter gasg;:t) 
in war and peace, was the king. 	After their conquest the nobles share 
out the land in the feudal system, assuming the rights and obligations 
involved i their power is decisive, and that of the king is conditioned by 
it, at least in the very earliest phase. 6 
4. For such purposes as defence and economy clans or families combine into 
the larger unit of the tribe, but a powerful sense of belonging to the 
family, in distinction to the tribe, still remains. 
5. Because of the fierce competition between tribes value would be placed 
upon the individual in the interest of keeping up the numbers of the tribe. 
6. Moscati ; The Face of the Ancient Orient (Eng.translation Vallentine, 
Mitchell and Co.Ltd.,1960) p.155. 
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In other words, the king's dependence upon the nobility forced him to 
reward their military efforts with land. 	Thus Hittite origins largely 
explain theuundoubted feudal nature of the Hittite kingdom. 	It will 
be seen that this feature becomes one of considerable political importance 
to the Hittites. 7 s 
But where in fact did the Hittites come from ? Opinion is still 
divided as to the avenue of approach used by the Hittites for gaining 
access to Asia Minor. 	There are two theories postulated: that they 
came in a north—westerly direction from Europe by way of the Bosphorus 
and the Hellespont, or that they penetrated by way of the Caucasian mountains 
thus coming from the north—east. 8 	What has been said in this section 
would seem to indicate a European (Balkan—Danube) origin for the Hittites. 
The steppes of southern Russia perhaps threw forth the Hurrians and the 
Kassites into the respective regions of the Khabur and Euphrates river 
valleys. 	The Hurrians and the Kassites successfully conquered and ruled 
areas which were essentially made up of plains. 	Their steppe origin suited 
them to this and no doubt helped to give them success. 
7. In connection with Hittite origins and their relationship to feudalism 
it is ithformative to quote from, Feudalism in History,edited by R.Coulborn 
(Princeton,New Jersey,Princeton University Press,1§56) p.5 
" Feudalism as a method of government means that the performance of 
political functions depends on personal agreements between a limited 
number of individuals and that political authority is treated as a 
private Possession. 	Since personal contacts -are so important in 
feudal governments, it tends to be most effective at the'local level 
where such contacts are easy and frequent." 
Because the nobles of the Hittite kingdom were often to treat 'political 
authority'as a 'private possession' the Hittite state was prone to periods 
of anarchy. 
8. Mellaart,J ; "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia andtthe Aegean", 
A.J.A., vol 62, (1958), p.11 considers that the migration came from 
the east. 
But Hittite political forms and the area in which they finally settled 
successfully suggest a mountain origin. 	It is interesting to note 
that the Hittites did not possess any cavalry. 9 It *Ill later be 
demonstrated that it is not likely that the Hittites brought the 
horse to the Ancient Near East. 	But the Hurrians and the Kassites, 
coming from the steppes of southern Russia where the employment of 
cavalry is possible, and proceeding through the Caucasian mountains 
to areas of plains where cavalry is also possible, both had a cavalry 
arm :1. 
The above features of the Indo-European Hittites 10 may perhaps 
be held to be inherent traits of character but their geographic environ-
ment in many ways fbrmed the so-called inherent characteristics. 
9. Goetze, A j-Kleinasien (Munchen;Muller,Handbuch der Alterumswissenschaft, III 
I,iii,1933) p.117 
Mellaart; op.cit.p.11 and footnote 62 does not believe that the Hittites 
brought the horse to Anatolia. 
10.Gurney,O.R ; The Hittites.(2nd ed. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin 
Books Ltd., 1954) p.117-118, where he correctly contends that the 
affinity of Hittite with the Indo-European languages 'has been proved 
beyond all doubt and for more than twenty years has been accepted by 
all those who have studied the subject.' 
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THE COMING OF THE HITTITES TO ASIA MINOR 
It is not possible to establish exactly the date for the arrival 
of the Indo—Europeans in Asia Minor. But the so—called Cappadocian 
tablets, which mention the names of early. Assyrian kings, permit the 
compilation of a reasonably accurate chronology. 
These tablets, whlch in their majority come from a site near 
Kultepe, ancient Kanis, are linguistically Old Assyrian and they give 
an account of the activities of Assyrian merchants in Anatolia. 	The 
appearance of Indo—European words in the Cappadocian tablets is the 
first historical indication of the Indo—European element in Anatolia. 
But even more important is the occurrence of the names Anittas, and 
Pitkhanas (the former's father) in the tablets. 1 	Later Hittite kings 
claimed at least a spiritual connexion with Anittas. 
The tablets are also synchronistic with the reigns of king Sarrum-
ken of Assur and with those of both his immediate predecessor and 
successor. 2 Thus it has been possible to reckon that the vintage of 
the tablets is approximately that of the twentieth century B.C. 	To 
establish more firmly the relationship of the Cappadocian tablets with 
the appearance of the Indo—European Hittites it is possible to cite 
archaecilogical evidence of a corroborative nature. 	In Alisar, situated 
in the east of thni-Ah6tolian plateau, the following successive sequences 
of culture have been determined: 
"Phrygian" — Alisar IV 
Hittite 	— Alisar II 
And there have been observed in the lower reaches layers of an 
Early Bronze Age — Alisar I 
Below it the remnants of a village have appeared which are held to be 
reflective of the Chalcolithic Age: Alisar O. 
Now Alisar has -yielded some Cappadocian tablets and their position 
in the sequence is important for obtaining a near absolute chronology. 
1. Goetze,A ;"The Cultures of Early Anatolia" from Proceedings of the  
American Philosophical Society,vol:97,No.2.(Apri1,1953) p.216 
2. Ibid. p.214-215 
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They came from level 10c which is the lowest sub-level of the second 
last level within Alisar II. 	Goetze dates level 10c at about 1950 B.C. 3 
We also learn that the culture which is known as 'Hittite' to archaeologists 
was to some extent established when the Assyrian merchants entered Anatolia. 
But not only this; the 'Hittite' culture can be shown to grow out of 
Alisar I. 	This relatively early beginning of 'Hittite' civilization has 
been further borne out by excavationsat Boghazkeui and more especially 
by those carried' out at Kultepe. 	In Boghazkeui there appeared below an 
extensive 'Phrygian' layer (Boghazkeui II) two 'Hittite' layers (III and IV). 
On the next level, level V, Cappadocian tablets appear. 
The work of Turkish excavators at the so-called karum kanis not only 
offered valuable information in so far as it showed the tablet carrying 
layer of the twentieth century (Kultepe II) existing between a younger 
'Hittite' layer (Kultepe I) and two older layers (Kultepe III and IV), but 
it also indicated that Kultepe IV contains much Cappadocian pottery. At 
this level the ware is particularly abundant. 	It is evident here that the 
4 floruit of that ware antedates the twentieth century. 
The appearances of Cappadocian pottery, is intimately related to the 
coming of the Hittites. 	Goetze claims that whether we see in the bearers 
of the so-called Cappadocian ware the Indo-European element or not it is 
. obvious "that the phenomenon as such is related in one way or another to 
the influx of a new component in the population." 5 Be this as it may, it 
3. Ibid.p.217. Goetze's chronology may be too high. Mellaart,J; "The End 
of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean",AJA,Vo1 1 .62 (1958) 
p.33 thinks that Pitkhanas and Anittas ruled in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century B.C. 	This adds to my belief that Gurney's chronology 
for the Hittite kings should be lowered. Van der Meer, The Chronology oT  
Ancient Western Asia and Egypt,  (2nd  ed, Leiden, E.J.Bri11,1955), p.91 
considers that Pitkhanas and Anittas " were contemporaries of Puzur-Assur 
and his father Sarru-Ken, who lived in the first half of the eighteenth 
century." 
4. Ebetze,TA "The Cultures of Early Anatolia" from Proceedings 6f the American 
Philosophical Society,vol.97.No.(Apri1,1953)p.217 
5. Ibid.p.220. Goetze had previously maintained in Kleinasiern (1933) 46ff, 
that the bearers of this ware were Hittites. He obviouny still considers 
the connection to be possible but he is now not so convinced. 
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is acknowledged by Goetze himself that with the coming of the Hittites 
civilization acquired a new appearance that was more vigorous than before. 
Seton Lloyd remarks as follows when speaking of the elaborately painted 
_Cappadocian pottery: 
"In a country with an unbroken tradition of plain and burnished ware, 
whose rare experiment in decoration had till now been almost completely 
limited to simple lines of white paint on a dark ground, the sudden 
appearance of these gay colours on a light clay must have been revolutionary, 
and can only have resulted from the admixture of a new element in the 
population. 	Sooner or later a tangible Connexion must surely be found 
between this phenomenon and some major historical event, such as the 
arrival of the Indo—Europeans, who-mingled with the'indigenous people to 
produce the original Hittite stock."7 
It seems scarcely necessary to pose the question of who else other 
than the Hittites could have introduced such a distinctive, vigorous and 
elaborate pottery. 	The Assyrian traders, who'se main buginess was to gain 
copper from Anatolia, would hardly have been interested in this type of 
activity. 	To the best of my knowledge no such pottery as the Cappadocian 
ware has been unearthed in twentieth century. B:C.Assyria. Lloyd has 
pointed out that the natives of Anatolia were not likely to have been res- 
ponsible for it. 	Had they beenLcapable of such exciting and vigorous 
ceramic art the outcome of the Hittite struggle for power in Asia Minor 
might have been vastly different. 
Thus not only does the appearance of the Cappadocian tablets and 
pottery allow the early Hittites to be fitted into the chronological scheme, 
but the Cappadotabn pottery is reflective of the Hittites in relation to 
• the natives of Anatolia in a way which has a possible bearing on their 
political and military success'in Asia Minor. 
7. Lloyd.op.cit. p.67. For a totally opposite opinion see Mellaart,J,"The 
End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean".AJA,Vol.62. 
(1958), p.13. 
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One of the archaeological phenomenet which Goetze claims coincides 
with the coming of the Hittites are the layers of destruction which are 
observable in many sites. For example, Early Bronze Age at Alaca Huyuk 
ends in an apparent catastrophe. 	The same may be said of Polatli and 
Kussura. 8 That the Hittites were not peacefully received, or were 
unwilling to co-exist peacefully with the natives of the plateau, is 
confirmed by the Anittas text which is the source for the activities of 
that king. 	But before recounting the expansionist drive of Anittas I 
propose to say something of the significance of the existence of different 
languages in the Boghazkeui archives. 
In 1919 Forrer astonished Hittitologists with his announcement that 
the archives of Boghazkeui contained as many as eight languages. These • 
consisted of Indo-European, Hittite, Luwite, Palaic, Hieroglyphic Hittite, 
Hattian, Akkadian, Sumerian and Hurridn. 	For their official state docu- 
ments the Hittite kings used only two of these languages, Indo-European 
Hittite and Akkadian. 	The Indo-European Hittite language supersededaHattlan 
which was the language of the indigenous, non:Indo-European, natives of 
Anatolia. 	This in itself is sufficient proof that the real power of Asia 
Minor was in the hands of the Hittites. 	Akkadian,which became the diplomatic 
lingua franca of the Ancient Near East, was to be of real importance to 
the Hittites when they entered the international complex. 
The Luwite, Palaic, Hattian and Hurrian languages are mainly met with 
in religious texts. 	Hurrian is also associated with literature such as 
in the Hurrian reproduction of the Babylonian "Epic of Gilgamesh". 	But 
when it comes to affairs of state or empire these languages are conspicuous 
by their absence. 	While the Hittites were prepared to forgo control of 
religion and literature, which the demand to have literature and religious 
rituals entirely written in Indo-European Hittite would have helped to 
gain for them should they have desired it, the attempt at monopoly in 
8. Goetze,A 'The Cultures of Early Anatolia' . from Proceedinqs-ofthe  
American Philosophical Society,vol.97, No.2,(APril 1953),p.215 
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political and imperial affairs is witnessed by the exclusive use of 
Indo—European Hittite. 	The Romans had the same forbearance in rela- 
tion to such peoples as the Gauls, Spaniards, Italians, Jews and Greeks. 
The same may be said of the Persians in their dealingswith their subjects. 
It was only when dangerous political subversion became apparent through 
the usage of religion or literature that independence in these fields worried 
them. 	The Persian attitude to the subversive Davidites is a good example 
of this attitude. 	The preservation of the religious and artistic mores 
of the governed is, of course, one way of gaining 'their goodwill. 	In 
short, a ruling caste, such as the Hittites were, was not vitally interested 
in religious and literary practices so long as theT:mere politically dis- 
interested. 	They obviously felt that the advantages of such a toleration 
outweighed the risk of these local practices being put to subversive uses. 
It will become increasingly apparent that the Hittite achievement lay in 
the fields of state and empire rather than in any other. 	To a large extent 
this was due to the great emphasis placed on these two felaCedtfields to the 
exclusion of other interests. Indeed once the Hittites became a minority 
ruling caste in Asia Minor there was no ther alternative open to them. 	If 
they had dissipated their energies by channelling them into fields other 
than those of state and empire their survival as a ruling caste would have 
been greatly threatened. 	The irreducible minimum of Hittite history is 
the continued attempt by the Hittites to remain the master people of Anatolia. 
They were never completely successful for very long in this respect but 
the attempt to be so was always the driving force of the Hittite state andtthe 
intensity of the attempt was seldom diminished. 	The Hittites did not 
find time for anything else, hence the dearth and comparative paucity of 
Hittite culture. 	Such inferior pursuits could well be left to others. 
One is here forcibly reminded of Virgil's implied contrasts between the 
Greeks and the Romans. 9 
9. Virgil, The Aeneid; Harmondsworth, Middlesex,Penguin Books Ltd.1956) 
p.103 — 104. 
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Therefore it is not surprising that the Hattian language was 
used in quite a number of the religious cults, many of them being 
those of the leading deities of the Hittite pantheon. 	The Hattian 
litanies were often left as they were without being translated into 
the Indo-European Hittite. 	Intthe Hittite religious services, according 
to theHittite religious texts, sometimes Hattian, sometimes Hurrian 
and sometimes Luwian singers took part. 1° 
Some scholars have seen in the Hittites an "extraordinary religious 
conservatism which resulted in the custom of continuing indefinitely the 
cults of ancientdeities in the language of the communities whence they 
had been taken over': 11 	I think that this statement is in need of correction. 
Conservatism would have been a more applicable term if the Hittites had 
insisted on the wholesale practice of their own religious customs. What 
Goetze calls "extraordinary religious conservatism" was in reality good 
politics based on the understanding that a numerically inferior ruling 
caste could not afford to offend the religious sentiments of the conquered. 
Cyrus of Persia was highly conscious of this factor when by his own 
patronage he reinstated Marduk as the national god of Babylon. 	This 
attitude on the part of Cyrus was founded on the realisation that the 
religious policy of Nabonidus had provoked much discontent. 	It would 
appear that Nabonidus, as king of Babylon, had been an energetic worshipper 
of the moon-god Sin with the result that the traditional national god 
Marduk was neglected. 	Nabonidus accordingly received opposition from 
the priestly class. 	Cyrus could not in safety have such opposition. 
The Hittite position must have been similar. 
The existence of two other Indo-European languages, Luwian and Palaic, 12 
proves that the Hittites were not the only Indo-European tribe in A6la Minor. 
10. "The Hittites", Encyclopaedia Britannica, The University of Chicago, 
Vol.II,1947. p.603. 
11. Goetze,Ai"The Cultures of Early Anatolia" from Proceedings of the American  
Philosophical Society,vol.97.No.2(Apri1,1953) p.215. 
12. Gurney,O.R; The Hittites,(2nd ed,Harmondsworth,Middlesex Penguin Books Ltd. 
1954) p.123. 
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These facts are informative since they indicate that the Indo-European 
invasion of Asia Minor consisted of a series of incursions 13 , possibly 
at different times, of several Indo-European tribes, rather than a com-
bined overwhelming invasion occurring in the space of a few years. 
Hrozny claims that the Luwians comprised the earliest Indo-European wave 
to reach Asia Minor. 	He claims that the language of this vanguard of 
the later Hittites was destroyed toaa greater degree by the autochthonous 
languages of Asia Minor than was the case with the language used by the 
Hittites. 14 This is evidence for the contention that the Luwites were 
earlier residents in Asia Minor than the Hittites and that the Indo - 
European invasion of Anatolia took the form of a gradual penetration. 
If we consider that the Hittites came to Asia Minor:as a single 
tribe or people and at a different time to the other Indo-European tribes 
it is likely that this conquering people were not very numerous. 	This 
lack of numbers will dictate their attitude to the conquered to no small 
extent. 	It will mean that the doctrine of force is not possible in its 
entirety since they have not the numbers to hold down a far-flung area by 
Hittite man-power alone. 	An awareness of their lack of numbers and a 
sense of isolation in relation to the ruled resulted in a very close cohesion 
among the Hittites and the sense of mutual dependency, already mentioned, 
was heightened in the interests of survival and the maintenance of the 
position they had won. 	Thus the institution of the council with its 
control over the king was encouraged to remain in force and as life became 
more settled feudalism was the natural consequence of the king's dependence 
upon his nobles. 
These political factors become even more apparent when we realise that 
the other Indo-European tribes in Asia Minor were subjugated rather than 
asked to coalesce with the Hittites in ruling Asia Minor. 
13. Moscati; The Face of the Ancient Orient,(Vallentine,Mitchell and Co., 
Ltd.,Engli'sh translation,1960)p.158, makes this claim but does not 
give any reasons. 
14. "The Hittites", Encyclopaedia Britannica, The University of Chicago, Vol.11 
(194N),p.603. MellaartTJ; "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and 
the Aegean",AJA,vo1.62,(1958),p.2, considers that the Hittites were 
inferior in numbers to the local population, the Hatti. He also considers 
p.32-33 that the Luwians arrived before the Hittites. 
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Hrozny remarks that Luwian appears to have been spoken in the Hittite 
kingdom, in so far as they did not use Hattian, by the peasantry 15 . 
The infrequent appearance of Luwian and Palaic is evidence enough that 
their role in the political life of the Hittites kingdom was inconsiderable. 
PITKHANAS AND ANITTAS 
Before the activities of these two kings can be discussed it is 
necessary to say something about the sources from which we derive our 
information. 	In the so-called Anittas text, which in its present form 
16 Gurney considers to date from about 1300 B.C., 	there occurs the story 
of the struggletfor power in Anatolia by Anittas and his father Pitkhanas. 
Opinion is divided as to whether the text was contemporary with 
Anittas or not. 	The following is Gurney's view. 	Anittas was a contemporary 
of the Assyrian merchants. 	But the style of cuneiform used by the Hittites 
in this text is quite unlike that employed by the Assyrian merchants. 
Hence it is implied that the Hittites adapted their script from a source 
at a time when the Assyrians were no longer living in their midst. There-
fore, the assumption that the Anittas-text is simply a late copy of one 
composed by Anittas himself leads to difficulties, since Anittas who was 
contemporary with the Assyriammerchants could hardly have written in 
'cuneiform Hittite' if the script was notiintroduced into the country 
until after that time. 	Thus the following question arises. 	In what 
script did the Hittites of the time of Anittas write if in fact they did 
write ? 	Gurney continues by saying that such elaborate inscriptions as 
15. "The Hittites", Enclyclopaedia Britannica, The University of Chicago, 
Vol.11,(1947),p.603. 
16. Gurney,O.R ; The Hittites, (2nd ed, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 
Penguin Books Ltd., 1954), p.19-20 where he gives his opinion 
regarding the Anittas text. 
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that which is ostensibly of the time of Anittas do not come into being 
overnight, and not a single example of an Anatolian royal inscription 
of this period has yet come to light. 	The view that a whole literature 
inscribed on some perishable material such as wood, possibly in Hittite 
hieroglyphics, has been lost to us is unsubstantiated in view of the 
very brief and formal nature of the earliest extant hieroglyphic inscriptions. 
Gurney therefore concludes that the deeds of Anittas became legendary. 
If this view is accepted one cannot accept as historical the activities 
of Anittas and his father as recounted in the Anittas text. The importance 
of establishing whether the text is authentic or not does,not - need stressing. 
Hardy considers that the Anittas text is most likely a chronicle 
compiled from several sources and may not have been written in its present 
form by Anittas. 	The first paragraph begins in the third person and its 
story is continued into the second paragraph. 	There then follows a section 
in the first person which is taken from an inscribed monument which Anittas 
claims to have erected in the gateway of the city of Nesas. (This must have 
been one of the sources for the tablet). 17 	The different use of person 
indicates the composite nature of the text. 
Assuming that Hittite hieroglyphic or some other form of writing was 
available at the time of Anittas it is possible that later Hittite scribes 
pieced together into a whole the scattered information recorded at the 
time of Anittas. 	The fact that no uniformity was given to the text in 
the use of the first and third person perhaps indicates their accurate 
preservation of the information as it survived to them. 	The historical 
honesty of the Hittites is sufficiently attested to by many of the passages 
contained in such documents as the Annals of Mursilis II and the Apology of 
Hattusilis III. 	Why the text should mention that Anittas erected a 
monument in the gateway of Nesas is not understandable if in fact he did 
not since the Hittites were not vainglorious boasters of feats; not performed. 
Their Royal Annals even 
17. Hardy,R.; "The Old Hittite Kingdom",A.J.S.L,LVIII (1941),p.182 footnote 18. 
Hardy's translated lines from the Anittas text have been my source 
for the activities of that king. 
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mention defeats! 	If the later Hittites took the trouble to preserve 
a record of his activities it is to be seen as at least partial proof 
of their authenticity. 
Goetze maintains that there was no break in tradition or culture 
between the time of Anittas and the dynasty of Labarnas and he implies 
the catemporaneity of the account of the activities of Anittas with 
the reign of the latter. 18 This particular scholar has more to say 
regarding the Anittas Text and Bittel and Otten agree with him that the 
text is based on a trustworthy old source and that the events narrated 
therein actually took place in substantially the way they are related. 
However, Landsberger still maintains that the text is apocryphal. 19 
His finding --,rests on two suppositions. 	Firstly, that Anittas was a 
Hattian and secondly, that before the Mari age the Anatolian languages 
were not written at all, or at least not in cuneiform. 	Goetze cannot 
bring himself to agree with either of these two suppositions. 	As to 
the first contention Lamdsberger recognises at the time of the Cappadocian 
tablets only Hattians and Luwians (who are said to be non-Indo-Europeans) 
By taking this stand Landsberger is compelled to remove all those Indo-
European lexical elements in the Cappadocian tablets which, according 
to the majority ofscholars, are common to the Hittite language. I am 
quite convinced that future Hittite kings would not claim even the vaguest 
connexion with Anittas if he were a Hattian. 	For obvious reasons it is 
extremely unlikely that a superior ruling caste would claim any indentification 
with any portion of the inferior subject population. 	One could argue 
that for reasons of state solidarity the Hittites were anxious to flatter 
the Hattians by such an indentification. 	But since there is nowhere any 
18. Goetze,A ; 	reView,offKiBitte1si"Die_Kleinfunde=der:- Grabunge4 
A.J.A, XLII,(1938),p.185. 
19. Goetze,A ; "The Cultures of Early Anatolia", from Proceedings of the  
American Philosophical Society, vol.97,No.2 (Apri1,1953),p.215 
footnote 6 which contains his refutation of Landsberger's suppositions. 
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indication to this effect it is hardly a worthwhile proposition. 
The alleged illiteracy of the Anatolians, Landsberger's second point, 
is based on the argument of silence which is not evidence of a really 
admissible -nature. 	Goetze “ates that he would not be surprised if 
Hittite tablets were discovered in Anittas or pre—Anittas levels. 
Finally, and most important of all, Goetze remarks that "the Hittite 
script, as is now well known dates back to the period of Ur III at the 
latest." 	This last statement gives an answer to Gurney's theory. 20 
All being considered I am inclined to believe in the historical 
worth of the Anittas text and I am also disposed to believe that Anittas 
had the means to record the expansionist drive of himself and his father 
in Anatolia. 
It is not easy to give causes which adequately explain the rise t'8 
power of the Hittites in Asia Minor which had its historical beginning 
in the activities of Pitkhanas and Anittas. 	Hittite scholars are notorious 
for the lack of attention which they give to this fundamental problem. 
The usual section of a book or article on early Hittite history simply 
records how the Hittites expanded but neglects to make an attempt to 
explain why they expanded. 	While no evidence of.a direct nature is 
forthcoming to answer this question there are indications implicit in 
our knowledge of early Anatolia which justify a tentative attempt to repair 
this omission. 
It has already been shown that the coming of the Hittites coincided 
with destruction at certain sites. 21 	The Hittites were not welcome 	in 
Anatolia and they had to fight to gain admission. 	Hittite racial difference 
may have intensified the opposition of the non—Indd—European inhabitants. 
If the Hittites defeated one member of the barrier of opposition it is 
unlikely that they-lwould have given the opportunity for a repeat performance. 
20. Supra. p.28 
21. Supra.p.23 
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The inhabitants will either be put to the sword or enslaved. 	The former 
fate is more likely when an incoming tribe, struggling for a foothold in 
a hostile land, cannot afford to be generously disposed towards the conquered. 
Such must have been the fate of the opposition until the Hittites established 
themselves in settled life, secure within the confines of a fortified city 
such as Kussara must have been. 
The Hittites may have had no ambition beyond the attainment of this 
condition. 	But it is not likely that they were long permitted to enjoy 
such a condition. 	According to a text, admittedly of uncertain historical 
value, Naram—Sin (a successor of Sargon of Agade) who reigned from about 
2159-2123 B.C. 22 fought successfully against a coalition of seventeen kings 
which included a king of Hatti named Pamba. 	It is safe to conclude that 
this event took place before the time of Pitkhanas and Anittas. 	The 
important point is that there was some form of political organisation in 
Asia Minor when the Hittites arrived. 	Indeed we know that Anittas struggled 
for power against the ruler of Burushadum who called himself 'great prince'. 
Thus the sovereign of that city probably exercised hegemony over the other 
princes. 23 	The Cappadocian tablets tell us of local princes and their 
palaces and it is evident that the country was divided into at least ten 
small principalities. 	No doubt it was these that were in some way con- 
trolled by the 'great prince' of Burushadum. 
If such a political coalition was in - existence in Anatolia when the 
Hittites arrived it is unlikely that the first military successes of the 
latter passed unnoticed. In fact the Hittites would be regarded as a 
threat to the political status quo of Anatolia. 	Therefore eVen if they 
§ained a sedentary form of existence because of their military prowess 
it would not be long before it was challenged. 	The Hittites were perhaps 
forced to break the military—political combination in Asia Minor if they 
were to remain intact in their newly won position. 	It is not possible 
22. Van der Meer. op.cit. Table 2. 
23. Hardy,R.S.; Op.cit.p.180. 
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to definitively state who it was that began hostilities, but the Anittas 
text attests to warfare and gives the impression of the Hittites making 
a lone stand against various cities in Anatolia. 	It is more reasonable 
to assume that the many attacked the one and thus prompted Anittas to 
move against the individual cities of Salatiwara, Zalpa and Hattusas. The 
military activities of Pitkhanas and Anittas are a testimony to their 
awareness of the danger of their situation. 
Having conquered a member of the Burushadum coalition the next step 
would have been to seduce or force that member over to the Hittitesside 
in the hope of enlisting the former member's aid against the other members 
of the coalition. 	That this may well have happened is proved by the 
section in the Anittas text which deals with the policy of the Hittite king 
towards the ruler of Burushadum. 	This process appears to have continued 
for some time. 	But at the end of the reign of Anittas the Hittites con- 
trolled the centre of the Anatolian plateau at least. 	The geography of 
Anatolia must have greatly assisted the Hittites in their policy of divide 
and conquer and in some ways the process must have beenF,similar to the Roman 
conquest of Italy. 
It is not reasonable to say that the Hittites did not have any ambition 
to control Anatolia, but in the light of the available evidence it is 
possible to say that if any desire in that direction did exist it was heightened 
and forced into application by the very nature of the situation which the 
Hittites found in Anatolia. 	While it would be naive to claim that the 
Hittites gained Anatolia by accident, circumstances not of their making 
partially compelled them to take the course of action described above. 
Pitkhanas came to power in Kussara which appears to have been the 
main city of the Anatolian principality which the Hittites had carved out 
for themselves. 	Pitkhanas most likely challenged the authority of the 
:great 	of_Burushadum. when jle_mo.ve.d. out of his own territory to 
attack the city of Nesas which was the seat of another principality. 
Although none.of the inhabitants were harmed Pitkhanas placed the ruler 
of the city in captivity. 	The idea of this may have been to leave the 
city leaderless. 	Perhaps Pitkhanas had gaineda hostage in return for 
whose safety the inhabitants of Nesas were to fight alongside the troops 
of Kussara. 	Anyway we know that when Anittas succeeded his father he 
held Nesas as well as Kussara. 	Thus Pitkhanas may have decided to rule 
in place of the ruler he had deposed. 	The Hittites appear to have realized 
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at this early stage that annexation was the surest way of eliminating 
danger. 
At another time Pitkhanas inducted Anittas into the office of rabi 
simmilti. 	This title has been translated as meaning "chief of the 
citadel". 24 	If this translation is correct one may speculate that members 
of the ruling family were entrusted with military responsibility. 	This 
would give an indication as to whether one so entrusted would make a 
suitable •king. 
When Anittas began to rule he modestly claimed the title 'prince' 
or 'king'. 	But during his reign his kingdom increased and he then felt 
justified in calling himself 'great prince' or 'great king'. 25 	In fact 
the chronicle of his reign shows that his early years were occupied in 
establishing his rule over the surrounding kings. 	Thus it is unlikely 
that he immediately claimed the title 'great king'. 
After his accession Anittas turned firstto the lands east of his 
city. 	According to his own claim he conquered in one year all the lands 
in which the sun rose. 	He next moved in another direction and fought 
with Ullammas and Hattusas, the last named being the chief city of the 
Hattians. 	This city seems already to have been involved militarily with 
Anittas who declared as follows: "The king of Hatti came back" 26 We 
may guess that the engagement ended successfully for Anittas. 	He then 
turned against the city of Harkiunas which fell before him in the 'warm 
time'. 	This probably refers to the early afternoon. 	Hardy thinks it 
unlikely that the Nam time' refers to summer. 	In Anatolia this season 
was the only one in which to campaign since during any other time snow 
and muddy roads made military activities impossible. 	Thus the 
mention of summer would be superfluous. 	Hardy contends that in this part 
24. Ibid.p.180, footnote 12. 
25. Delaporte,L.; Les Hittites,(Paris,L'Evolution de l'humanite,1936) 
p.58 thinks that Anittas assumed :thetitle after defeating the city 
of Zalpas. Contenau,G.; .L.ra civilization des hittites et des hurrites  
du Mitanni, (2nd ed, Paris, Payot, 1948,) p.55 comes to the same 
conclusion. 
26. Hardy,R.S.; Op.cit.p.182. 
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of the text an attempt seems to have been made to distinguish between 
cities taken in the daytime and those taken at night. 	The following 
words in the Anittas text add weight to this assumption: " 	 and 
the city 	mas, which succumbed in a night attack 	 ”27 	In other 
words these early Hittite military forays did not lack the element of 
surprise or variety from the point of view of the time when they were 
launched. 	This will be seen to be a consistent factor in Hittite 
military enterprises. 
The next move5by Anittas are not clear but he appears to have given 
certain cities into the safe keeping of the storm-god of Nesas. 	It is 
likely that at this time he set up in the gateway of Nesas an inscription 
testifying to his military activities and placing a curse upon anyone who 
should mutilate his record. 	The Hittite consciousness of power and 
superiority has had its first known manifestation. 
Then Anittas warred with the city of Zalpas but we do not know the 
outcome. 	Trouble then began anew with the city of Hattusas. No doubt 
the expansionist tendencies of Anittas were a threat to the ruler of the 
Hatti. 	Although the two kings had come to blows at least once before 
the struggle between Anittasand Piustis, king of Hatti, cannot have been 
decisive. 	In this renewed action Piustis took the initiative and 
marched against Anittas but the former and his allies were defeated. But 
before Anittas could follow up this vijtory and attack the city of Hattusas 
he had first to eliminate Zalpas which remained a disturbing element. 
As a result all the countries between Zalpas and the sea were first subjugated.21 
27. Ibid.p.182, footnote 17. 
28.Ibid.p.183. Hardy in footnote 19 of the same page poses the following 
question. Is this sea the Mediterranean or one of the large salt lakes of 
Anatolia ? 	He thinks that the kingdom of Anittas was more likely con- 
fined to central Anatolia. 	Therefore the Mediterranean is excluded, 
especially if we look for Zalpas somewhere near Hattusas and Kussara. 
The fact that Zalpas had to be disposed of before Hattusas could be dealt 
with indicates the proximity of Hattusas to Zalpas. 	Therefore the modern 
lake of Tuz Golu is probably the sea referred to in the Anittas text. 
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The conflict with Zalpas enabled Anittas to avenge an act of an 
earlier king of Zalpas, Uhnas, who had attacked Nesas and Parried its 
gods Siusmis back with him to -Nesas. 	The Hittites had apparently 
suffered some reverses since their annexation of Nesas by Pitkhanas. 
Anittas now took the city of Zalpas, retrieved the god, and took it, t . 	- gether with king Huzziyas of Zalpas, to Nesas. 	Again we have the 
Hittites acting firmly in the hope of eliminating troublesome cities, 
and again we note that the Hittites did not kill the captured king. 
	
Anittas had opened the path to Hattusas. 	He proceeded against the 
stronghold and laid siege to it. 	When hunger had weakened the inhabi- 
tants he stormed the city by night and destroyed it. 	He then placed a 
curse of death upon any king who in future times should rebuild it. 
This may notl,refer to Hittite kings but rather it may refer to any king 
who rebuilds the city with hostile intent towards the Hittites. 	Gurney 
makes the following remark in connection with this event. 	 "it has been 
argued that the episode of Hattusas and the peculiar animosity shown by 
() Anittas against that city proves him to belong to a tradition foreign to 
the kings who later made Hattusas their capital." 	Gurney is here referring 
to Hittite kings from the time of Hattusilis I onwards. 	He goes on to 
say that the Anittas story " would then have been preserved only as a saga 
with which the Hittites claimed a spiritual connexion." 29 But would the 
Hittite Kings claim a 'spiritual connexion' with one who belonged to a 
different tradition ? 	I do not think that the sacking of Hattusas means 
that Anittas belonged to a tradition which was 'foreign to the kings who 
later made Hattusas their capital'. 	On Gurney's own. admission the connexion 
was forthcoming despite the action of Anittas. 	I believe that there is 
very good reason for this connexion. 	Hattusas was not a Hittite centre 
• 	-  at the time of Anittas. 	According to Gurney it was "a -•Hattian,Pity' 30. 
29. Gurney,O.R.; "The Hittites,  (2nd  ed,Harmondsworth,Middlesex, Penguin 
Books Ltd.1954) p.21 
30. Ibid. p.17-19 
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We may conclude that Pidstis was a Hattian king. 	That Pidstis gave 
Anittas much trouble has already been sufficiently demonstrated. The 
trouble he gave was an indication not so much perhaps of Hattian strength 	 
but rather of the strength of the geographic position of the city of 
Hattusas. 	It is small cause for surprise that Hattusilis I later 
transferred the Hittite capital to that great stronghold. 	The later 
Hittite kings would be proud to have this connexion with Anittas who 
had rendered the double service of subjugating the Hatti folk and thils 
making the city of Hattusas available as the Hittite seat of government. 
Salatiwaras, undaunted by the fate of the other cities which had 
fallen to Anittas, became so hostile that Anittas was obliged to proceed 
against it. 	He defeated the army of Salatiwaras and carried it away 
to Nesas. 	This must have had as its object the strengthening of the 
Hittite army by augmenting it with the conquered soldiery of Salatiwaras. 
Yet another consistent imperial practice has emerged very early in Hittite 
history. 	But this attiontdid not quell the hostility of Salatiwaras. 
Within a year the ruler of Salatiwaras rebelled. 	Although we do not 
know the actual outcome of the engagement Anittas appears to have been 
the successful party since either booty or tribute 31 consi"Sting of chariots, 
31. •Hardy,R.S.; op.cit. p.184 
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horses, 32 and a quantity of silver seems to have gone to Anittas. 
If this was tribute I believe that we have in the Salatiwaras 
episode the real beginnings of the Hittite Empire.. There is an 
indication that the ruler of Salatiwaras may have been a Hittite 
vassal. 	The fate of the soldiery of Salatiwaras after the first 
known conflict with the Hittites points in the direction that the 
defeated Salatiwaras was obliged to provide troops to the Hittites. 
Secondly, it would be difficult for a new ruler or even the same ruler 
of Salatiwares to become strong enqugh;kwithin a year (the army being 
absent) to engage in open conflict with the Hittites if the latter had 
completely subdued the area. 
32. I believe that these horses should more properly be seen as asses. 
The chapter devoted to Hattusilis I deals with the Hittite acquisition 
of the horse. 	See Gurney,O.R. The Hittites,(2nd ed, Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd. 1954) p.104-105 for a discussion of 
the introduction of the horse to the Near East. 	On p.104 Gurney 
claims that the Sumerian chariots were most likely drawn by wild 
asses. 	But he also considers that "the Assyrian merchants of 
Cappadocia seem to have used horses as draught—animals." But Lloyd, 
op.cit.p.117 disagrees. 	He maintains that the Assyrians used donkeys 
as a means of transport. See Hardy,op.cit.p.184, footnote 21, for 
a discussion of horses as part of the booty or tribute received by 
Anittas. He admits that one text does not preserve information that 
horses were received by the Hittites. 	It is interesting to note 
that Gurney does not use the appearance of the word horses in the 
Anittas text to refute the authenticity of that text. 	If he considered 
that the text indicated the use of horses and chariots at the time of 
Anittas he coilld well use it as evidence in his above mentioned refutation 
since he considers the introduction of the horse to Anatolia, at least 
as an instrument of war, to come after the time of Anittas. Therefore 
it is not likely that Anittas captured horses. 	We must see instead 
chariots (also mentioned as booty or tribute) drawn by asses. 	Mellaart,J. 
"The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean",AJA,vol.62, 
(1958( p.13 and footnote 62 has a different opinion. 	He does not think 
that the Hittites introduced the horse and the chariot. He considers 
that 'horses on reliefs and horseheads on Kultepe pottery antedate the 
4.11n11^11 I 
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In this second conflict the rebellious ruler of Salatiwaras seized the 
river Hulas which he held as a barrier against Anittas. 	But Anittas and 
his army encircled and burned the villages of the rebellious ruler. 	That 
the ruler of Salatiwaras should still be powerful enough to possess 
villages is informative. 	The Hittites seem to be granting some measure 
of autonomy to the conquered in return for soldiers and possibly tiibute. 
If the system of vassaldom commenced in the time of Anittas we may 
conclude that even at this early period the Hittites had definite desires, 
not only to defeat those who threatened their existence, but also to 
bring the conquered into an imperial system. 
We now come to Burushadum which next received attention from Anittas. 
The ruler of Burushadum is designated not as king, let alone as 'great 
prince', but as the 'man of Burushadum 1 . 33 	There seems to be implicit 
in this lesser title the likelihood that some previous action on the part 
of Anittas had diminished the power of the ruler of Burushadum. 	I have 
already mentioned that Burushadum was more than likely the head of a coalition 
which Pitkhanas and Anittas were forced to break. 	The fact that Burushadun 
was not finally dealt with until last testifies to its powerful position. 
Anittas appears to have disposed of the satellites before attempting to 
eliminate finally the real centre of power which resided at Burushadum. 
33. Hardy,R.S.; op.cit.p.184, footnote 22 claims that the meaning of the 
designation, 'man of Burushadum;,in the Hittite records and especially 
here in the Anittas text, can only be that of a subject ruler. The 
phrase is used elsewhere to designate a ruler of Salatiwaras known 
to have been placed in subjection, but who is said to have rebelled. 
Hardy considers that such a designation cannot be considered in any 
other way. 	Thus in the case of Burushadum the same may be said. 
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Anittas was successful against Burushadum and the ruler of that 
city presented him with an iron throne and sceptre. 	Gurney thinks 
that such a statement "certainly looks like an anachronism". 34 Bittel 
believes that at this time the existence of an object such as an iron 
throne is archaeologically out of the question. 	Hardy stands by the 
authenticity and contemporaneity of the document until the non—existence 
of iron at this time has been definitely proved. 35 Lloyd, when writing 
about Assyrian merchants in Anatolia trading with the inhabitants of that 
country, states that the rate of gold to silver was normally 8:1, and an 
even more precious metal, which is thought probably to have been iron, 
had five times the value of gold and forty times that of silver. 36 	Iron 
at this stage may have been extremely rare and available only to kings 
for limited purposes such as the making of a throne and sceptre. I have 
already given my views regarding the Anittas text. 
After the defeat of Burushadum Anittas went to Nesas. HeL:tOok with 
him the 'man of Burushadum',apparently as a guest. 	During the latter's 
sojourn in Nesas he accompanied Anittas to a holy place and occupied the 
position of honour on the right of Anittas. 	It is reasonable to condlude 
that Burushadum and the area over which it had formerly exercised sovereignty 
had became in somemeasure subject to Anittas. 	But the treatment given 
to the defeated ruler of Burushadum suggests that his status was of a 
special kind. 	If Anittas were anticipating further opposition in Anatolia, 
as he may well have been, these friendly overtures to the ruler of Burushadum 
may have had as their object the gaining of the support of an apparently 
powerful city. 	If Anittas gained such a powerful ally Hittite ambition, 
following a series of military successes, would inevitably increase and 
a wider scope of activities would be made possible. 	We also have here 
34. Gurney,O.R.; The Hittites,(2nded,Harmondsworth,Middlesex,Penguin Books 
Ltd. 1954) p.20. 
35. Hardy,R.S.; op.cit.p.184,footnote 23. 
36. Lloyd.op.cit.p.118. 
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the first instance, of which we know, of: that consistent Hittite and 
imperial characteristic whereby diplomatic overtures were considered as 
being more likely to be effective in some instances than the continual 
use of force. 	Such a line of approach is in keeping with a minority 
ruling caste which cannot afford the continual expenditure of man—power. 
Lloyd remarks that "the indigenous people themselves, who were 
thereafter subjected or absorbed by the newcomers, seem previously to 
have been organised into a federation of small city states, one •of 
which was known to them as the 'Land of the City of Hatti'(Hattusas)". 37 
It would thus appear that the Hittite organisation was-superior,in some 
vital respects at least, to that of the people whom they conquered. Perhaps 
the Hittites themselves were a federation of clans which moved out of 
the Balkan area and defeated an inferior but in many ways similar organi-
sation to their own. 	If the Hittites did not arrive in Anatolia until 
the twentieth century B.C. it would appear that they had learnt to become 
politically organised elsewhere than in Anatolia. 	Because the geography 
of central Anatolia is in many ways similar to that of the Balkans the 
Hittites continued in usage a federal form of government. 
• • 
Anittas for the time being held warlike pursuits in abeyance and became' 
engaged in building activities. 	Nesas was enlarged. 	The sanctuaries 
of one of the storm—gods of heaven, other gods, and of the storm—god 
whom Anittas regarded as his patron deity, were built. 38 The fact ' 
that his whole reign did not have to be spent in fighting is a measure 
of his success. 	The Hittites had so established themselves that the 
37. Ibid.p.30 
38. Hardy,R.S.;op.cit.p.183.It is interesting to note the increasing 
importance attached to Nesas. 	Could it have been a Hittite 
religious centre such as Nerik was later to be for the Hittites ? 
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leisure time was available for such peaceful enterprises. 
It is not likely that the kingdom created by Anittas was very large. 
The conquests achieved by himself and his father, where they can be 
checked, do not seem to have penetrated beyond the central plateau. Nesas 
was the first place attacked. 	Thus it was most likely in the near vicinty 
of Kussara. 	It has already been noted that before subduing Hattusas 
Anittas had first to deal with Zalpas. 	One gains the impression of a 
logical commonsense expansion. 	There appears to have been a gradual 
spreading outwards from the pivot of the home area. 39 The policy was 
to secure the most immediate territory rather than to embark on distant 
enterprises. 	There is something preconceived in the course of action 
that Anittas took. 	The threat which the coalition headed by Burushadum 
offered to the Hittites may well have demanded a preconceived line of 
action on the part of Anittas. 	It was not,Hittite policy to merely 
attack and subdue temporarily. The attempt to consolidate what had been 
gained is witnessed by the holding in captivity of enemy rulers, the use 
of captured soldiers and the attitude towards the ruler of Burushadum. 
The history of the reigns of Pitkhanas and Anittas is that of the 
rulers of Anatolian principalities at the time of the Assyrian merchant 
colonies. 	•nittas emerges from the military scuffles of this period as 
the one man capable of imposing his rule over the neighbouring cities. 
By employing the policy of divide and conquer which led finally to the 
isolation of Burushadum Anittas commenced the movement which had its 
culmination in the H•ttiteAdmination of Asia Minor and areas beyond the 
confines of that region. 
39. See Mellaart,J.; "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and 
the Aegean",AJA,vol.62,(1958),p.14, where he discusses the positions 
of some of the cities which Anittas conquered. 	He considers that 
Kussara may have been at Alishar. 	See Mellaart Plate 1. 
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Whether the Anittas text is of the time of Anittas or a later 
redaction of it, its continued existence among the state documents 
in the Boghazkeui archives is a sufficient testimony of his importance. 
Rome had a Romulus and Remus but it cannot be doubted that Anittas 
has a greater historicity and hence a greater importance than the 
legendary founders of Rome. 40 
THE ASSYRIAN MERCHANTS IN ASIA MINOR 
It remains to complete this section with an analysis of the possible 
relations between the Assyrian merchants in Asia Minor and the Hittites. 
The bulk of the tablets on which the Assyrian merchants recorded their 
day to day business, have been found at a number of sites, but the majority 
come from Kultepe, the ancient Kanesh, near Kayseri. 	These of course 
are the Cappadocian tablets. 
"The Assyrians of Kanesh seem freely to have intermarried with the 
Anatolians among whom they lived and generally to have been on the most 
friendly terms with them."41 	Gurney remarks that "there is nothing to 
suggest that the attitude of the indigenous rulers to the Assyrians was 
anything but friendly. 	Indeed, we may well suppose that the foreign 
merchants were welcome to the native princes, to whom they brought the 
benefits of the higher civilisation of the Mesopotamian valley." 42 
While this may have:ipeen the attitude of the natives of Anatolia I do 
not believe that the same can be said of the Hittites. 
The settlement of Kanesh had in the end been destroyed by fire. 
Tahsin and Nimet Ozguc unearthed five separate building levels which 
are to be dated between approximately 2000 and 1700 B.C. Level IA represented 
40. Ibid.p.33 Mellaart has no doubt as to the military achievement of 
Pitkhanas and Anittas. 
41. Lloyd op.cit.p.119. 
42. Gurney,O.R.; The Hittites,(2 nded,Harmondsworth,Middlesex,Penguin 
Books Ltd. 1954) p.20-21. 
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a period before the arrival of the Assyrian traders and level IV sees 
the rebuilding of the settlement after their departure. 	In the three 
middle levels (1B-III) were the houses of the colonists and in each case 
there were signs that the settlement had been destroyed by fire. 	Level 
II especially had obviously ended in a holocaust of no meagre proportions. 
The fire had spread so rapidly that the inhabitants had no time to remove 43 their belongings. 
I believe that it is possible that the Hittites were responsible for 
the disappearance of the Assyrian merchants from the Anatolian plateau. 
That is, it is possible that the Hittites destroyed the dwellings in levels 
IB-III. 	From the above it would appear that the natives of Anatolia were 
not likely to have wreaked such havoc. 	Who, other than the Hittites could 
have been responsible for this catastrophe ? We know that Anittas, a 
contemporary of the Assyrian traders, spent the greater part of his reign 
waging war in Anatolia. 	But if it were the Hittites who destroyed the 
Assyrian trade colony at Kanesh what were the factors which led them to 
take these drastic measures ? 
The basic essential for successful trading is peace. 	The activities 
of Anittas could well have been disrupting the pursuits of the merchants. 
We know that there was an Assyrian karum(trading factory) at Burushadum. 44 
Apartirom Kanesh Burushadum is the most frequently mentioned karum in the 
Cappado'clan tablets. 	This may be seen as proof of its importance. 
Burushadum was the major Anatolian city with which Anittas warred successfully. 
Thus it may well have been that the Assyrians interfered in the local 
politics of Anatolia in the attempt to create conditions most favourable 
for trade. 	They may even have given aid to Burushadum against Anittas. 
43. Lloyd. op.cit. p.48. 	For a different opinion see Mellaart,J. op.cit. 
p.33 who does,however, imply that the Hittites were at least indirectly 
responsible for the catastrophe that overtook the Assyrian merchants. 
44. Lloyd.op.cit.p.116. 
Ibid. p.119. 
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Their interference may have been so extensive as to force Anittas to 
drive them out of Anatolia completely. 	Levels IB and II at Kanesh 
indicate that the existence of the Assyrians had been precarious for 
some time. 	One gains the impression that the Assyrians received 
warnings that interference in political or military concerns would not 
be tolerated. 	Apparently they did not heed the warnings. 
Lloyd considers that direct dealings between the Assyrian merchants 
and the native Anatolian princes were infrequent. 	"They are in fact 
confined to rare cases of a prince intervening to protect one of his 
subjects, for example when he is in danger of beingrreduced to servitude 
on account of his debts." 45 	Such a state of affairs offers excellent 
potential for upheaval. 	Turmoil does not seem to have resulted with the 
indigenous peoples of Asia Minor. 	But with the Hittites it may well have 
been different. 	One can imagine that disputes were likely to arise between 
Hittites and Assyrians, especially if the latter attempted to impede the 
course of the former. 46 	The English Concession trading areas, and the 
excellent potential for dispute, in India and China offers an interesting 
analogy which has some similarity with the position in Anatolia. 	The 
Assyrian traders appear to have enjoyed a type of extra—territoriality. 
The very nature of the situation in Anatolia in relationship to the Hittites 
made it imperative that such interference, as may have been forthcoming 
on the part of the Assyrians, had to be eliminated. 
45. Ibid. p.119 
46. If the Assyrians were trading in Anatolia before the arrival of the 
Hittites they would have become reliant an the natives for the 
establishment of trade relations. 	Hence they may well have supported 
them in opposition to the Hittites. 
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If the foregoing is correct we have here the first instance of 
direct Hittite contact with a people from Mesopotamia. 	Although 
the Hittites would not tolerate them as political nuisances on the 
plateau the attraction of wealth from the Tigris and Euphrates valleys 
and the contact with a superior culture must to some extent have 
orientated their thoughts in a south—easterly direction. 	The expansionist 
drives of Hattusilis I and Mursilis I are dufficient to attest to this. 
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LABARNAS 
1 Labarnas, the son of Pu-Sarrumas, is the next Hittite king of the 
Old Kingdom, of whom we have any positive knowledge. 	His importance 
in connection with any analysis of the Hittites is very considerable. 
In the political testament of Hattusilis I we read the following 
lines: "My grandfather had proclaimed his son Labarnas (as heir to the 
throne) in Sanahuitta,(but afterwards) his servants and the leading 
citizens spurned(?) his words and set Papadi4maii 2on the throne. Now 
how many years have elapsed and [how many of them) have escaped their 
fate ? The houses of the leading citizens, where are they ? Have they 
not perished ?" 3 
It is not altogether clear whether the rebellion occurred because 
Labarnas was made heir to the throne of Sanahuitta or because Labarnas 
was proclaimed heir to the Hittite throne while his father Pu-Sarrumas 
was in Sanahuitta. Hardy considers that the father of Labarnas sent 
. him to govern the disaffected city of Sanahiatta. But the chief men of 
that city formed a conspiracy, set Papadilmah on the throne and drove out 
Labarnas. 	When the rebellion was put down the houses of the conspirators 4 were destroyed. 
1. Gurney,O.R.; The Hittites,(2nd ed, Harmondsworth, Middlesex,Penguin 
Books Ltd, 1954)p.216. See also Cavaignac,E., Les Hittites, (Paris, 
L'Orient ancien illustrg,Maisonneuve,1950),p.18. 
2. Hrozny,B.; Ancient History of Western Asia, India and Crete,  (New York, 
Philosophical Library Inc.,1953,)p.125. Translated by Jindrich Prochazka. 
Hrozny states that after Pu-Sarrumas died his son Papadilmah seized the 
throne illegally, but was soon replaced by the legitimate successor who 
was his brother Labarnas. 	Hrozny gives no evidence for this claim. 
3. Gurney, op.cit.p.172. 
4. Hardy,R.S.; "The Old Hittite Kingdom", AJSL;voi.LVIII,(1941) p.186. 
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Perhaps the problem may be solved in this way. 	Labarnas was 
being groomed for the Hittite kingship by being entrusted with Sanahuitta. 
Such was usual Hittite practice. 	Pu-Sarrumas visited Sanahuitta and 
was satisfied with the way his son had handled the affairs of that city. 
Thus Pu-Sarrumas, while in Sanahuitta, formally designated Labarnas as 
heir to the Hittite throne. 	The context does not make it seem likely 
that a son of the Hittite king whom we know to have later become the 
Hittite king would have been merely the heir to the throne in Sanahuitta. 
The statement, "[but afterwards] his servants and the leading citizens 
spurned(?) his words and set Papadilmah on the throne," suggest that the 
rebellion most likely occurred when Pu-Sarrumas died and Labarnas attempted 
to fulfil his father's word and become king. 	It is hardly likely that 
the leading citizens and servants of Pu-Sarramas would have been in the 
disaffected city of Sanahuitta which it had been the lot of Labarnas to 
pacify. 	The leading Hittite servants and citizens would have been in 
the Hittite capital of Kussara. 	But we do know that Labarnas finally 
became the Hittite king, but apparently not without a struggle. 	Since 
the political testament of Hattusilis I was concerned with the designation 
of his heir to the Hittite throne and the disobedience that he,Hattusilis, 
had experienced it follows that his reference to Labarnas dealt with the 
difficulty that king experienced in gaining the throne despite the edict 
of his father.Pu-Sarrumas. 
The refusal of the leading Hittite citizens or nobility to accept 
the king's proclamations as binding was the curse of the Old Hittite Kingdom. 
If we suppose that the kingship was an elective office in the original 
instance the reason for the trouble surrounding the accession of Labarnas 
is quite obvious. 	Pu-Sarramas had attempted to make the kingship an 
hereditary office. 	The leading citizens, jealous of their traditional 
privilege to elect the new king, did not accept this move to limit their 
power. But why should Pu-Sarrumas wish to confine the monarchy to his 
own family ? 	There are a number of reasons which can be given. 
48 
Because of the Hittite king's dependency on the nobility for his 
office he would be obliged to treat them as a privileged class. Two 
of the most obvious ways of treating them as such was to reserve the 
offices of state to them and to give them grants of land. The Hittite 
law code, to be discussed later, proves the feudal nature of the Hittite 
kingdom. 5 	Gurney says that "it is clear that the king's kinsmen, called 
the 'Great Family', enjoyed special privileges, which they constantly 
abused. 	The highest offices' of state were generally reserved for them."6 
What the Hittite kings granted to the nobility to satisfy their demands 
and thus ensure their continued support is now being used as a weapon 
against the king who in his turn attempts to limit the increasing power 
of the nobility resulting fromtthese gifts. 	But still the question 
remains: why should one family wish the kingship to be its prerogative ? 
Another fundamental question also deserves consideration at this stage. 
Did the nobility use their powerful status to threaten the position of 
the king because he first attempted to curtail their powers or did the 
nobility first attempt to eliminate the king or further limit his powers 
and hence force the king to limit their power ? 	I shall answer the first 
question first. 
5. Coulborn,R/(ed.), Feudalism in History, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton , 
University Press,1956,) p.5. 	It is stated that "in all feudal societies 
there has been a strong, almost irresistible tendency towards heredity 
of function. 	Even in Egypt between the Sixth and Twelfth dynasties, 
where the feudal character of the societYais more than doubtful, the 
position of the nomarch (chief officer of local government) becomes 
hereditary." 	One can well imagine that the Hittite nobility, along 
with the king, Would wish their positions to become hereditary. 	It is 
also claimed, Coulborn (ed).op.cit.p.7, that one of the conditions favourable 
to the rise of feudalism is "where military power has fallen into the 
hands of a relatively small part of the population." 	This was certainly 
the case with the Hittites who were a minority ruling caste. 
6. Gurney,O.R. op.cit.p.67. 
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The pleasures and relative security of settled court life as 
compared with the hazards of a quasi—nomadic existence plus the newly 
won power in Asia Minor may well have led to the desire on the part 
of a family, which had exercised the kingship, to make the attendant 
power and privileges their permanent possession. 	To achieve this 
desire would mean the solicitin6 of support from some of the leading 
Hittite families, who, in return for a privileged status, would be 
only too willing to lend their support. 
Such an attempt to monopolize the kingship could not have been 
viewed favourably by other leading families with a similar'ambition. 
Under such conditions, where you have families or houses aligned against 
each other, strife is inevitable. 	The same tendency for leading houses 
to monopolise the officesof state and to compete against each other for 
the privilege, is evident during the Roman Republic in respect to the 
consulship. 	Perhaps one of the Hittite families had possessed such 
ability that a number of kings had been elected from it. 	Power once 
tasted is hard to forego. 	It would only be necessary for a family over 
a period of time to hold the highest of offices successfully a number 
of times before tradition and custom would give such a monopoly a popular 
acceptance if not a strictly legal sanction. 	Again, the position in 
, Rome is well worthwhile keeping in mind. But with the Hittites l as with 
the Romans, the popular acceptance of monopoly of office was never •such 
as to eliminate rivalry and !faction since ether leading families could 
never bring themselves to accept the moncely. At the time of Labarnas 
there was apparently no such acceptance. 	But perhaps the requisite 
amount of time had not elapsed to enable tradition and custom to become 
powerful political factors. 
There is one more point incconnection with the above and this has 
a direct bearing on the second question which was posed. 	Now that the 
Hittites had begun to rule other peoples they could not afford political 
faction of an internecine nature. 	Subject peoples are historically 
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notorious for making an attempt to throw off the yoke if the ruling 
people are beset with internal political difficulties. If the Hittite 
kingship were to remain an elective office there would most likely 
be several candidates nominated for the office by the various leading 
families, who,for obvious reasons would be more than politely determined 
that their candidate would be successful. 	This is suggested by the 
support given to PapOilimah in opposition to Labarnas. 	The faction 
supporting PapadiImah was forced to use violence because Pu-Sarrumas 
attempted to make the kingship hereditary. 	But even if the principle 
of electing the king still remained operative violence would no doubt 
still be used. 	The riches and privileges of a conquering people would 
surely sharpen the political ambitions of the more powerful Hittite 
houses. 	What Pu-Sarrumas and his successors presumably try to do is 
to make the hereditary principle a traditionally accepted principle so 
that a measure of political certainty might be gained and the succession 
to the throne be orderly and free from violence. 	It is not unreasonable 
to assume that the Hittite king would attempt to minimize the likelihood 
of revolt on the part of his subjects. 	This would certainly be a reasonable 
justification of the desire of Pu-Sarrumas to keep the kingship within the 
family fold. 	It is hardly surprising that the leading Hittite citizens 
were not prepared to surrender their ambitions and accept the hereditary 
principle in the interests of the security of the state. 
4L 	In short, we may say that the Hittite nobility, enjoying the benefits 
of a conquering people and the riches and power resulting from the feudal 
system)challenged the power of the king. They possibly considered that 
their newly won power and the relative security of settled conditions made 
them less- needful of the king's abilities. At the same time, however, 
individual members of the nobility aspired towards kingship. 	But at the 
same time the reigning kingT:s ambitions for his family coincided with!:the 
interests of the Hittite state in relationship to the ruled. The hereditary 
principle in connexion with the kingship had only brief periods of accep- 
tance in the Hittite Old Kingdom. 	Indeed, the struggle between the 
Hittite king and his nobility Will be seen to be the tragedy of the Old 
51 
Kingdom, if not of the New Empire itself. 
Another important document of the time of the Old Kingdom, the 
Proclamation of Telipinus, gives information concerning Labarnas. 	It 
bears out more fully what has so far been stated in this section. 	This 
document gives a brief abcount of the reigns of the predecessors of Telipinus 
to •indicate that harmony in the Royal Family and the army leads to the 
prosperity of the state whereas the reverse leads to anarchy. 	The docu- 
ment will be treated at length when we come to Telipinus. 	The following 
is the relevant section of the Proclamation concerning Labarnas: 
(1) "Thus (speaks) king Telipinus, the great king. 
(2) Formerly Labarnas was the great king. (2) And then his sons,, his brothers, 
and his relatives by marriage, the members of his family, and his 
soldiers were united. 
.2.  
(5) And the land was small, but on whatever clibpaign he went, by (his) 
strength(?) he kept th hostile country in subjection. 
.3. 
(7) And he kept devastating countries, and he made the countries tremble(?); 
and he'..made them boundaries of the sea. (8) But when he returned from 
the campaign, one (of) his sons went to each (of) the countries — 
.4. 
To Hupisnas, Tuwanuwas, Nenassas, Landas, Zallaras,Parsuhantas,Lusnas. 
- They governed the countries; and the large cities were assigned (to them). 7a 
The extract quoted sheds considerable light on the political and 
imperial stage of development at the time of Labarnas. 	Section one indicates 
that Labarnas had established unity between his family, and the army. 	They 
' were at one with each other. 	Since the ruling house was also a conquering 
house it was imperative that it should have the support of the soldiery. 
7a. Sturtevant,E.H.F7 Bechtel,G.A.; A Hittite Chrestomathy,(Philadelphia,  
1935),p.183. , 
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The real importance of this opening section lies in the emphasis given 
to the family of Labarnas. 	One gains the impression of a group of people 
directly related to the king who in conjunction with the army wielded the 
basic Hittite power. 	There appears to be a quasi—regal exclusiveness 
operative II-ere. 	This is further borne out by sections 3(8) and 4. 	Here 
we see that the newly conquered countries were assigned to his sons to rule. 
The use of his sons as governors placed them in a position whereby they 
could give strength to the dynastic tradition which Labarnas was trying to 
found. 	But at the same time they had themeans to contest the authority 
of the king, in the form of armed support, should the occasion arise. If, 
as is likely, the Hittite kingdom was based in feudalism, the sons of Labarnas 
would not only have troops at their disposal in the areas they ruled. They 
wofild also retain people on the land they held and these people no doubt 
owed military service through them to the king. 	For the time being 
strong rulers were able to hold this danger in check, but such was not 
always the case. 
Perhaps we have here "the existence of a class of local magnates, 
exercising considerable de facto political authority... If the central 
government cannot retain the obedience of these men, their de facto power 
easily becomes power de jure and is inherited by their descendants." 7 
At the time of Labarnas the dangers manifest in this Situation were not 
realised. 
Thus Hittite Imperial life is at this juncture a family affair. 
The monopoly of power vested in a family or house is here directly evidenced. 
There was of course to come a time when the Hittite Empire assumed such 
proportions as to make it impossible for the Royal Family to supply all 
the rulers for the conquered areas. 
It is important to remember that the members of the Hittite ruling 
house would not comprise the whole of the nobility who owned land and retained 
people upon it. 	That other leading Hittites owned land sufficient to retain 
a significant body of men will be demonstrated later. 
7. Coulborn(ed) op.cit.p.7 See also p.100. 
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This extract implies that unity at home was essential before military 
enterprises could be undertaken. 	It was of course this unity on the 
home front which enabled the military operations to be successful. 	Even 
though the land was small before Labarnas embarked on a series of military 
expeditions favourable conditions at home made possible an increase in 
Hittite controlled territory. 	Sections 2 and 3 of the quoted extract indicate 
that Labarnas was in personal control of the army. 	The Hittites king 
was always commander in chief of theHittite army even though on occasions 
he delegated control of a section of the army to one of his generals. 
The treaty which Muwatallis made with Alaksandus of Wilusa is also 
informative in respect to Labarnas and his activities : 
I "Thus saith the Sun Muwallis 	the son of Mursilis.... 
2 In bygone times Labarnas,mvancestor, fought against the Arzawan lands 
and the land of Wilusa; he subdued them. Now after that Arzawa became 
hostile but never did the land of Wilusa secede from Hatti, but 
from afar they remained loyal to the kings of Hatti 	 
And when Tudhaliyas came into Arzawa, he came not into Wilusa because 
it was title to him 	 
3 And when my grandfather Suppiluliumas came and reconquered Arzawa, the 
king of Wilusa, Kukunnis, remained loyal, so he did not invade his 
territory. 
4 And again where,the King of Arzawa showed hostility towards Hatti... 
and my father (Mursilis) invaded Arzawa; but again the king of Wil6sa 
remained loyal and sent help. 118 
Thus Labarnas (about 1640-161,0 B.C.) was the first Hittite king of 
whom we know who conquered Arzawa and Wilusa. 	Even though Arzawa was soon 
lost to the Hittites and was never completely 'aubjected by them, Wilusa 
remained consistently loyal. 	Wilusa, lying immediately to the north of 
Arzawa,(see map p.1.) remained loyal even though Arzawa made repeated efforts 
to gain independence from the Hittites. 	How much this consistent loyalty 
on the part of Wilusa was due to the original policy of Labarnas in that 
area it is difficult to say. 
8. Garstang—Gurney.op.Cit.p.102. 
54 
Garstang and Gurney place Arzawa 9 in the fertile area of the Hermus 
valley, which later gave birth to the prosperity of the Lydian empire 
and witnessed the rise of Sardis. 	This new proposition, when compared 
with the theory of placing Arzawa in Lycia has much in its favour since 
the prosperity and fertility of Lydia reflect the former greatness and large 
population of Arzawa which held empire over several states in the western 
half of Asia Minor and successfully' resisted the efforts of the Hittites to 
reduce it to vasSalage for any length of time. 	The number of the prisoners 
taken by Mursilis and his generals during the tWo_ years of the Arzawa campaign 
amounted to over 100,000 then. 	The district of Lycia did not possess the 
natural advantages which led to the great prosperity of Lydia, not could it 
show any imperial expansion commensurate with that of Lydia. 
Despite the obivous power and resources of Arzawa and its persistent 
hostility towards the Hittites Wilusa not only remained loyal to the Hittites 
but lent them aid against Arzawa. 	In the treaty of Muwatallis with Alaksandus 
of Wilusa Muwatallis names Alaksandus as one of the four kings in the Arzawa 
lands. 10 	Garstang and Gurney contend that Muwatallis recognised Wilusa as an 
Arzawa land because of racial affinities that it had with the Arzawan populatiok 
Ibid. p.84 
10.Ibicr. p.94 
11.Ibid.p.101. Garstang and Gurney, p.104, equate Wilusa with the Troad and 
see it as the prototype of Ilios. 	Blegen,C.W.; C.A.H.(Cambridge,University 
Press,1961) Revised edition of Vols.I and II,p.10 considers that Troy VI 
ushered in a new era distinguished by a culture of its own. 	Hence there 
was most likely the arrival of fresh human stock at this stage. 	Blegen 
thinks "there is every reason to believe that they formed part of the 
movement that at the same time swept over the Greek mainland." The Indo—
European affinities of the peoples in this movement is widely held. In 
Mercer,S.A.B., The Tell El—Amarna Tablets,(Toronto,1939,) p.182,183 it is 
suggested that the language of letters 31,32 has marked Indo—European 
affinities. 	These two letters more than likely comprise the surviving 
correspondence between the king of Arzawa and the pharaoh of Egypt, 
Amenophis III. 
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By the time of Muwatallis it is not likely that Wilusa was a satellite 
of the kingdom of Arzawa. 	It was situated on the outer fringe of the 
Arzawan states and it was far enough from the centre of Arzawan power 
to express wishes and policies of its own. 	Its territory must have been 
large enough to supply an army capable of keeping the Arzawans friendly, 
or at least making them unwilling to launch any attack against the Wilusan 
rulers in order to "win back" Wilusa Into the Arzawan kingdom. 12 The 
phrase "win back" is instructive. 
It would appear that Wilusa once belonged to the Arzawan kingdom. 
"Relations between the chieftain of Wilusa and the Hittite kings dated 
in fact from the time long past when 'Tabarnaas' had just subdued the 
Arzawa land and annexed Wilusa, at that time an Arzawan province." 13 
The fact that Arzawa was hostile to Hittite kings from the time of Labarnas 
onwards and Wilusa was not, proves that Wilusa was lost to Arzawa. 
It is reasonable to conclude that Labarnas seduced Wilusa away from 
its allegiance to Arzawa. 	We have operative here the time-honoured imperial 
device of 'divide and conquer' so skilfully practised by the Romans amongst 
the tribal confederacies of the Italian peninsula. 	It seems that Hittite 
dependency on Wilusa, in the form of aid for campaigns against Arzawa, is 
to be traced back to the time of Labarnas. 
How Labarnas managed this seduction is not clear, but there is no 
trouble from that quarter until the last days of the Hittite empire. The 
terms of vassalage which Labarnas most likely offered Wilusa must have been 
12.Garstang-Gurney.op.cit.p.102. On p.83 the same scholars agree that 
there was a kingdom of Arzawa itself, and the smaller states which at one 
time owed loyalty to the king of Arzawa, and later become vassal states 
under treaty with the Hittite king were Mira with Kuwaliya, the Seha River 
land with Appawiya and Hapalla. 	Their omission of Wilusa is informative. 
13.Garstang,J.Arzawa and the Lugga Lands", Belleten,V61Thy(1941),p.40. 
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sufficiently attractive to render negative the undoubted overtures made 
by ArzaAm to Wilusa. 	To the best of my knowledge we have no direct 
information which indicates the policy of Labarnas towards Arzawa and Wilusa. 
It has already been stated that Wilusa should perhaps be equated with the 
Troad. 	Blegen gives 1900-1800 B.C. as the upper chronological limit of 
Troy VI and he has the lower limit within only a few years of 1300 B.C. 
If the equation of Wilusa with the Troad is correct it means that it is 
likely that the people of the VIth settlement were those who owed allegiance 
to the Hittites and gave military aid against Arzawa. 14 	Blegen states 
that "although the Sixth Settlement was thus contemporary with the early 
and the greater part of the late stage of the Hittite Empire in Central 
Anatolia, not a single object of any kind whatsoever that can definitely 
be called Hittite has ever been recognised in strata of Troy VI, nor have 
any certainly identified Trojan objects yet been recovered in the Anatolian 
Hittite layers. 	This negative evidence is not conclusive in precluding the 
possibility that relations were maintained between the two areas. 	A 
trade route to Cyprus was open, and there may well have been communications 
with Central Asia Minor by way of Cilicia". 15 	But perhaps one could well 
consider the possibility that the lack of Hittite objects in the strata of 
Troy VI is to be explained by the imperial policy of the Hittites to Wilitsa. 
In the interests of gaining the support of Wilusa against Arzawa the Hittites 
may have given the former a very privileged status which precluded Hittite 
occupation of the area. 	Do we have here the first of the Hittite protectOrate , 
such as Kizzuwadna was later to be ? 	Labarnas could well have claimed to 
have liberated Wilusa from Arzawa. 	In return for this liberation and the 
protection that the Hittites would give Wilusa it was expected that the king 
of Wilusa should give aid against the Arzawans. 
14. Blegen. op.cit.p.11 
15. Ibid.p.11-12. 
57 
But apart from this stipulation and the likely insistence that Wilusa 
surrender an independent foreign policy Wirusa was to enjoy an otherwise 
unimpaired autonomy which made it in the best interests of Wilusa to 
_ remain loyal to the Hittites. 	This would certainly be the case if member- 
ship of the Arzawan kingdom necessitated obligations of a more onerous 
kind. 	The fact that Helladic ware has been found at Troy VI does not 
prove that there was a Trojan foreign policy in relationship to the Aegean
The achievement of Labarnas in relationship to Arzawa begins the process 
of subjugating that area which reached its apogee in the days of Mursilis II. 
This successful expansion of Labarnas in a westerly direction gives 
meaning to the statement contained in the Telipinus Proclamation: " and he 
made them boundaries of the sea." (See map, p.1.) 	It is interesting to 
reflect that as early as this the Hittites reached their ultimate extent 
in westward expansion. 
Gurney has the following to say of the seven cities mentioned in 
section four ofthe Telipinus Proclamation: 
"Tuwanuwa is certainly the classical Tyana, and Hupisna is generally 
equated with Kybistra; Landa and Lusna may be the classical Laranda (modern 
Karaman)....Zallara and Nenassa have not been identified with any certainty, 
but Parsuhanda must have been in the same general area, since it is said 
elsewhere to have been in the province called the Lower Land,which is the 
plain to the south—east of the salt lake (Tuz Gol) within the curve of the 
Taurus. 	The cities thus form a compact group separated by a considerable 
distance from Hattusas, and it is therefore not surprising to find that the 
capital of the kingdom at this time was most probably not Hattusas but' the 
ancient city of Kussara, which has not indeed been located but may well 
have been south of the Halys." 16 
16. Gurney,O.R.; op.cit.p.22 	But Mellaart, "The End of the Early Bronze 
Age in Anatolia and the Aegean", A.J.A. vol..62,(1958)p.14 says that 
"although the location of Kussara is still disputed, we have elsewhere 
brought forward arguments that it may have been at Alishar". 	Alishar 
of course lies well within the loop of the Halys close to Hattusas. 
More will be said about Kussara in the section in the chapter devoted 
to Hattusilis I where the transfer of the capital from Kussara to 
Hattusas is discuSsed. 
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The whole area in which these cities are placed is low-lying in 
comparison with the central Hittite homeland, from which it is separated 
to the south of the Halys by a range of hills. 	This line of expansion is 
of great importance in the light of future Hittite expansion to the south 
and south-east. 	Indeed, one may say that the success of Labarnas in this 
area made possible the drive of Hattusilis I, the successor of Labarnas, 
into northern Syria. 
It has already been noted that the sons of Labarnas ruled these con-
quered places- south of the Halys. 	"They governed the countries; and 
the large cities were assigned (to them)", is the conclusion of section 
four from the Telipinus Proclamation. 	It would seem:that the cities 
referred to were what Athens was to Attica. 	They must have been the focal 
points of administration for the areas of which they were the main centres. 
Such a system would have in many ways facilitated the administration of 
the areas over which the sons of Labarnas ruled. 
In the treaty which Hattusilis III made with Tiliura the following 
statement occurs in respect to the Kaska folk: 
(11) "....But at first Labarnas (and) Hattusilis used not to let them cross 
the river Kummesmaha."1 7 Garstang and Gurney claim that the chief town 
of the Kummesmaha district was Tiliura. 18 They see this town as the 
Hittite frontier in that area in the time of Labarnas. 19 	Thus the Kaskans, 
who were to be a "running sore" to the Hittites, were first encountered, 
as far as we know, in the reign of Labarnas. 	Thermilitary successes of 
his reign indicate that he was able to confine them to their mountainous 
homeland north of the Kummesmaha river. (See map, p.1, for the position of 
Tiliura and the Kummesmaha river.) 
To complete this section it is necessary to say something of the un-
doubted importance that Labarnas had for later Hittite kings. 	The fact 
that the Proclamation of Telipinus attempts to show that if the hereditary 
principle in politics is obeyed there will be unity in the Hittite kingdom 
and military success abroad makes it significant that the Proclamation begins 
with the reign of Labarnas. 	Telipinus regarded Labernas as the 
17. Garstang-Gurney.op.cit.p.119. 
18. Ibid49/24 
19. Ibid.p.101. 
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founder of the hereditary principle in Hittite politics. 	Because Telipinus 
commences his treatise with Labarnas some authorites have inferred that 
this diminishes the importance of Anittas in relationship to the Hittites 
and that they considered Labarnas as the first of their line of kings. 
Gurney states that "no Hittite king ever claimed Anittas as his forebear, 
and it has been argued that the episode of the destruction of Hattusas and 
the peculiar animosity shown by Anittas against that city proves him to 
belong to a tradition foreign to the kings who later made Hattusas their 
capital." 	I have already answered this latter point. 	Gurney continues 
in the same vein when he says that " the later Hittite Kings liked to 
trace their descent back to the ancient king Labarnas, and with him therefore 
Hittite history may be said to begin, although he does not appear to have 
been the first of his line. ,,20 	Hardy has 'the same attitude in so far as 
ne attempts to lessen the importance of Anittas on the basis of the Telipinus 
Proclamation. 21 
I do not doubt that later Hittite kings identified themselves witn 
Labarnas and that he was of great importance to them. 	But I do dispute 
the point that they traced their descent back to him. 	Gurney admits that 
Labarnas "does not appear to have been the first of his line." 	I do not 
think that the importance of Anittas is in any way less than I have claimed 
for him in the previous chapter. 	We may simply say that Labarnas made 
actual a practice which Telipinus and other Hittite kings heartily approved. 
In the time of Anittas the kingship was more than likely still elective. 
Since Anittas did not do what Labarnas did in this respect he is not important 
for the purpose of Telipinus which was not so much to recount history as to 
illustrate the worthwhileness of the hereditary factor, and obedience to it, 
in Hittite politics. 	Telipinus begins with an account of the activities 
• of Labarnas because Labarnas is the first of whom Telipinus knows in 
connection with his coming declaration of the law governing the succession to 
the throne. 	This is the only conclusion possible after reading the Telipinus 
Proclamation. 	To say that Labarnas was the founder of the Hittite line to 
20. Gurney,0.R.;op.cit.p.21 
21. Hardy.op.cit.p.186. He has Labarnas ruling at Hattusas thus giving him 
an importance which is not warranted. 
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to which other kings traced their descent is to say more than the 
evidence warrants. 	If anything their identification with Labarnas 
is to be seen as a tracing back of their descent to a political practice 
or idea which was of the highest moment in Hittite political life until 
the destruction of their empire. 	The Apology of Hattusilis III bears 
out this claim. 	If Telipinus had proposed to give an account of - 
Hittite history from its origins he would surely have made some mention 
of Tudhaliyas I and Pu—Sarrumas, to say nothing of Pitkhnas and Anittas. 
I do not mean to diminish the undoubted importante7.of Labarnas. 
He was the founder of the dynastic tradition in so far as a ruling house 
was established in his time. 	The importance of his expansion to the 
west and the south has already been discussed. 	His greatness is well 
attested to by the fact that later Hittite kings styled themselves "Great 
King tabarna" 	Tabarnas is probably Labarnas in a different form. 22 
The name Caesar received similar usage, but if the Romans were asked to 
trace back their descent I doubt whether they would have stopped short 
at Caesar. 	This later indentification with the name Labarnas resulted 
because he represented a political principle which when applied meant 
power and territorial expansion. 
The successor of Labarnas I was Labarnas II. 	He kept the name of 
his father until he moved the Hittite capital from Kussara to Hattusas. 
But the title "tabarna" was to become a royal affixture. 	This type of 
practice helps to create a dynastrc tradition. 	An association with a 
great name is not only flattering to the bearer of it but it also has an 
appeal to the sentiments of the ruled. 	It is permissible to speculate 
that such an association can conjure up the illusion of the existence of 
strength even in its absence. 	The number of Henrys and Georges who have 
been Engli'sh kings is testimony to this psychological axiom. 	The continuing 
use of the name George after George III further proves this point. 
Finally, the title of the Hittite queen became Tawannannas. 	This 
had its origin in the name of the wife of Labarnas. 	We do not know whether 
she exercised power to the extent of Queen Pudu—He0a, the wife of Hattusilis III. 
The continuing usage of her name as a title for the' Hittite Queen may be soley 
due to the fact that she was the wife of Labarnas. 
22. Gurney,O.R.; op.cit.p.64 
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HATTUSILIS I  
The reign of Hattusilis I (Labarnas II) is comparatively well 
documented. 	The so—called political testament of this king is, 	. 
along with the proclamation of Telipinus, our main source of information 
for the political conditions of the Old Kingdom. 	But before attempting 
an analysis of the political testament it is best to set forth the other 
knowledge we have of his reign since that knowledge makes more apparent 
the significance of the political testament. 
The proclamation of Telipinus, continuing on from the account of 
the days of Labarnas, has the following to say about the beginning of 
the reign of Hattusilis the first : 
5 
13." Afterwards Hattusilis became king. (13) And then likewise his sons, 
his brothers, his relatives by marriage, the members of his family, 
and his soldiers were , tunited. (15) And on whatever campaign he went, 
he also by (his) stfength kept the hostile country in subjection. 
6 
(17).And he kept devastating countries, and he made the countries tremble(?); 
and he made them boundaries of the sea. (18) Moreover, when in those 
days he returned from the campaign, one (of) his sons went to each 
(of) the countries, and the large cities were put into his hands" 1 
On the basis of this we may say that at the very commencement of the 
reign of Hattusilis I there was harmony in the Hittite court. The royal 
family was united and it had the support of the soldiery. Hence the 
military success. 	Hittite controlled territory increased rather than 
1. Sturtevant, E.H., and Bechtel, G.; A Hittite Chrestomathy,(PhiladOphia, 
1935,) p.183. 
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shrank. 	Arzawa, Wilusa and the Lower Land remained in Hittite hands. 
The method of governing the newly conquered countries and cities was 
identical to that of the time of Labarnas. 	Hattusilis, at the beginning 
of his reign, would seem to have profited immensely from the strength and 
successes of his predecessor. 	But the next section of the proclamation 
presents a picture in complete contrast to the above. 	Rebellion and 
disobedience marked the last days of Hattusilis : 
7 
(21)"But when afterwards the subjects of the princes became rebellious, 
they began to despoil their (i.e., the princes') holdings, and to 
conspire (against) their masters, and to shed their (i.e., the princes') 
blood." 2 
It will later be shown that Hattusilis managed to restore order before 
he died. 
It must have been early in his reign that the Hittite kingdom expanded 
for the first time outside the confines of Asia Minor. 	Indeed it was 
during the reign of Hattusilis I that the Hittites made their first attack 
on northern Syria. 	This line of expansion was to preoccupy continually 
Hittite military ambitions. 
Hattusilis attacked the kingdom of Yamhad (in northern Syria) which 
had as its centre and capital the city of Aleppo which is to be read in 
Hittite texts as Halap. 	In the time of Zimrilim of Maril (1722-1690 B.C.), 3 
Aleppo or the country of Yamhad is specified as one of the five great 
kingdoms of western Asia. 4. This kingdom of Yamhad controlled twenty kings 
2. Ibid.p.185. 
3. Van der Meer,P.;The Chronology of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt,(2nd ed, 
Leiden, E.J.Bri11,1955,) table 3. 
4. Albright,W.F.,"Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research," 
No.77,(February 1940,)p.32. (The Bulletin of the American Schools of 
Oriental Research will hereafter be referred to by the abbreviation BASOR) 
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and some time before the time of Hattusilis it was governed by rulers 
named Hammurapi and Yarimlim. 	The Hittites reduced the region to 
vassalage. According to Cavaignac Hattusilis did not send one of the 
members of the royal family to rule Aleppo but rather he let the local 
dynast of Aleppo exist as his vassal. Cavaignac, no doubt referring 
to the later revolt of Aleppo during the reign of Hattusilis, says that 
it was left to that king's successor to rectify this weakness caused by 
such a method of government. 5 
The chief source for the relations of Hattusilis I with Aleppo is 
the treaty which Mursilis II made with Rimi-Sarma of Aleppo:- 
• - Obverse 
(9-10)"Thus the Sun, Mursilis 	 the king of Hatti: 
(11.-14) Formerly the kings of Halab held a great kingdom (kingship) and 
their kingdom, Hattusilis 	took away. 	After Hattusilis 	 
Mursilis 	the grandson of Hattusilis....destroyed the kingdom 
of Halab and the land of Halab."6 
But Luckenbill admits that 'took away' could also be 'kept it up'. 7 
Hardy claims that no problem arises from the contention that Hattusilis 
attacked the city but he admits that much difference of opinion exists as 
to what happened there. 	He considers that the usual translation has it 
that Hattusilis destroyed the city as did Mursilis I later on. 	But he 
further considers that a study of the treaty shows that the action of Hattusilis 
is differentiated from that of Mursilis. 	Hardy believes that linguistically 
we may conclude that the kings of Aleppo held a kingdom from Hattusilis I. 
5. Cavaignac,E,; Les Hittites, (L'Orient ancien illustre,Paris,Maisonneuve, 
1950,)p.18. 
6. Luckenbill,D.D.; "Hittite Treaties and Letters", AJSL, vol.XXXVII, 
April, 1921, No.3,) p.188.(Luckenbill points out that the original treaty 
between Mursilis II and Rimi-Sarma had been broken. 	A new copy was 
drawn up by Muwatallis, son of Mursilis. This is the text we have.) 
7. Ibid. page 188 Note 1 
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He offers the following translation of the relevant section of the treaty 
which Mursilis II made with Rimi-Sarma of Aleppo: 8 
"Which [kingship Hattus] ilis gave Halap to perform Purilis destroyed, 
(and)'] - theking of the land of Halap." 9 
In short the revolt by Aleppo caused:Murgilis to destroy it. 	This 
revolt no doubt occurred during the last years of Hattusilis when the 
Hittite homeland was torn by faction and the king was unable to leave his 
more pressing domestic concerns. 	Contenau considers that Hattusilis, either 
from free will or because he was forced to, allowed Aleppo to gain in 
importance. 	He also claims that the Hittites had to repent of their• 
docility towards Aleppo since Mursilis destroyed it. 10 
This is the first indication we have that the Hittite empire can no 
longer be administered soley by the Hittite nobility, let alone the 
governing family. 	Power is now left in the hands of a native king who 
is a Hittite dependent. 	We do not know the terms of the dependency but 
it must have owed some form of allegiance since Aleppo was destroyed when 
it disobeyed the terms of vassalage by revolting. - The Hittites are using 
a form of indirect government to hold a conquered area outside the confines 
of Anatolia. 	The distance of Aleppo from Hattusas and its separation 
from Anatolia by the Taurus mountains forced the Hittites to grant this 
measure of independence to Aleppo. 	One may also contend that the Hittites 
were fully aware of the power of Aleppo and the corresponding futility of 
attempting to annex it or rule it directly by one of their own number. 
This may be seen as evidence that the Hittites were a minority ruling 
_caste who could not afford the manpower to directly control a far flung 
empire. 	It will •be demonstrated in a later chapter that the Hittites 
8. Ibid, p.188. 
9. Hardy,R.S. "The Old Kingdom",AJSL,vol.LVIII , (1941), p.213. 
10.Contenau,G.; La civilisation des hittites et des hurrites du Mitanni, 
(2nd ed, Paris, Payot,1948), p.55. 
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were never more than a minority element in northern Syria. 11 	But be 
this as it may, the very infancy of the Hittite kingdom might have 
precluded it from entertaining a more thorough scheme for the control 
of Aleppo. 
The assault on the kingdom of Yamhad meant that the Hittites had 
emerged from their 'mountain fastness' and crossed the formidable range 
of Taurus through which only a few passes lead. 	A glance at the map 
(page 1) shows that the conquest by Labarnas of the Lower Land was 
fundamental to the success of the campaign of Hattusilis in northern 
Syria. 	The most feasible explanation for taking such a difficult line 
of expansion lies in the Hittite awareness that the south-east of Asia 
Minor was richer than the Anatolian highlands. 	Seton Lloyd remarks as 
follows : 
"Through the medium of the Assyrian karum, the Hittites must long 
ago have come to understand the superior wealth and attainments of the 
people occupying the riverain country beyond their mountains in the 
south, and from the first it was in this direction that their political 
ambitions were orientated." 12 
It will later be seen that Hittite contact with the peoples to the 
south-east modified their political and imperial attitudes. 
It is at this juncture that the Hurrians make their first historical 
appearance in relationship to the Hittites. 13 	In the period of Hammurabi 
of Babylon (1724-1682 B.C. 14) Hurrians appear at Tell Atshaneh, marking 
the beginning of Hurrian penetration into northern Syria. 	Reports on 
the excavations of 1939 show that in the Hammurabi period the principal 
element at Tell Atshaneh was Amorite; but Hurrian nobles are mentioned. 15 
11.infra p. 
12.Lloyd,S.; Early Anatolia,(Harmondsworth,Middlesex,Penguin Books Ltd. 
1956,) p.129. 
13.Hogarth,D.G.;C.A.H.(Cambridge,Cambridge University Press,Vol.II,Chapter 
XI,iii,1924),p.260, remarks that Hattusilis warred victoriously with 
Aleppo which is supposed to have been of Harrian origin. He also states 
that this indicates a wide enough territorial power to justify us 
speaking of an early Hittite empire preceding the New Empire. 
14.Van der Meer, Op.cit.table 3 
15.Gelb,I,J,; Hurrians and Subarians,(Chicago, 1944),p.64 
66 
Thus it is more than likely that the drive of Hattusilis into northern 
Syria brought him into contact with the Hurrians who were to have a 
direct bearing on the imperial fortunes of the Hittite people. 
After the death of Samsi-Adad I (1744 or 1734-1724 B.C.) 16 all: 
historical inscriptions from Assyria cease abruptly. 	Nothing much is 
known about the country for some two hundred years. 	This silence is 
perhaps as telling as any written document. 	It bears eloquent testimony 
to a great catastrophe caused by an invasion of people, the same who 
presumably drove the Kassites before them into Babylonia. 	It is not 
difficult to assume that the invaders were Hurrians. 17 It would appear 
that this Indo-Aryan dominated people were a potent political force by 
the time of Hattusilis. 
Gurney considers that the siege of Urshu; a literary description 
of Which has survived, must have occurred during either the campaign of 
Hattusilis I or Mursilis I against the kingdom of Yamhad. 	The scene is 
laid outside the city of Urshu. 18 Garstang and Gurney claim that Urussa 
is to be equated with Urshu, the territory of which extended to the 
Euphrates immediately to the north of Carchemish. 19 	The city is besieged 
by a Hittite army—the operations being directed by the king from the tom 
of Luhuzantiya which is an earlier form of Lawazantiya. 20  Goetze proves 
that Lawazantiya was a city in Kizzuwatna and that it was actually on 
or near the main route from Syria to Hattusas.21 He remarks thd:the evidence 
indicates that Lawazantiya is to be placed near Kummanni, the most sacred 
16. Van der Meer, Op.cit. table 3 
17. Gelb. Op.cit.p.66 
18.Gurney,O.R.; The Hittites,(2nd ed,Harmondsworth Middlesex,Penguin Books 
Ltd,1954) p.23. 
19. Garstang-Gurney, The Geography of the Hittite Empire. Op.cit.p.56. 
It is not unusual for a city to have the same name as the territory 
to which it belongs. Thby,consider,p.59, that it was situated on the 
Hittite corridor to Syria. 
20. Ibid.p.55 
21. Goetze,A.; Kizzuwatna and the Problem of Hittite Geography, (New Haven, 
1940), p.71 
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city of Kizzuwatna. 22 Kummanni is to be placed in the north-west part 
of the corridor which gave the Hittites access to northern Syria. 23 
Thus the evidence argues that if this siege was conducted by Hattusilis 
he had some form of understanding with the country of Kizzuwatna. 	But 
perhaps most important of all is that at this stage the Hittites had 
gained control of what was to be their main line of approach to Syria. 
It will be later shown in this chapter that the choice of the site of 
Hattusas as the Hittite capital must have been intimately involved with 
this strategic consideration. 
The text dealing with the siege of Urshu suggests that the city was 
in contact with, perhaps allied with, the Hurrian city of Aleppo, and the 
city of Zaruar. 	It may also have been alied with Carchemish, "the forces 
of which are ensconced on a mountain overlooking the city and keeping 
watch." 24 	The following excerpts which I quote from the tale of the 
Siege of Urshu are taken from Gurney's translation of it. 25 
"They broke the battering-ram. 	The king waxed wrath and his face 
was grim: 'They constantly bring me evil tidings; 	Be not idle. 
Make a battering-ram in the Hurrian manner and let it be brought into 
plac.e........Begin to heap up earth. 	When you have finished let everyohe 
take post. 	Only let the enemy give battle then his plans will be confounded' 
(Later the king speaks to his general Santas): 'Would anyone have thought 
that Iriyaya would have come and li"ed saying': (We will bring a tower and 
a battering-ram' - 'but they bring neither a tower nor a battering-ram, 
but he brings them to another place. Sieze him and say to him': 'You 
are deceiving us and so we deceive the king'. 	There is then a lacuna. 
22. Ibid.p.72 
23. Garstang-Gurney. Op.cit.p.50 
24. Gurney,O.R.;The Hittites,(2nd ed,Harmondsworth,Middlesex,Penguin Books 
Ltd,1954),p.178. 
25. Ibid.p.178-179. 
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When Santas next reports to the king he finds him still raging at the 
delay: 
'Why have you not given battle ? You stand on chariots of water, you 
are almost turned into water yourself (?).......You had only to kneel 
before him and you would have killed him or at least frightened him. 
But as it is you have behaved like a woman' ......Thus they answered him: 
'Eight times (i.e., on eight fronts ?) we will give battle. 	We will 
confound their schemes and destroy the city.' 	The king answered, 'Good.'' 
But ,while they did nothing to the city, many of the kinds servants 
were smitten so that many died. The king was angered and said: 'Watch 
the roads. Observe who enters the city and who leaves the city. No one 
is to go out from the city to the enemy.' 
	They answered: 'We watch. Eighty chariots and eight armies 
surround the city. Let not the king's heart be troubled. 	I remain at 
my post.' 	But a fugitive came out of the city and reported: 'The subject 
of the king of Aleppo came in five times, the subject of Zuppa is dwelling 
in the city itself, the men of Zaruar go in and out, the subject of my 
lord the Son of Teshub goes to and fro' 	The king waxed wroth...." 
Hardy, when setting forth the "anecdotes" of the time of Hattusilis I 
gives one in connection with a certain Sandas (Santas). 	He was a prince 
and a native of Hurmas, but apparently an official in Hassumas. 	He 
feared an invasion of the Hurri people. (This is probably the earliest 
mention of these people in a Hittite source). 	The Hurri people appear 
to have been harassing Sandas, but instead of staying to meet the invasion 
Sandas withdrew to his superior in the district. 	When news of this neglect 
of duty reached Hattusilis he sent word and had Sandas killed. 26 	Gurney 
gives a different version of what must be the same episode : "Santas, a 
man of Hurma, was a palace servant in Hassuwa. 	He served the Hurrians 
and went to see his lord (i.e; the king of the Hurrians.) 	The king heard 
of it and they mutilated him"27 
26. Hardy. Op.cit.p.191 
27. Gurney. Op.cit.p.173. 
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Despite the difference between the two versions they both possess 
one factor in common, namely, the disloyalty of Santas. 	If this Santas 
is the same as that of the tale of the Siege of Urshu then that event 
took place during the reign of Hattusilis I. 	This disloyalty and treachery 
on the part of Santas, the king's general in the seige of Urshu, (and his 
main general at that it seems)3 may well explain the perpetual delay and 
incompetence of the king's officers witnessed in this tale. 	The section 
concerning Iriyaya and the laxity in guarding Urshu illustrate an in-
efficiency or even planned treachery which may well have caused the most 
level-headed of monarchs to express annoyance. 	The incidents which made 
the king justifiably angry do not seem to have been unintentional mistakes. 
Explicit orders were given and disobeyed. 	Perhaps Santas was working 
in conjunction with the Hurrians during these seige operations. 
If what has been said of Santas the general is true the prospects of 
Hittite military success are not good. 	Hardy says that he was a prince. 
If this is the case he no doubt possessed retainers who may have given 
him their loyalty rather than to the king where it was owed theoretically. 
The feudal nature of the Hittite kingdom made such a danger possible. 
Santas certainly could not have caused such trouble at ',..Urshu solely by 
himself. 	The situation implies accomplices. 	Both Gurney and Hardy 
state that although Santas wasof Hurma his duties lay in Hassuwa. 	The 
placing of officials in an area where they had few contacts and thus little 
influence with the inhabitants would be a means of minimizing the risks 
of rebellion inherent in the feudal system. 	Perhaps Hattusilis was aware 
of such,a danger. 
One gains the impression from this tale that the Hittite king was 
the military strategist who delegated the execution of his plans to his 
generals. 	That the Hittites have a military hierarchy at this stage is 
apparent on reading the above quoted extracts. 
The Urshu text is informative in another respect. 	The statement: 
"Make a battering-ram in the Hurrian manner..." implies that the Hittites 
were at least parially dependent on the Hurrians for their weapons of war. 
The mention of eighty chariots in this comparatively early Hittite text 
need not be cause for the surprise it has engendered on occasions. 	The 
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Hurri were dominated by the Indo-Aryan Mitanni. 	They are evident in 
northern Syria at the time of Hammurabi who reigned in the late eighteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries B.C. 28 	It is quite possible that the 
Hurri brought the horse to the Near East, especially if they came from 
the steppes of southern Russia where conditions are suitable for the 
breeding and use of the horse. 	If, as I think is likely, Hattusilis I, 
reigned from about 1610 B.C. to 1580 B.C. he coulth.well have gained the 
horse from the Hurri. 	He was not adverse to making battering-rams in 
the 'Hurrian manner' and Hittite religious texts owe much to Hurrian in- 
fluence. 	Gurney says that "we must conclude that this Aryan clan, moving 
westwards, brought with them special knowledge of horse breeding, and that 
it was from them that the art was learnt by the peoples of Western Asia." 29 
The Boghazkeui archives contain four tablets "on the training and 
acclimatization of horses by a certain Kikkuli of the land of Mitanni." 3° 
Gurney continues that "the treatise of Kikkuli is certainly later," (than 
the text containing the tale of the Siege of Urshu) •and it is unlikely 
that the Hittites would have employed this Mitannian as their instructor 
if they were already familiar with the science of horse-training. 31 	I 
am in no position to question the date of Hittite texts. 	However, it is 
quite possible that the Hittitespossessed horses and chariots before the 
time of Kikkuli, but not being as good as the Mitanni in training them they 
hired the services of an expert. 	Gurney does not deny the existence of 
a chariotry arm in the Old Kingdom. 	Speaking of the worth of the Hittite 
chariotry during the battle of Kadesh he goes on to say that"it is questionable 
whether this arm was equally well developed under the Old Kingdoe.32 
' 28. Supra p.65 
29. Gurney. Op.cit p.105 
30. Ibid p.104-105 
31. Ibid p.105 
32. Ibid p.105 
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This is surely evidence favouring my contention in respect to the Hittites 
hiring Kikkuli. 
Another text from the time of Hattusilis I is largely concerned with 
the activities of a person named Nunnus. 	He was a resident or ruler 
of Hurmas who went to Arzawa, apparently as an agent of the king. 	He 
appears to have diverted property not his own, to his personal use. 	This 
crime was exposed by a man from the city of Huntaras. 	Hattusilis accordingly 
ordered Nunnus "brought up," (probably to the court) and sent Sarmassus 
to Hurmas to effect this royal decision. 	But Sarmassus delayed his 
departure and Hattusilis then dispatched "the man of the golden ensign", 
an official of unknown duties, in his place. 	"The man of the golden 
ensign" seized both Nunnus and Sarmassus. 	He had them carried to Mount 
Tahayas where he harnessed them to oxen. 33 This punishment is clarified 
by law 166 of the Hittite Law Code : 
"If anyone sows seed upon seed, his neck shall be put upon the plow. 
They shall harness two yokes of oxen and direct the face of one (of them) 
this way, and the face of the other that way, the man shall die and the 
oxen shall die too. 	He who sowed the field first, shall take it for himself. 
Formerly they proceeded thus." 34 This means that they certainly proceeded 
that way in the days of Hattusilis I since the law code was not revised 
until later in Hittite history. 
On the basis of the above quoted law it seems that Nunnus had attempted 
to appropriate land that was not rightfully his. 	Sarmassus disobeyed the 
king and possibly aided and abetted Nunnus. 	Hence his similar punishment. 
If Hittite society was a feudal society whereby the holding of land entailed 
service to the crown it was obvious why Hattusilis was concerned with this 
action on the part of Nunnus. 	The person who had previously owned the land 
33. Hardy Op.cit. p.190-191 
34. Pritchard,J.B; Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, 
( 2nd e . , a Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press,1955,)Jp.195. 
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was now possibly free from his obligation to render service to Hattusilis. 
Nunnus, most likely a powerful lord and a member of a great family, would 
be gaining wealth and possibly additional followers or retainers. 
Hattusilis naturally sought to prevent such situations from arising. 	If 
Sarmassus was of similar status to Nunnus the danger to the stablility of 
the Hittite kingship is all too apparent. 	Whatever the case may have 
actually been there is no doubt that two officials have here disobeyed the 
king. 
There is also another piece of information from the time of Hattusilis 
which indicates the suspect nature of the Hittite nobility during the Old 
Kingdom. 	Asgaliyas, a lord of Hurmas, was a very important official who 
was generally praised by the residents of the city. 	The king appointed 
him steward in Ankuwas. 	But he does not seem to have sustained the same 
reputation while holding this position: 
"He was a mighty man, but he died in shame, in the city Kuzurus he 
cut up kakkalius, (and) in Ankuwas the Kakkalius (were) thin." 
We also have the knowledge of a second episode concerning Asgaliyas. 
He wished to kill Ispudas-Inaras, a hupralas man who had been appointed 
governor of Ullummas. 	Asgaliyas had Ispudas-Inaras imprisoned. 	But 
Asgaliyas failed, and the prisoner, on being released indicted his oppressor 
in the following way: 
"You (are) corrupt; you disgrace the king greatly." 35 
It is not possible to say anything specific about the significance 
of the first episode other than that Asgaliyas abused the responsibilities 
and attendant privileges of high office. 
With the second episode it is different. 	Here we more than likely 
have rivalry between two powerful Hittites. 	Where you have members of 
leading families vieing for high office there is bound to be competition 
which does not stop short of violence. 	Hattusilis, in his attempt to 
35. Hardy. Op.cit. p.191-192 
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prevent any one member of the nobility from becoming too powerful, no 
doubt drew his appointees for high office from as wide a field as was 
possible. The more ambitious members of the nobility would inevitably 
see this as a reason for resentment. 	The ambitious nature of some of 
the leading aristocrats would have forced Hattusilis to favour other 
members of the nobility whom he felt were more likely to remain loyal 
to the throne. 	The potential use of violence is obvious. 	Perhaps 
Asgaliyas had by this stage proved himself unworthy of trust. Hence he 
was passed over when it came to appointing a governor of Ullummas. His 
reaction must have been typical of many of the Hittite nobility. It was 
undoubtedly incidents such as this which explain the unsettled nature of 
Hittite domestic affairs during the last years of the reign of Hattusilis 
His 'political testament', made during his last days, will bear out this 
statement more fully. 
Following the unpleasantness of Asgaliyas Hattusilis made Ispudas-
Inaras overseer to the squires Subbiumas and Marassus. 	The king decreed 
as follows: 
"At night he shall await them for war (?)" 
Further: 
"At night they shall summon; and he shall place each of the mighty, 
excellent squires on horses. 	Then Ispudas-Inaras shall assign them the 
opening of the knife(?) and the taking of arms." 
Hattusilis divided the squires into three sections and gave them, for 
training, to Nakkilid, chief of the cup-bearers, to Huzzis, chief of the 
smiths, and to Kizzius, chief of the Meside, and "they made them skilful." 36 
A training rule obligated the troops to sleep before the king. 	Those 
who performed their duty were to be given wine to drink, but those who 
neglected it were to be given iyara (?) to drink. 	The latter were also 
to be in a state of nakedness and were c to avoid being seen. 37 
Thus we may say that there was a carefully regulated system for the 
training of young squires. 	Obviously it was the members of the nobility 
who were entrusted with the supervision of the squires. 	One would expect 
such organisation of military training from a state which had an essentially 
military basis. 	In fact the Hittite capacity for organisation, right 
36. Ibid p.192 
37. Ibid p.192 
74 
down to the most meticulous detail, is very evident in political 
documents and religious texts. 	This undoubted ability to plan and be 
methodical must have stood the Hittites in good stead as administrators 
of empire. 
The rule stipulating that the recruits should sleep before the king 
is reminiscent of the practice of Alexander the Great. 	It no doubt had 
as its object the fostering of an early attachment and loyalty to the 
crown. 	These recruits who slept before the king would have been the sons 
of the Hittite ruling caste. 	Hattusilis must have been conscious of the 
fact that the gaining of their loyalty was essential. 	But apart from 
this consideration these sons of the nobility were to be the future members 
of the chariot arm which was the basis of Hittite military power and success. 
Recruits such as these would have belonged to those Hittite families 
capable of equipping them with horses and chariots. 
Another document of the time of Hattusilis gives us information 
concerning the chief men, cities and internal affairs of the Hittite kiodddm. 
This text mentions Arzawa as part of the Hittite realm. 	It also names 
twelve cities some of which were administrative centres under Labarnas. 
Those which can be in any way identified show only the extent of the kingdom 
within Asia Minor. 	Huspisnas, which temproarily held a garrison, and 
Nenassas were important just as they were in the time of Labarnas. 	Kussaras 
was apparently only a royal residence at this time. 	Hurmas, under the 
direct control of the king, was the seat of a petty king who may possibly 
havesupervised his counterpart in Ullammas. 	Hardy's use of the word 
governor in this context is rather surprising. 38 
Goetze believes that in the Old Kingdom the princes of the royal house 
were often elevated to the rank of petty king even though they were subject 
to the Great King. 	This, he maintains, was especially true of the central 
core of Hittite possessions, of which we are now speaking. But, he continues, 
in later times the organisation of the central core seemed to develop towards 
a type of civil rule where governors rather than petty kings ruled. 39 
38. Ibid.p.190.The information from this document is gained from Hardy. 
39. Goetze,A; Kleinasien, (Muller, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, III, 
Munchen, 1933,) p.95,100. 
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Because of the following reasons I would tend to agree with Goetze. 
In the days of the New Empire when the Hittite kingship gained in power 
and grandeur which gave it Egyptian and Mesopotamian connotations it is 
not likely that officials ruling territories in central Anatolia would 
be permitted, for purposes of prestige reserved for the Great King, to 
bear the title of king. 	Since the kingship in the Old Kingdom was an 
essentially limited and qualified institution which did not pretend to 
the great importance of the kingship of the New Empire it is quite possible 
that the existence of petty kings in the Hittite homeland during the Old 
Kingdom did not give offence. 	We also find, in many respects, that in 
the Old Kingdom imperial life was a family affair. 	Thus it is not 
anomolous to suppose that the sons of Labarnas and Hattusilis were minor 
kings. 	But when the empire increased and administrators were perforce 
drawn from outside the ruling house it is likely that the lesser title 
of governor came into being. 
The significance of one ruler supervising another is not clear. 40 
Perhaps the Hittites were using a system of checks and balances in their 
imperial administration. 
Hassuwas and Ankuwas were administered in a similar fashion by the 
king who moved their officials from place to place as he pleased. 41 
The significance of moving officials from one area to another has already 
been stated in connection with the Santas episode. 	But this mobility 
which existed in the use of officials has yet another advantage. 	If an 
official is exceptionally gifted in one facet of administration his services 
can be utilized to rectify the short-comings of that facet of administration, 
should they exist, in other Hittite controlled areas. 
The cities of Tibiyas, Hasbinas and Parduwatas also came within the 
province of the activities of Hattusilis. 	The Hittite king made a settle- 
* ment in 'Parduwatas and Hasbinas. 	Cattle and sheep were driven from various 
localities to the settlement in Parduwatas. 	It seems that two men, Zahara6us 
and Zahares, with a garrison of three thousand warrior's, were left in Tibiyas. 42a 
40. Supra p. 74 
41. Hardy. Op.cit.p.189 
42a.Ibid p.193 
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Tibya was situated in the region dominated by the unruly Kaska folk,. 
(See map,p.i) When once considers the trouble -that the Hittites were to 
have with this people the stationing of such a large garrison among them 
is not surprising. 	Indeed, Hattusilis I appears to have actively concerned 
himself with the - Kaska problem and to have had a large measure of success. 
In the treaty which Hattusilis III made with Tiliura (See map, p.i) the 
Kaska folk are spoken of in the following manner : 
"But at first Labarnas (and) Hattusilis used not to let them cross 
the River Kummesmaha.u42b  (See map,pi) 
If Parduwatas and Hasbinas are to be located in the Kaska area we have yet 
another aspect of the policy of Hattusilis in relationaship to the Kaskans. 
Hattusilis may have made settlements amongst them in an attempt to control 
an area which was never satisfactorily managed by the Hittites. 
Hattusilis proceeded against Hahhas (site unknown) whose inhabitants 
and herds he transplanted. 	Hardy claims that this episode witnesses a 
Hittite king transplanting populations and herds, apparently to break the 
power of antagonistic cities. 	Similarly, by the means of establishing 
settlements and buildingor enlarging cities Hattusilis rendered hostile 
communities less dangerous. 43 	The transference of populations is well 
enough known among the Assyrians and the Hittites in the time of the New 
Empire, but this is the first evidence that we have of its use by the rulers 
of the Old Kingdom; 
The cities comprising the Hittite homeland appear to have been, in 
some important respects at least, under the direct supervision of Hattusilis. 
But there were attempts by some of his officials to flout his will. 	The 
very proximity of these cities, which must have been the centres of Hittite 
provinces, to the Hittite seat of government demanded the strongest possible 
control. 	Dependencies such as Arzawa, Wilusa and Aleppo, by virtue of 
their distance from Hattusas, cannot have received the same attention that 
Hattusilis personally gave to those areas which were more vital to the 
immediate safety and stability of the realm. 
Up to this point events have been described which indicate that Hattusilis 
did not receive the individed loyalty of his officials. 	But during the 
early years of his reign Hattusilis was sufficiently able to keep these 
tendencies in check to permit him to have military successes. 44 But worse 
.1.1■1■ 
42b. Garstang-Gurney Op.cit.p.119 
43. 	Ibid.p.194 
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to follow, and in this connection I requote the paragraph in the 
Telipinus Proclamation which concludes the section on Hattusilis: 
7 
(21) "But when afterwards the subjects of the princes became rebellious, 
they began to despoil their (i.e., the princes') holdings, and to conspire 
(against) their masters, and to shed their (i.e. the princes') blood." 45 
For example, Huzziyas, who may have been the son of Hattusilis, was 
sent to the city Tappassandas whose people received him and began to wean 
him away from loyalty to the king, saying,"Revolt against thy father's 
head."46 	Perhaps Huzziyas refused and his blood was shed. 
Then there is the incident connected with Zalpas which had become 
dissatisfied but was influenced to make peace. 	When peace was restored 
Hattusilis addressed the leading men of Zalpas. 	In reply the elders of 
Zaipas seem to have demanded a son of Hattusilis as their ruler. Hakkarpilis 
was accordingly sent. 	But while he was in Zalpas he declared against 
his father and urged the people of Zalpas to become hostile. A person 
named Kisusas replied for the people of Zalpas but the subsequent story 
is not preserved. 47 
While it is not possible to claim definitely that these two incidents, 
with a marked tendency towards insurrection, took place in conjunction with 
the rebellious labarnas-son, whom Hattusilis denounced and disowned in his 
political testament, it is at least likely that the labarnas-son was behind 
them. The opening lines of the political testament support this view: 
"Great King Labarnas%.4044. to the fighting men of the Assembly and 
the dignitaries (saying): Behold, I have fallen sick. 	The young Labarnas 
I had proclaimed to you (saying); 'He shall sit upon the throne; 'I, the 
king, called him my son, embraced him, exalted him, and cared for him con-
tinually. 	But he showed himself a youth not fit to be seen: he shed no 
tears, he showed no pity, he was cold and heartless. 	I, the king, summoned 
him to my couch (and said): 'Well: No one will (in future) bring up the 
child of his sister as his foster-son: 	The word of the king he has not laid 
to heart, but the word of his mother, the serpent, he has laid to his heart.' 48 
47. Ibid p.193 
48. Gurney Op.cit.p.171 
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It appears that the mother of the heir had corrupted him and made 
him treacherous. 	Hardy claims that some of the princes of Hatti became 
disaffected. 	They went to a person known as the "daughter" and poisoned 
her mind against the king : 
"[Against the head] of they father [rebel]. 	[A servant he will 
”49 set up 	 
It is difficult to point to a connection between the "daughter" and the 
sister of Hattusilis. 	That women should command so much power at the 
Hittite court speaks volumes for the amount of intrigue that must have 
been in existence. 	The exhortations of the disgruntled princes to the 
"daughter" indicate that they were not satisfied with some action or another 
on the part of Hattusilis; perhaps his designation of the heir. 	The 
incomplete line,"[A servaint he will set up...", suggests this. It is of 
course -possible that the princes are here exploiting the thwarted wishes 
of the "daughter" to gain their own ends. 50 Anyway the princes had their 
way with the "daughter" and the subsequent revolt threw the land into 
turmoil. 	But the rebels were overcome and captured. 51 
Hattusilis was lenient and merely banished the woman. 	She was given 
fields and herds for her support, but she was forbidden to return to the 
capital lest she should bring harm to the king's house. 	Before the 
assembled nobles the king disowned her: 
"[Now you shall no]t do evil to me]; that one [did not call] me 
father, I shall not call her daughter"52 
Nothing definite may be said about this confused episode other than 
that the ambitious :Hittite Prince were prepared to exploit the jealousies 
and dissatisfaction of those closest to the king in order to undermine the 
power of the latter. 	Whether the "daughter" and the sister of the king 
are in any way to be connected it is not possible to say. But I would 
offer a tentative solution to this problem which has as its crux the un-
doubted power held by the woman relatives of Hattusilis. In the light of 
the later Telipinus Proclamation it seems likely that various women of royal 
standing were often determined that their son would become the next king. 
49. Hardy. Op.cit. p.195 
50. She may have had ambitions for her husband or one of her children to 
become king, depending on her age. 
51. Hardy. Op.cit.p.195 
52. Ibid p.195 
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The jealousies, resultant intrigues and bloodshed which are apparent in 
the time of Hattusilis and his immediate successors called forth the 
carefully regulated laws of Telipinus which were to govern the succession 
to the throne. 	The fact that the original heir of Hattusilis was only 
his nephew may have meant that women of strcing maternal instinct did not 
stop short of the use of violence to put their sons in line for the kingship. 
If the successor to the throne lwas: chosen from a wide area of relatives 
that could well have been the cause of this trouble. 	The wives of 
Hattusilis may have had cause for discontent. 	We know that Hattusilis 
had one son at least and most likely two. 53 
But, to confuse the issue even further, Goetze holds that Hattusilis 
took the right of succession away from his eldest:eson and awarded it to 
his youngest son Mursilis. 	He further claims that Hattusilis ordered his 
wife Hastajar to recognise this change. 54 Hattusilis warned Hastajar 
not to oppose him -Jor to let it be said, either by the king or by the princes 
that she was going to the Old Women for oracles. 	If she stayed away from 
them, the king declared, he would not have to protect her by claiming 
ignorance of her affairs when accusations were brought against her. Con-
cluding his caution he again warned her not to oppose him, and that if she 
needed information she was to come to him and he would impart his affairs 
to her himself. 55 The whole situation smacks of intrigue and suspicion. 
Such situations could well breed groups of informers or delatores such as 
those who existed in the days of the Roman emperor Tiberius. Goetze con-
siders that Hastajar was the Tawannannas, that is, the Queen Mother. She 
was also the wife of Hattusilis. 56 
53. Supra pii77 
54. Goetze,A; Kleinasien,(Muller, Handbuch der Alertumswissenschaft,III, 
Munchen,1933),p.87. 
55. Hardy Op.cit.p.199 
56. Goetze,A; Kleinasien, (Muller, Handbuch der Aleertumswissenschaft,III, 
Munchen,1933) p.87. 
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Hardy contends that Hattusilis issued an injunction to the nobles 
of his kingdom to the effect that anyone mentioning the names of the sons 
and daughters of a woman called the Tawannannas would suffer the penalty 
of being hanged in the gates. 	This woman appears to have been the wife 
of Hattusilis. 57 Gurney makes the following remark in connection with 
the Tawannannas: 
"Another peculiar feature of the Hittite monarchy is the strongly 
independent position of the queen. 	Her title, Tawannannas,...was inherited 
only on the death of her predecessor. 	Thus as long as the Queen Mother 
lived, the wife of the reigning hing could only by styled 'the king's wifet" 58 
One can well imagine that some Queen Mothers would wish to exert an in- 
fluence that the new king would find difficult to tolerate. 	No doubt 
"the king's wife" was aften unhappy with this situation. 	The problem 
had not been solved by the time of the New Empire. 
While it is impossible to reconcile the conflicting points of view 
which have arisen in this discussion centering around the revolution and 
intrigue which prompted the political testament of Hattusilis, this much 
is certain : the women of the Hittite court possessed a power and an 
. influence which could only spell disaster in so far as the stability of 
the throne and the orderly succession to it were concerned. 
The political testament continues: 
"Brothers and sisters spoke evil words to him, and to those he paid 
heed. But I, the king, learned of it; and then I met strife with strife. 
Now it is finished: 	He is no longer a son."59 
Thus Hattusilis evidently retained sufficient support to enable him 
to sums the revolt. 	But it took civil war, the most bitter of all 
wars, before the king was able to again bring order into his kingdom. 
57. Hardy Op.cit.p.199 
58. Gurney Op.cit.p.66 
59. Moscati, 	The Face of the Ancient Orient, (Eng.translation,Vallentine, 
Mitchell and Co.Ltd. 1960) p.159. 
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"Then his mother bellowed like an ox: 'They have torn asunder 
the: womb in my living body: They have ruined him, and you will kill 
him.'' But have I, the king, done him any evil ?El° 	Did I not make 
him a priest ? 	Always I honoured him, thinking of his good, 	But 
he did not follow the king's will with love. 	How could he, following 
his own will, feel love for Hattusas ?61 	Behold, I have given my son 
Labarnas a house. 	I have given him [arable land] in plenty, [sheep in] 
plenty I have given him. 	Let him now eat and drink. [So long as he 
is good] he may come up to the city; but if he cdme forward(?) Las a trouble-
maker.... then he shall not come up, but shall remain [in his house1" 62 
These lines are important in so far as they give witness to the Hittite 
practice of sparing the lives of members of the royal family who have 
opposed the will of the king to the extent of taking part in a revolt against 
him. 	We have already seen this attitude in connection with the "daughter" 
of the king. 	There must have been reasons for such leniency. 	To leave 
people at large who have proved themselves capable of treachery is in some 
cases, as \carr:J3d:we1fl -seen in the time of Hattusilis III, to give them the 
opportunity of a repeat performance. 
Hittite origins may well have had something to do with this respect 
for individual life. 	Where tribes have to keep up their numbers in order 
to survive in relationship to other tribes a consciousness of the value 
of life could have been engendered. 	The intimacy of contact with one's 
fellows and the mutual dependency amongst the individual members of the 
tribe which must have been a powerful factor in an area of geographic and 
climatic hazards from whence came the Hittites perhaps partially explains 
this feature of HittiteAomestic policy. 	The instinct to personally 
survive is heightened under such conditions and the more difficult it is 
to survive the greater the need for the asistance of others in order that 
this fundamental desire may be realised. 	It is interesting to note the 
infrequent mention of the death penalty in the Hittite law code. 
60. Gurney Op.cit. p.171 
61. Moscati.Op.cit.p.159,Gurney's translation of the political testament 
does not ge the whole text so I have supplemented the missing parts, 
where it has been possible, with excerpts from Moscati's translation 
of the text and also F.frdm'Hardy'version. 
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Secondly, it is more than likely that the rebellious members of 
the royal family possessed a following which would have given the Hittite 
king continued trouble if the leader were executed. 	Feudal conditions 
with lords and their retainers make this a possibility. 	A minority 
ruling caste cannot prolong civil war with any safety. 	An apparently 
united front must be presented to the ruled. 
Thirdly, the proscriptions of Sulla, Antony and Octavian helped to 
deprive the Roman Senate of quality and ability. 	The Hittites may have 
been alive to this danger. 	They placed great reliance on Hittite officials 
for the control of conquered territory. 	The Hittites would not solely be 
concerned with whittling away the quality of their officialdom since the 
factor of keeping up the numbers must always be taken into account. 	The 
Hittite Law Code with its emphasis on compensation rather than the death 
penalty supports this contention. 
Fourthly, the Hittite ruling family was but one family in relationship 
to other powerful families. 	An awareness of the need to keep the ruling 
family intact if it was to continue to rule may also have promted this 
attitUde towards insurgents who belonged to the family. 
Finally, the very affection and sense of kinship which family or 
clan members would basically have for each other is not to be underestimated 
as a probable reason for this Hittite peculiarity. 	The lines, " [So long 
as he is good] he may come up to the city; but if he come forward(?) [as 
a trouble-maker],....then he shall not come up, but shall remain bn his 
house]," are suggestive of a sense of a family attachment. 	There is a 
form of conditional forgiveness displayed here. 
Another informative statement from the above quoted section is as 
follows: "How could he, following his own will fell love for Hattusas ?" 
There is obviously a distinction being made - here between what the prince 
wants to achieve personally and what is in the best interests of the welfare 
of the state. - Personal ambition was to be sacrificed should it conflict 
with, and threaten to disrupt, the harmony of the state. 	This sentence 
may be seen in the light of .an appeal to the moral sense of the Hittites. 
One can imagine a Roman Senator in pre-Empire days giving voice to the 
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same sentiment. 	Perhaps Hittite rulers were intent on inculcating such 
virtues as firmitas and gravitas. 	The sense of dedication to the state, 
manifest in this statement, is one of the most impressive features Of the 
testament of Hattusilis. 	While it is not permissible to say that this 
evidences an attempt at political theory on the part of the Hittites it 
is fair to say that it raises a universal problem which has never been 
solved satisfactorily. 	All states have had the problem of an Alcibiades 
in their midst. 
The testament continues : 
"Behold, Mursilis is now my son 	Him you must acknowledge, set 
him on the throne. 	In his heart god has put rich gifts. 63 In place 
of the lion the god will [set up another3 lion. 	And in the hour when 
a call to arms goes forth 	 you, my servants and leading citizens, must 
be [at hand to help my son]. 	When three years have elapsed he shall go 
on a campaign 	If you take him [while still a child] with you on a 
campaign, bring [himl back [safely1 .... 64 
This extract is extremely important to an understanding of Hittite 
political life. 	Hattusilis, after declaring that Mursilis is now his 
son, proclaims him as heir to the throne. 	The proclamation has taken 
place before the "fighting men of the Assembly and the dignitaries." 65 
Hattusilis has - conVened - a gathering' of , thote who are entitIedto --A :voice 
in the affairs of state. 	He talks to them directly and informs them of 
his chosen successcir. 	The speech of Hattusilis does not indicate that 
the Assembly or 'pankus' has been consulted regarding the choice of 
Mursilis. 	The Assembly is simply told that Hattusilis has decided that 
Mursilis is to be the next king. 	What then, is the relationship of the 
assembly to the king ? 	If the assembly originally had the right to elect 
the king it would appear that in the course of time that it had lost it. 
63. Moscati. Op.cit. p.159 
64. Gurney Op.cit.p.171 
65. Ibid p.171 
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The king is growing more independent of the assembly. He now 
chooses his successor from his own family. 	The reasons for this have 
already been discussed. 	But the assembly still possesses considerable 
power. 	The officials and princes with whom Hattusilis had trouble would 
have belonged, formerly at least, to this gathering. What is more, this 
body of men are entrusted with the respon'sibility of protecting the youthful 
heir. 	They are also to play their part in the education of Mursilis: 
"Thus I have given thee my word, now this[tabllet let them read aloud 
before thee month by month. Thus thou wilt impress my&olrds and m77 
document in thy heart, and my servants and great ones thou wilt govern 
well 66 
Thus Mursilis is, in a very real way, dependent upon the pankus. 
The convening of the gathering to hear this proclamation is no mere exercise 
of lip service to a power that has passed away. 	This is not an Augustus 
speaking to the Roman Senate. 
The power of the pankus is further indicated by these lines from the 
testament which Hattusilis addresses to Mursilis. 
"The evil from anyone, thou will see; whether anyone sins before the 
god, or anyone speaks any word of evil, then ask again the assembly; thus 
then let the tongue (i.e. the decision) be turned back to the assembly. 
My son what is in [thy] heart, do it." 67 	Apart from the tendency of this 
last line it is obvious that Mursilis is to consult the assembly in 
relation to certain matters at least. 	I do not consider it likely that 
the youth of Mursilis explains this power of the Assembly. 	What we have 
here is the guarantee of the rights of the assembly. 
Hattusilis also instructed the assembly how to behave: toreoveriyou shall not be overweening, let not anyone[be hos] tile, 
and let not anyone violate the word. 	The[affaidof the city Sinanumas, 
and the city Ubariyas. 	You shall not do; let evil not be established. U68 
66. Hardy Op.cit. p.199 
67. Ibid. p.199 
68. Ibid. p.197 
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Gurney's translation gives the reason why the assembly should thus behave: 
"[SO]Hattusas will stand high and my land (will be) at peace. 	But if 
you do not keep the king's word.... you will not remain alive- you will 
perish. ,,69 
Hattusilis is fully aware that the nobility and their supporters have the 
power and the means to wreck the state of Hattusas. 
"When power is distributed on a local basis and put into the hands 
of fighting men, a good deal of rebellion and internecine war can occur. 
All these things have occurred often enough to cause some to say that 
70 anarchy is a normal feature of feudalism." 
What has been recounted indicates the insecurity of the monarchical 
position in the Hittite Old Kingdom. 	This insecurity was basically due 
to the traditionalp,rerogative's. of the nobility which were a nomadic-canton 
inheritance. 	The root cause of conflict between the nobility and the 
king was centred in the attempt being made by the king to establish the 
principle of hereditary succession to the throne. 	That the assembly was 
convened to hear the heir proclaimed is testimony of its ancient right, 
if not to elect the heir, to at least be taken into the king's confidence. 
The very fact that Hattusilis enjoins the assembly to keep his word and 
be loyal to his heir is conclusive proof of the royal recognition of the 
nobilitys power. 	If, as it is held, Hattusilis was trying to establish 
the hereditary principle it is hardly surprising that he omits to refer 
to the ancient right of the nobility to elect the king. 
One is forced to conclude with Moscati that "the peculiar character 
of the Hittite regal power - its limitation and control by the assembly - 
renders it ill adapted to the pursuit of political expansion." 71 	This 
was certainly true of the Old Kingdom. 
Hattusilis further foresaw that if the disowned labarnas-son came 
to power he would avenge himself on the people who had sided with the king 
during the rebellion. 	Being well attuned to the political repercussions 
69. Gurney Op.cit.p.172 
70. Coulborn,R; (ed) Feudalism in History,(Princeton, New Jersey,Princeton 
University Press,1956)p.9 
71. Moscati.Op .cit.p.197 
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of such an event Hattusilis spoke to the following effect in the testament: 
"His mother (is) a serpent; now it shall I -Appen (that) the word of 
his_mother, of his brothers and of his sisters[q will continually hear, 
and he will approach to return vengeance. Tife:marriors, dignitariestanj1 
servants who are appoi[ntecilby the king,[he will sw3ear (of) them: 'Now 
these shall continually die before the king' 	And it shall happen (that) 
whoever are sons of Hatti, he will approach thus, and to whom thee is an 
ox or a sheep he will approach to lead (it) away.... 
Now let it not happen, .afterwards he will establishErly land in rt 'llin."72 
The rebellion in his kingdom must have made a very deep impression 
on Hattusilis since at about the same time as his political testament he 
made a second entreaty to the nobles of his kingdom: 
"And my servants let yo family be one as (that) of the wolf: And 
also whoever makes ineffectual the word of the king - whether the MeSedi-
men, the bastard-men, or the Musa-men make (it) ineffectual(?) - those 
cur[sesi the sons of the palace (i.e., the princes)...., whilch-evea son 
of the palace his(wo]rds shall make ineffectual(?), h[is neck(?) let them) 
ft73 pierce, and let them hang him in his gate 	 
The testament of Hattusilis indicates his indubitable political insight 
While recognizing the power of the nobility he points out that privilege 
must be coupled with 
in so far as he asks 
own ambitions. 	But 
you will perish." 
testament, in so far 
the iron hand in the 
responsibility. 	He appeals to their moral sense 
them to put the stability of the realm before their 
if this appeal should fail "you will not remain alive 
This is the political realist talking. 	In fact the 
as it is directed to the nobility, has as its tactics 
velvet glove. 	The nobility has its importance 
recognized but should they turn their power to destructive uses their end 
point is threatened extermination. 	That an ill and perhaps aged king 
should still concern himself with the future of the kingdom suggests a high- 
minded seriousness and dedication to the office of monarch. 	This is not 
72. Hardy Op.cit. p.197 
73. Ibid p.199-200 
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the least impressive fact to be gleaned from this important document. 
The political testament, is of course, an address delivered by Hattusilis 
to the assembly. 	It is not a royal edict delivered by an official on 
behalf of the king. 	The Hittite king was not remote and detatched from 
his people. 	This intimacy of contact between the assembly a'nd .theking',must 
have been a means whereby the king could rally and enlist the loyalty 
of his subjects if he was a gifted speaker and was able to discern accurately 
the nature of the situation with which he was dealing. 	Homer's 'Iliad' 
has interesting.1speliallels to offer. There we see Agamemnon addressing 
not only the council of lesser kings, but also the whole assembly of 
warriors. 	One is tempted to say that we have in both cases a political 
characteristic which is typically Indo-European and which derives its 
origins from earlier times when the chief was directly responsible to the 
tribesmen who demanded the right to know from their chief his policy 
and decisions. 
Another interesting extract from the testament is informative in a 
way which has at least an indirect bearing on the Hittites as a political 
people. 	Hattusilis is here talking to Mursilis : 
"Keep[thy father';]word: If thou keepest thy father's word, thou 
wilt [eat breadjand drink water. 	When maturity [is within] thee, then eat 
two or three times a day and do thyself well 	("And when]old age is within 
thee, then drink to satiety: 	And then thou mayest set aside thy- father's 
word."74 
This is Hattusilis in the role of pater familias. 	Mursilis is to 
be abstemious. He is to be disciplined and frugal in his private life. 
Excess and self indulgence are to be guarded against since they corrupt 
and prevent one from giving of one's best. It is only when life's work 
has been done that there is justification in indulging in the pleasures 
of the appetites. 	This firmness and hardihood which is to be practised 
in private life is very reminiscent of early Rome. 	There is implicit in 
the quoted extract a sense of dedication to duty. 	With the Hittites 
high position was not synonymous with a life of ease and luxury. 	Again 
74. Gurney Op.cit.p.172 
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we have the suggestion of a mountain origin fraught with hazards which 
not only demanded this frugality but which made any other form of existence 
impossible. 	Such an attitude no doubt had much to do with Hittite 
success in Asia Minor •and the Near East generally. 
But it is not only MurAlis that Hattusilis thus addresses: 
"[NoWlyou (who are) my chief servants,you (too) must[keep]my, my, the king's 
words. 	You shall (only) eat bread and drink water." 75 
If a ruling caste is to survive it must practise the virtue of self 
denial and the ruling family must set the example. 76 	A note of resolution 
and fixity of purpose is struck in the following passage from the Testament: 
"And thou (Mursilis) shalt not delay nor relax. 	If thou delayest 
(it will mean) the same old mischief....What has been laid in thy heart, 
"77 my son, act thereupon always' 
Hattusilis was not only the political head of the Hittite state. i. , He 
was also, it would seem, the guardian of the morals of the state. He 
condemns as sinful ingratitude the disloyalty of the labarnas-son who has 
counted as nothing the kindness and consideration which he, the king, 
had displayed towards him. 78 	There is the quality of the paternal in 
the advice or order that Hattusilis gives in respect to the private life 
of the ruling caste of which he is the leader and 'father' 	This intimacy 
of concern with his nobility not only gives the latter an awareness of 
their importance but it could also foster in them a sense of responsibility 
in relation to the ruled since they are made to appear as a group to 
whom others will look to for guidance and example. 
75. Ibid p.172 
76. A superficial glance at Hittite art permits one to say that it has 
the quality of 'bare necessity'and even starkness. 	If art is 
reflective of the people who produce it the Hittites obviously possessed 
a certain austerity. 
77. Gurney Op.cit p.172. 
78. It may be suggested that some Hittite kings like some of the leading Roman., 
Senators were not devoid of self-righteousness and even priggishness. 
The Apology of Hattusilis III certainly conveys this impression. 
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If religion is reflective of the people the 'Hymn to Telipinus' 
contains some lines which give the impression that the rulers thought 
more of the ruled than merely ruling them: 
"Of the oppressed, the orphan and the widow thou art father (and) 
mother; the cause of the orphan, the oppressed thou, Telipinus, dost 
take to heart." 79 
Goetze considers that it was the aim of each king to get for the 
country and self, health, victory and fertility. 	The ideal is that no- 
body in the land should be needy, hungry or unclothed. 80 
The lines from the political testament, "Till now no onelpf my family] 
has obeyed my will;[but thou," my sonkursilis, thou must obey it," 81 gives 
direct and irrefutable evidence that' the Hittite ruling family was not 
conceived of as blameless and consisting of god-like members to whom no 
evil could be attached. 	This admission by Hattusilis of the misdemeanours 
of his family is proof that responsible and loyal behaviour was expected 
from them. 	If it was not forthcoming the indignity of a public denouncement 
was experienced. 	The idea that privilege was to be equated with respon- 
sibility is obviously evident in this document. 
The testament is also important from another point of view. 	It is 
the first evidence we have which proves that the Hittites had a most powerful 
historical sense. 	It is the first appearance of their capacity to think 
and write as historians in the modern sense. 	The testament provides no 
mere chronicling or listing of events. 	Hattusilis deals with the causes 
and possible effects of the event that he recounts. 	The cause of the 
disastrous family rebellion and the support given to it by members of the 
nobility is the activity of the labarnas-son's mother whom Hattusilis calls 
79. Pritchard,J.B; (ed) Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating  to the Old 
Testament, (2 1 d ed, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press,1955) 
p.397. 
80. Goetze,A; Kleinasien, (Muller, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft,III, 
I,iii, Munchen, 1933), p.83-84. 
.81. Gurney Op.cit. p.171472 
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a serpent. 	The possible effect of this event is to threaten the very 
existence of the Hittite kingdom. 	To offset such a threat Hattusilis 
offers a remedy: loyalty to the king's word and the acceptance of Mursilis 
as the heir to the throne. 	In short, the document is a reasoned piece 
of statecraft. 	It is evidence of clear-sighted political thinking. 
Indeed, it is an appeal to the reason and commonsense of the members -' 
making up the gathering that Hattusilis is addressing. 	They are told 
why the situation has come into being. 	They are informed that their very 
existence could be threatened and they are told how the dilemna can best 
be solved. 	An appeal to the best interests of people is always a worth- 
while starting point. 	The whole approach of Hattusilis is eminently 
reasonable. 
When speaking of the fate in store for the nobility if they do not 
keep the king's word Hattusilis gives an historical example of what formerly 
happened to the nobility when the king's word was not heeded: 
"My grandfather had proclaimed his son Labarnas (as heir to the throne) 
in Sanahuitta,(but afterwar4 his servants and the leading citizens spurned(?) - 
his words and set Papadilmah on the throne. 	Now how many years have elapsed 
andihow many of themj have escaped their fate (?) 	The houses of the leading 
citizens, where are they (?) 	Have they not perished 9 	982 
Hattusilis is really saying that the nobility should take notice of 
the lessons that the past affords and profit by them. 	This awareness 
of the importance of events in time past in relationship to events in 
time present is one of the hall marks-of a politically minded people who 
attempt, by reference to happenings in the past, to remedy present political 
defects. 	Politics is essentially an art which uses the device of reference 
to what has formeilybeen politically. 	Indeed, political sense and the 
possession of an historical sense are inseparable factors. One cannot 
exist without the other. 	As further proof of the Hittite capacity in 
this respect I offer the following lines which are taken from what has been 
called the second entreaty of Hattusilis: 
82. Ibid p.172 
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"The man of the city of Zalpas threw away the word of the father; here 
(is) that city of Zalpas. 	The man of the city of Hassuwas threw away 
the word of the father; this (is) that city of Hassuwas. 	Well, the man of 
the very city Haloes also threw away the word of the father, and the city 
of Halpas will be destroyed.u 83  
One very important, but difficult question, arises in any analysis 
of the political testament. 	Does it indicate that there is both a Hittite 
Assembly and a Hittite Council ? 	The opening lines of the testament 
are worth repeating in this connection: 
"Great King Labarnas spoke to the fighting men of the Assembly and 
the dignitaries.." 	Is this to be taken as meaning that the dignitaries 
belong, not to the Assembly, but comprise another political group ? 	It 
seems likely that the dignitaries formed a royal council of advisors who 
were close to the king and who exercised considerable power. 	The distinction 
between Council and Assembly will become more apparent when the reign of 
Telipinus is discussed. 
• One can well imagine that the Council consisted of the male members of 
the ruling family and the leading men of other Hittite families of standing. 
No doubt the petty kings of the Hittite provinces were summoned to the 
Hittite capital to hear this important proclamation. 84 	Perhaps the Council 
had met and discussed at length with Hattusilis the appointment of the new 
heir. 	It is not surprising that the councillors and the assembly of 
warriors should be at the same gathering to hear the new heir proclaimed. 
It was a formal declaration to all those who had political rights. Even 
if the councillors had assisted in appointing the heir it was a matter of 
form that they should hear, along with the Assembly, the king's official 
statement. 85 
In 'The Iliad' we have Agamemnon addressing both the assembled warriors 
and councillors after he has come to a decision with the latter. 86 That the 
83. Hardy Op.cit. p.200 
84. For a different view see Coulborn Op.cit.p.100-101 
85. The gathering most likely consisted of all those male Hittites who had 
full citizen rights. 
86. Hom.I1.II 48-154 
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Achaean Assembly of warriors was becoming vocal - is proven by the inci-
dent concerning Thersites. 87 	By analogy with the Indo-European Achaeans 
we may say that Hittite. political organisation, regarding the Assembly 
and the Council and their relationship to the king,was possibly similar. 88 
There are sections from the testament which prove that there was 
undoubtedly a Hittite Council. 	The young Mursilis is to have his father's 
instructions read to him month by month. 	This task would surely be 
allotted to the chief councillorsrather than to the whole Assembly of 
warriors. 	Words such as..."you, my servants and leading citizens" and 
"my chief servants" which divide the gathering into at least two groups 
are further proof of the separate existence of a Royal Council. 
The assembled warriors would be essentially Hittite warriors, members 
of the ruling caste upon whom the Hittite king and his councillors were 
dependent for the extension and maintenance of the Hittite kingdom. 	The 
Hittite warriors, aware of their importance in relation to the subject 
natives of Anatolia especially, and to other subject peoples, inevitably 
gained political rights. 	The same may be said in respect to the Achaeans 
who invaded Greece. In Egypt the situation was different. Perhaps one ...: 
87. 11.11 211-264. Hardy Op.cit.p.214 considers that the 'pankus' (assembly) 
probably consisted of the totality of men capable of bearing arms. 
See p.214-215 for a discussion of the Assembly and Council in relation to 
the king. 	Neufeld,E; The Hittite Laws,(London,Luzac)p.113 believes 
• that Hattusilis proclaimed his choice of heir before two assemblies. 
88. Hom.0d.VI 53-55 (c.f.VIII 1-47) Here we see king Alcinous 'going out to 
join his princely colleagues at a conference to which he was called by 
the Phaeacian nobles' See also where the people's meeting place is referred 
to. Od.VI p.266 
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of the reasons why the rank and file of the Egyptian armies never gained 
political rights to the extent that their Hittite counterparts gained them 
was due to the absence in their home territory of a subject indigenous 
population to relationship to whom they could feel important or superior. 
The following lines from the testament further bear out the above con-
tention: 
"The elders of Hatti shall not speak to thee, neither shall a man of.... 
nor a man of Hemmuwa nor a man of Tamalkiya, nor a man of 	 , nor indeed 
any of the people of the country speak to thee." 89 
Gurney considers that Hattusilis is addressing these lines to Mursilis. 9° 
But Hardy holds that they are directed to the assembled gathering. 91 	The 
important point is that these people do not form part of the gathering that 
Hattusilis is addressing. 	That is, they do not have political rights in 
conjunction with the Hittite ruling caste. 	They are the subject people to 
whom full political rights have not been accorded. 	This is direct proof 
that the people addressed by Hattusilis are the ruling caste which has 
superimposed itself upon the native population'of Asia Minor. 
The reference to the elders of Hatti is most instructive. 	It seems 
that the subject people continued to have some form of self government. 
The elders of Hatti may well have comprised a Hattian council which was res-
ponsible for local affairs; a type of county or municipal government. 
In the time of Anittas we saw that Anatolia was divided into principalities 
which had as their centres a number of cities. 	Perhaps each principality 
had a council of elders, which in association with the local chieftain or 
king, had helped to conduct the affairs of the principality. 	By the time 
of Hattusilis there is no reference to the local king or chieftain. 	Apparently 
they had disappeared. 	But in the interests of facilitating administration and 
in the attempt to win the goodwill of the natives the local council had been 
allowed to remain. 	The political rights of these councils would, of course, 
be Hittite controlled. 
89. Gurney Op.cit. p.68 
90. Ibid p.68 
91. Hardy Op.cit.p.197 
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At this stage it is appropriate to deal with a text which makes quite 
clear the nature of local government enjoyed by the subject people. This 
text instructs the commander of the border guards as to his duties in 
respect to local government while he is making a tour of inspection. 	The 
relevant portions of the text are as follows: 
"In the town through which the commander of the border guards ..passes 
on his tour of inspection he shall attend to the necessary.provisions for 
town-elders, priests,'anointed 1 (and) mothers-of-god. He shall speak to 
them as follows: 'The sanctuary which exists in this town, whether it is 
of the Storm-god or of other gods,(30) is now collapsed and in disrepair. 
It is not provided with priests, mothers-of-god (and) 'anointed'. So 
provide it again with such (functionaries)'. 	They shall restore it. As 
it was built previously,(35) so shall they rebOld it. 
Furthermore, due reverence shall be shown to the gods, but to the Storm-
god special reverence shall be shown. 	If some temple has a leaking roof, 
the commander of the border guards and the town commandant shall put it 
right, or (if) any i.hyton of the Storm-god(40) or any implement of any other 
god is in disrepair, the priests, the 'anointed' (and) the mothers-of-god 
shall restore it. 
Furthermore, the commander of the border guards shall make an inventory of 
the god's utensils and send it before the Sun. (Hittite king) 	Furthermore, 
they shall worship the gods on the right dates. 	If a certain date is set 
for some god, they shall worship him on that date.(45) 	If some god has no 
priest, mother-of-god (or) 'anointed', they shall promptly appoint one. 
(iii) If no provisions have been made for sacrifices to the gods' stone 
pillars, provide for them now 	They shall arrange for them and furthermore 
they shall present whatever sacrifices have long been customary. 
The rites which are established for the springs that are in the town, 
(5) they shall go to them and celebrate their rites. 	And those springs: 
for which rites have not been established, they shall go to them all the 
same. 	In no circumstances shall they omit them. 	They shall regularly 
give sacrifices to the mountains (and) to the rivers for which such are 
established."92 
92. Pritchard, J.B; (ed) Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old 
Testament, (2nd ed, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 
1955,) p.208. Sec:5-9. 
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It is evident from this extract that the commander of the 
border guards is reponsible for matters concerned with religion. His 
duty is to see that the town-elders, priests, 'anointed' and mothers-
of-god keep the temples in repair, that the Storm-god receives special 
reverence and that rituals are observed when and where it is proper 
that they should be observed. 	This concern with religion on the part 
of a military commander is not surprising. As the commander of the 
border guards he would be making a tour of those towns which were situated 
on the outskirts of one of the sections of the Hittite kingdom. 	If 
the area was one of rebellious inclination and hard to hold it would be 
thought necessary to make sure that the aid of the gods was enlisted. 
Hence we have this instruction that the commander is to ensure a rigid 
adherence to rites due to the gods to prevent their alienation from the 
Hittite cause. 	The nature of the situation explains the emphasis which 
is to be given to the Storm-god, one of the chief Hittite deities. 	In 
areas which were securely Hittite the supervision of local religious 
practices was probably not as detailed as it undoubtedly was in areas not 
so pacified. 	But this purely religious consideration would not be the 
only factor. 	In areas which are vital from a strategic point of view, 
such as boundaries to a kingdom are, there is a very real necessity for 
control right down to the last detail. 	The people on the outskirts of 
the Hittite kingdom must not be allowed to gain the impression that Hittite 
supervision of strategic outposts is in any way lax. 	Similarly, the 
inhabitants of'the outpost must be made to feel the reality of Hittite 
mastery. 	It is vital in such areas that the attitude of having every- 
thing in a state of preparedness and good repair should be fostered. 
The commander of the border-guards and the town commandant are to 
act inconjunction with each other on one occasion,at least,should that 
occasion arise. 	The town commandant was probably in charge of the local 
military garrison stationed in the particular town which his superior was 
inspecting. 	The town commandant was perhaps a native of the town. Thus 
it is possible that we:have here a point of direct contact between the 
Hittite commander and one of his native subordinates in so far as they 
are made jointly responsible for the completion of the task mentioned. 
Such liasions make good 'sounding boards' for the gauging of local conditions. 
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The power of the Hittite king is made to be felt in outlying 
regions in that an inventory of the god's utensils is to be sent to him. 
This reminder that the power of the king can make itself felt in all 
parts of the kingdom is a good subjugating agency. 	It never does to 
allow the subject population to forget to whom they owe their allegiance. 
The pilfering of temple equipment was a major crime in Hittite law. 
This was not only in the interests of keeping the favour of the gods 
but it is also to be seen as a means of preventing the priestly caste 
from becoming too wealthy and thus powerful. 92 	As far as can be 
ascertained the priests of the Hittite world never attained the power 
and influence of the priests in Egypt. 
The text continues : 
"Furthermore, the commander of the border guards, the town commandant 
and the elders shall judge and decide legal cases (10) in accordance with 
the law. As it has been from older days - in a town in which they have 
been accustomed to imposing the death penalty, they shall continue to do 
so. But in a town where they have been accustomed to imposing exile, 
they shall continue that (custom). 	Furthermore, the citizens shall bathe 
afterward and there shall be a public announcement. 	No one shall let 
(the exiled) return. 	He who lets him return, shall be put in prison 	 
If anyone brings suit by means of a sealed brief, the commander of 
the border guards shall judge it according to the law and set them right. 
If the case is too much, he shall send it before the Sun. 
(25) He must not decide it in favour of his superior, he must not 
decide it in favour of his brother, his wife or his friend; no one shall 
be shown any favour. 	He must not make a just case unjust; 	he must 
not make an unjust case just. 	Whatever is right, that shall he do. 
92. Pritchard,J.B; (ed) Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the  
Old Testament, (2nd ed, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton Univertity 
Press, 1955,) p.208. Sec. 5-9. 
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Whenever you arrive at a town, call all the people of the town 
(30) together. 	For him who has a complaint, judge it and set him 
right. 	If a man's slave or a man's slave-girl or a widowed woman has 
a complaint (against someone) judge it for them and set them right. 
Should Kaasiya people, Himmuwa people, Tagaramma people and Isuwa people 
be there, (35) attend to them in every way."93 
This section is of first rate importance to any understanding of 
the Hittite attitude towards the subject population. 	The most important 
fact which emerges is the Hittite respect for local law. 	There is the 
recognition that different people in different locales will inevitably 
have different punishments for the same offence. 	But while respect and 
toleration of difference are evident it is not a case of_ letting the subject 
people have complete control of their legal affairs. 	The commander of 
the border guards judges cases in association with the town commandant 
and the elders. 	The administration of law is closely supervised by 
a Hittite army officer. 	With some law suits, those which come "by means 
of a sealed brief", the commander of the border guards shall judge it 
according to the law and set them right." Here we have a Hittite military 
officer judging alone but in accordance with local law. 	Again it is a 
question of making Hittite control felt and of ensuring official judicial 
proceedings. 	But the law has not been altered to make it adhere to 
Hittite legal practices. 	The impression is given that the Hittites are 
intent on seeing that justice is scrupulously done. It is reminiscent 
of the Persian attitude to the application of law even though the fate 
of a corrupt judge may not have been similar. 94 
This Hittite administration of local law means that the local officials 
have had their power curtailed. 	But there was possibly a feeling of 
gratitude on the part of the subjects because of the preservation of the 
laws with which they were familiar. 	Perhaps the Hittites also earned 
the gratitude of the subject people by ensuring that justice was done and 
that care was taken to guard against corruption. 	The commander of the 
border guards is not to be a free agent dispensing justice as he sees fit. 
His conduct was regulated and there were various dictates that he had 
to obey. 
93. Ibid. p.210-211 
94. Hdt.V. .28 
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This text offers further proof of the Hittite capacity to organize. 
One gains the impression that there has been an attempt to take everything 
into account. 	A public announcement would make the peoNe of the 
town familiar with the decision that had been reached. Ignorance was 
not to be an exuse. 	The people of the town were called together to give 
them a chance to air their grievances and have them set right if the 
commander of the border guard has the power to oblige. 	Again there is 
the opportunity for the Hittites to gauge the nature and trend of public 
opinion. 
But the commander is not the only Hittite arbiter of local law cases. 
He is only the king's representative in certain cases. 
"If the tase is too much he shall send it before the Sun". 
The power of the commander is thus circumscribed. 	No doubt those cases 
which involved treasonable behaviour were cases for the court of the king. 
Any activity which threatened the Hittite Empire would be dealt with by 
the king. 	The significance of the intervention of the king in affairs 
pertaining to outlying regions has already been stated. 	It would not 
only be dangerous to place too much judicial power in the hands of an 
army officer who had the command of a vital sector of the realm, but it 
would also make the ultimate Hittite power less in the eyes of the subject 
peoplez 
We also know that the elders of towns,o1r,some occasions at least, 
exercised the sole legal power; 
"If anyone finds an ox, a horse (or) a mule, he shall drive it to 
the king's court. 	If he finds it in the country, the elders may assign 
it to him and he may harness it. 	When its owner finds it, he shall 
receive the respective animal; there shall be no question of a thief. 
If the elders do not assign it (to him), he becomes a thief."95 
Thus although the commander of the border guards and the king 
exercised legal control in respect t) certain local affairs the independence 
of the elders in these matters still existed in some circumstances. No 
doubt the cases that the elders tried had only a local significance that 
did not bear directly on the Hittite state. 	A minority ruling caste would 
have no alternative other than to permit the continuance of judicial self— 
determination up to a point at least. 	This is not only to be explained 
95. Pritchard J.B; (ed) Op.cit. p.192 Law 71 
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on the basis of available Hittite man—power, but it is also indicative 
of a Hittite awareness that such an attitude is least likely to alienate 
the ruled. 
Theimention of the Kassiya people, Himmuwa ,ipeople, Tagaramma people 
and Isuwa people is very significant. 	If they are present they are to 
be attended in every way. 	They are obviously privileged people. The 
people of Hemuwa previously "did not render any services and did not 
perform socage."96 	One does not have to look far to find the reasons 
for the importance of these specified peoples. 	The Hurrians, who were 
ruled by the Mitanni, were troublesome during the reign of Hattusilis. 
A glance at the map (p.i) indicates that Kassiya, Tagaramma and Isuwa 
could act as buffers against the Hurrians and make it difficult for them 
to gain a foothold in - Asia Minor. 	Secondly, Kassiya, Tagaramma and Isuwa 
lie to the south—east of Hattusas. That is, they lie immediately in that 
area which gave the Hittites access to Syria and Mesopotamia. 	It is 
small wonder that they were given special consideration since the main 
Hittite line of expansion was essentially towards the south—east. 
Because the text giving instructions to the commander of the border 
guards has been discussed in this chapter it is not to be taken that I 
necessarily consider it to belong to the time of Hattusilis. 	But since 
it does not seem possible to assign this text to any definite period of 
time and because the political testament of Hattusilis necessitated an 
analysis of the role of town elders I have thought it appropriate to 
include the text in this chapter. 	Since Hattusilis conquered Aleppo 
the importance given to the above mentioned peoples, who are basically 
connected with the Hittite approach to northern Syriamakeditnot impossible 
that the text belongs to his time. 	Being the first Hittite king to conquer 
Aleppo it would be good policy to make secure the line of approach, by 
the granting of concessions to the people in the areas centred on that 
line of approach, to northern Syria. 	It is well to keep in mind that 
Aleppo rebelled later in the reign of Hattusilis. 	He may well have 
been aware of this danger. 	Hence his concern with the avenue of approach 
to northern Syria. 
96. Ibid. p.192 Law 54. Goetze, p.211,footnote 2, appears to equate 
Himmuwa with Hemuwa. 
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In conclusion it is necessary to explain the significance of 
moving the Hittite capital from Kussara to Hattusas. 	Gurney has the 
following to say about this important change: 
"The successor of Labarnas, Hattusilis I, was remembered in later 
times as king of Kussara, arid it was at this city Ithat.he delivered:thec'speech 
which is our main source of information for political conditions in the 
early kingdom. 	However, the same document shows elearly that the 
administrativescapital at the end of his reign was Hattusas; it also 
indicates that his original name was not Hattusilis but Labarnas, like 
his father. 	Hence we may conclude that this king during the course of 
his reign transferred his capital from Kussara to Hattusas and adopted 
in consequence the name of Hattusilis. 	His choice of this northern 
stronghold as his capital was doubtless guided by strategical considerations. 2 
But what were these strategical considerations ? 	Gurney oonsiders 
that "the ancient city of Kussara, which has not indeed been located, 
may well have been south of the Halys." 98 	Mellaart says that "although 
the location of Kussara is still disputed, we have elsewhere brought 
forward arguments that it may have been at Alishar, a great Middle Bronze 
Age city which appears to fulfil all the requirements."99 	Garstang 
considers that Samuha might be located at Malatia. 10° Garstang continues: 
"The fact that Samuha was associated in some way with Kussara... indicates 
broadly an area of search for the ancestral home of the Hittite kings."101 
Malatia (Maldiya) lies well to the south-east of Hattusas quite near to 
the region where the Mitanni settled. 	I would tend to the conclusion 
that Kussara was situated too close to the Mitanni for comfort and that 
it did not enjoy the natural strategic advantages possessed by Hattusas. 
It has already been noted that the Hurrians gave trouble during the reign 
Of Hattusilis. 	This may well explain the move from Kussara to Hattusas. 102 
97. Gurney. Op.cit.p.22-23. For a different view see Cavaignac,E. Les Hittite , 
(L'Orient ancien Must/4, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1950), p.18 and Hardy. 
Op.cit. p.185-186. 
98. Gurney. Op.cit. p.22 
99. Mellaart,J; "The End of the Early Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Aegean," 
AJA,Vol.62,(1958), p.14 
100.GarstangJ;"Samuha and Malatia", JNES,Vol.1,(1942),p.458. Malatia equals 
Maldiya in Garstang and Gurney's map. See p.i of this thesis. 
101. Ibid. p.459 
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Garstang makes a very interesting observation when comparing the 
sites of Angora (Ankara) and Boghazkeui (Hattusas) : 
"As the road and trade centre of the western peninsula, Angora was 
well chosen as a site of the modern capital of Turkey; and it is 
interesting to reflect that from the days when the Hittite capital was 
stationed at Boghzkeui no deliberate effort has been made to rule and 
organize the country from within until today, after an interval of 3000 
years. 	It is instructive to compare the situation of the two capitals. 
That of the Hittites is found where Nature afforded it protection and 
strategical advantage as regards the south-eastern frontier: but the 
problems of modern Turkish administration today are of necessity concerned 
more intimately with the European aspect." 103 
Thus we may say that Hattusilis, the first Hittite king of whom 
we know who made a drive in a south-easterly direction which had northern 
Syria as its objective, chose for his capital a position which gave him 
"protection and strategical advantage as regards the south-eastern 
frontier." 	That this was one of the main reasons for the choice of 
Hattusas is borne out by the line of expansion taken by later kings. 
Again it is informative to quote Garstang : 
..."while the course of the Halys river marks a convenient outline for 
this region, it provided only on the north-west a political boundary and 
protection. "'° 4 	The situation of HattusaS . 5 enabled it to take advantage 
of this protection afforded by the Halys. 	If the Hittites gained access 
to the Anatolian plateau from the north-west they would, knowing the ease 
of such an approach, be intent on gaining a position which would give 
them protection against an invasion from the north-west. 
103. Garstang,J; The Hittite Empire, (London, Constable, 1929), p.61 
104. Ibid p. 75 
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Garstang continues : 
"On the other hand, towards the east and south the ways lay 
relatively open. 	We are now in a position to apply these conclusions 
to the position of the capital from the strategic standpoint....the site 
of Hattusas does not mark precisely the natural route-centre of this 
area: 105 the roads that convevged upon it were directed there by man. 
Difficult of access, by way of defiles that required to be known to 
be turned to advantage, commanding the approaches to more favourable 
lands in several directions, it was essentially the raider's retreat. 
Tactically good as a centre for tribal expansion, it possessed none of 
the advantages which might pre-determine the strategical and commercial 
capital of an empire, such natural facilities of communication for example 
as are found in the sites of Amaseia, Sebasteia(Sivas),Mazaca, Tyana, and 
Iconium. 	A glance at the map will show these very places to form a 
ring in the centre of which stood the city of Hatti(Hattusas). 	They 
lay like advanced posts beyond the Asiatic,frontier. $4106 
Thus Hattusas was ringed by a chain of cities which gave protection 
to the capital from the east, south-east and south-west. 107 These 
cities must be seen as strategic outposts which were capable of offering 
opposition to hostility from the east, south-east and south-west. 	Even 
if they fell the way to Hattusas was still far from easy. 	When Kizzuwatna 
and Mitanni became part of the Hittite empire yet another line of defence 
to offer invading armies from the east and south-east was created. 
105. Garstang,J; "Hittite Military roads in Asia Minor",AJA,Vol.XLVII,No.1, 
(January-March 1943),p.37 remarks as follows:"The Hittite capital 
was not itself a natural road centre, but it occupied a defensible 
position not far from the crossing point at Yuzgat of two ancient trade 
routes: one from the northern coast at Samsun towards Cilicia and Syria; 
the other from the upper Euphrates westward to the Aegean Sea..." 
106. Garstang,J; The Hittite Empire (London,Constable,1929),p.75-76. For the 
map referred to see page 76. 
107. The advanced posts of Mazaca and Tyana to the south-west would afford 
the capital protection from the Arzawans. 
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Still talking of these advanced posts Garstang continues : 
"The routes connecting them provided lateral lines of communication, 
and the tracks along the ranges completed the scheme. 	The immediate 
rivals and dangers lay to the east and south-east beyond the wall of 
mountains, and it is from this standpoint that the value of the situation 
of Hattusas can be appreciated and understood. 	The original strength 
of its position lay in its natural defensibility, and this was supple- 
mented in time by walled ramparts; 	but the secret of its development 
as an imperial capital lay in the organisation of its radiating communi- 
cations with the great road centres. 	No headquarter stiff could have 
devised a more perfect defensive system; history shows how the empire 
grew and was maintained upon these lines of which Hattusas....was the 
focus. ' 108 
It was geographical considerations which made the south-eastern 
approach to Syria from Hattusas easier than the more direct southerly 
approach through Cilicia. 	The histotic route through the Cilician Gates 
is the only pass available for traffic through the unbroken rock wall 
of Taurus. 	It was not until Persian times that this narrow defile became 
a main thoroughfare. 	The rivers Sarus and Pyramus which link Cilicia 
with the Anatolian plateau do not provide readily accessible channels 
of communication through Taurus. 	Thus it is unlikely that the chief 
military communications of the Hittites with Syria passed through Cilicia 
as they did in the time of Persian and Macedonian supremacy. 109 The 
eastward pass of Amanus is high and rocky and it is doubtful whether wheeled; 
chariots could go that way before Roman times. 110 	Indeed, the Amanus 
range forms the barrier between the south-east corner of Asia Minor and 
northern Syria. 	The route round the coast to Alexandretta and the Beilan 
pass is a more practicable line of approach but where it skirts the sea 
at the Gates of Syria it meets with rocky promontories which have called 
for centuries of skilfUl engineering and bridge-building. 	The passage 
108. Garstang,J.;The Hittite Empire, (London, Constable, 1929),p.76-77 
109. Tarn,W.W.; Alexander the Great, (Boston, Beacon Press,1956),p.23 
110. Xen.Anabasis I. 4.4-5. 	Cyrus seems to have avoided this pass on 
his eastward march. 
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by the sea across the bay would appear a likely possibility but there 
is nothing to suggest that the Hittites transported troops by ship. 
Thus the main line of communication from Hattusas to Syria was 
inevitably forced in a south-easterly direction to the highland routes 
which issued from the plateau by the passes of anti-Taurus. 	And from 
centres such as Marash and Maldiya it was possible for Hittite alrmies- 
to descend on such Syrian cities as Carchemish and Aleppo. 111 The Hittites, 
having decided upon their lines of expansion, chose a site for their 
capital which made more likely of success their ventures to the south-east. 
111. Gurney. Op.cit. Fig.1 - Map of Asia Minor. 
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MURSILIS  
Mursilis, the heir designated by Hattusilis, was the next Hittite 
king. The testament of Hattusilis suggests that Mursilis was probably 
very young when he came to the throne: 
"When three years have elapsed he shall go on a campaign....If you 
take him[while still a child]with you on a campaign, bring(hirdbackc .safe14."1 
Hattusilis may have been ill when he made his speech to the assembly. 
If he died shortly after the speech Mursilis was possibly only fourteen 
or fifteen years old when he took the kingship. 	The three year lapse 
referred to would make him seventeen or. eighteen; old enough to independently 
undertake military campaigns. 	It is possible, then, that there may have 
been some form of regency while Mursilis was still too young to assume full 
monarchical responsibility. 	The fact that his education was entrusted 
to the nobility makes such e speculation feasible. 
If Mursilis was only fourteen or fifteen when Hattusilis died the 
injunctions of the latter to the assembled Hittite warriors and nobility 
must have had good effect. 	While Mursilis was young and inexperienced 
the situation would have been ideal for a coup d'etat by a leading Hittite 
who had a following at his call. 	But such did not eventuate. 	However, 
it must be admitted that there is no direct evidence to disprove the idea 
that Hattusilis lingered on for several more years, thus allowing Mursilis 
to grow somewhat older and so become more versed in the art of political 
survival. 	The proclamation of Telipinus indicates that MUrsilis did not 
have any trouble in gaining the throne and that his early regnal years were 
not torn by family feuds. 
8 
(25)"When Mursilis became king in Hattusilis, then likewise his sons, 
his brothers, his relatives in law, the members of his family, and his 
soldiers were united. (26) And by (his) strength he kept the hostile 
country in subjection. (27) And he made the countries tremble (?); and 
he made them boundaries of the sea." 2 
1. Gurney. The Hittites,(2nd)ed,Harmondsworth, Middlesex,Penguim Books Ltd, 
1954,)p.171 
2. Sturtevant,E.H - and Bechtel,G.; A Hittite Chrestomathy,(Philadelphia,1935),  
p.185. 
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This extract gives the impression that Hittite controlled territory 
was in no way diminished during the reign of Mursilis. 	Arzawa still 
belonged to the kingdom; Ankuwas, San'ahuittas, Hurmas and Ullumas, chief 
cities of the time of Hattusilis, were still important. 	But even so 
trouble did occur within the Hittite kingdom and Mursilis was occupied 
in the field suppressing rebellious cities and protecting his outlying 
provinces. 3 
Burushadum was rebellious but the inhabitants became the king's 
captives and the city was destroyed. 	Apparently the lenient policy of 
Anittas in connexion with this city had not been altogether successful. 
Also Zalpas, which apparently , had not been sufficiently subjugated, again 
revolted. 	The Zalpas episode informs us that there may still have been 
disloyalty within the ranks of the ruling family. 	Happis, the leader 
or organizer of the insurrection, may have been the son of the king. 4 
These events with which Mursilis concerned himself in the Hittite kingdom 
must have taken place before his raid on Babylon since we know that he was 
assassinated shortly after his return from Mesopotamia. 5 	If Mursilis 
was young when he came to the throne his son would not be capable of leading 
an insurrection until sometime later. 	Thus if Happis was his son, and 
the Telipinus proclamation informs us that he had sons, the Zalpas affair 
must have occurred just before the attack on Babylonia. 
But we learn that the Zalpas incident must have taken place some time 
before the campaign to the south-east. 	Mursilis marched to the city 
Hanahsus where he defeated the troops of Zalp"a's;s 2 but Happis escaped. 
In three years time the king returned to Zalpas and besieged it. The city 
refused to surrender Happis and Mursilis accordingly gave greater impetus 
to the campaigoihg-against"Zalpas.As a result many were killed. 	It was 
now time for Mursilis to go to Hattusas to officiate at religious ceremonies. 
But he left the great men to continue the siege against Zalpas. 	When the 
king returned the city was finally taken. 6 	In view of the possible youth 
3. Hardy,R.S; "The Old Kingdom",AJSL,vol.LVIII,(1941) p.201. 
4. Ibid p.201-202 
5. Van der Meer,P; The Chronology of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt,(2nd ed, 
Leiden,E.J;Brill, 1955),p.90 and Gurney Op.cit. p.24. 
6. Hardy. Op.cit.p.202 
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of Mursilis and the fact that Zalpas revolted some time before the 
raid on Babylonia it seems that Happis may not have been the sone of 
the king. 	But since there is no way at present of determining the length 
of the reign of Mursilis this question must remain open. However, it 
must be admitted that the Telipinus Proclamation credits Mursilis with 
sons at the time he ascended the throne. 7 The evidence is difficult to 
reconcile. 	But this much is certain: 	leaving aside the question of the 
age of Mursilis when he ascended the throne we may conclude that if had 
grown sons at that time they did not immediately become disloyal. 	If 
there had been treachery on the part of one of the sons of Mursilis early 
in his reign we can be rest assured that Telipinus would have mentioned 
it in his Proclamation. 	It was the objective Of the Proclamation to 
point to the disruption caused by such disloyalty. 	The more treachery 
he could indicate themere forcible the message of Telipinus became. 
One is tempted to conclude in the followingomay. 	The Proclamation 
of Telipinus offers official state information. 	Therefore Mursilis more 
than likely had grown sons when he came to the throne. 	But they did not 
become rebellious during the early years of their father's reign. Secondly, 
the history of Hittite politics does not indicate that a youthful heir 
to the throne would long Survive his father's death if he, the heir, was 
still a youth. 	Thus Hattusilis perhaps recovered from his illness and 
ruled for several more years. 8 
In connection with the Zalpas incident a characteristic feature of 
the Hittite monarchyemerges. 	The king waspprepared to delegate military 
power9 and, as we saw in the last chapter, judicial power as well. 	But 
the Hittite_king was apparently loathe to delegate religious obligations. 
Guterbock writes asffollows about Hittite religion : 
7. Supra p.105 
8. But Hardy is not sure whether or not Happis was the son of Mursilis. 
Op.cit.p.201-202. 
9. Supra p.106 
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"The main sources of our knowledge of the Hittite religion are the 
thousands of religious texts contained in the royal archives at Bogha4eui. 
It is not accidental that by far the largest number of all tablets found 
there are of the type generally called 'religious texts': this is a vivid 
manifestation of the religious character of the Hittite kingship. Tablets 
have been found at Boghazkeui mainly in one of the Temples and on the 
citadel. 	But this does not mean that religious texts were kept in the 
'Temple Library', ot political documents in the 'Palace Archives', on the 
contrary, at both places there were found all kinds of texts, which again 
shows that there was no distinction between what we would call the religious 
and political functions of the king and his court." 1° 
The Hittite king was chief priest. 	At first sight it might appear 
that the Hittite state had theocratic tendencies. 	A theocracy exists 
of course when the state is governed by God, directly or through a Sacerdotal 
class. 	But the Hittite state was not a theocracy because there the king 
became the chief priest rather than the chief priest became the king. 
If one reads the descriptions of the elaborate and meticulously organised 
religious festivals celebrated by the king, often covering several days 
and sometimes including travels to many shrines of the country, one wonders 
how Hittite kings found time to do anything else. 11 	But as Goetze says: 
"Engaged in warfare during the summer season, worshipping the gods took 
a considerable part of his time during the winter." 12 
In other words religious observations seem to have been so organized 
,., as to prevent them from often clashing with -the campaigning season. The 
above case of Mursilis sees such a clash. 
But why did the Hittite king take unto himself the office of chief 
priest and why was he so intent on fulfilling the functions inevitably 
associated with the office to the extent of leaving a military operation 
hanging in the balance ? 
10. Guterbock,H.G; "Hittite Religion" in Forgotten Religions,(ed,V.Ferm) 
New York, (1949), p.83 
11. Goetze,A; "The Roads of Northern Cappadocia in Hittite Times,RHA,Tome XV, 
Fascitule 51,(1957), p.91-99 
12. Ibid, p.91 
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Firstly, the appearance of the Hittite king in an officiating 
capacity at the many festivals celebrated at local shrines by the ethnic 
groups of Anatolia identified him with the religious .practices of his 
Subjects. 	It fulfilled much the same purpose as when Cyrus grasped the 
hand of Bel. 	It gave official sanction to, and exhibited respect and 
toleration of, the religious customs of the people of Asia Minor. The 
mere fact that the king found time to attend to such ceremonies must have 
gained considerable respect for the Hittite monarchy. 	We know that Hittite 
kings celebrated religious festivals as far afield as Kizzuwatna. 	It 
was a means of making the Hittite empire a more closely knit organisation. 
Hittite subjects would be made to feel more than just subjects ruled in 
a detached manner from Hattusas. The idea that present day Royal Tours 
have as their object the strengthening of Commonwealth ties is not as 
vainly pretentious as the superficial reactions to them would indicate. 
But no doubt these religious tours also had a more prosaic motivation. 
Indeed, they may be seen as Royal Tours of inspection which enabled the 
king and his dignitaries 13 to scrutinize at close range such aspects of 
empire as the efficiency,or otherwise, of administration. 	The mere annual 
presence of the king, regular and precise, must have done something in 
the way of discouraging inefficiency and subversive tendencies. 14 Such 
travelling, to be done efficiently, presupposed a developed road system 
on which the chariots or, for longer distances, the carriage of the king 
and his entourage could move quickly.- 5 
Since the king was chief priest he would have general supervision of 
all activities related to religion. 	This may partially explain why it 
was that a priestly class with excessive wealth, and consequently political 
power, never arose and threatened the Hittite monarchy. 
13. Guterbock Op.cit.p.96 
14. Though it may be argued conversely that this very regularity of royal 
visits gave the opportunity for the temporary suspension of administrative 
malpractices during the king's brief stay. 
15. Goetze,A; The Roads of Northern Cappadocia in Hittite Times," RHA, 
Tome xv,Fascicule 51,(1957),p.91. 
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There is evidence in Hittite religious texts of an obsession with 
the mechanics of the ritual. 	The procedure to be followed in the ritual 
is carefully formulated right down to the last detail. The impression 
is given that the observance of procedure is of more importance than the 
religious idea inherent in the celebration. 	The analogy with Roman 
religion is all too apparent. 	Hand in hand with this type of attitude 
is the idea that punctuality is imperative in the celebration of the festival 
or ritual. 	Just as the gods will not pay attention if there is an omission 
of detail while the festival is being celebrated so they will pay nal heed 
if the celebration does not occur at the appointed time. In this way 
we may explain why Mursilis hastened back to Hattusas to fulfil his religious 
obligations. 
The following extract from a ritual text makes this obsession with 
exactitude more evident: 
"The king and queen go into the temple of Zabaha. 	They kneel once 
before the spear; the statue-worshipper speaks, the herald calls.... 
The king and queen sit down on the throne. 	The palace servant brings 
in the cloth of the golden spear and the 'lituus'. He gives the cloth of 
the golden spear to the king, but he puts the 'lituus' by the throne on 
the right of the king. 
Two palace--servants bring the king and queen water for the hands from 
a jar of gold.... The king and queen wash their hands. 	The chief of 
the palace-servants gives them a cloth and they wipe their hands. 
Two palace servants place a knee cloth for the king and queen. 
The verger walking in front, the 'table-men' step forward. 
The verger walks in front and shows the king's sons to their seats. 1,16 
This capacity to organize so minutely the procedure of a ceremony 
is reflective of the Hittites as a ruling caste. 	Their undoubted gift 
for organizing and regulating suggests that they were a people of a practical 
bent who indulged not in mere speculation but rather in the application of 
positive solutions, perhaps mechanical and fixed if one judges from their 
religious texts alone, to the various political and imperial dilemmas which 
confronted them. They appear to have been essentially a people with their 
16. Gurney.Op.cit.p.154 
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feet very much on the ground. 	If the Hittites were not the -most 
imaginative of peoples they may have a reasonable claim to having been 
one of the most practical. 	Texts, such as "The Instructions to the 
Commander of the Border Guards" offer further proof of this ability for 
organized thinking and the consequent likelihood of organized, successful 
application of instructions. An analysis of their treaties with the 
subject peoples makes these qualities more manifest. 
According to Hardy the Habiru appear for the first time among the 17 Hittites during the reign of Mursilis. 	He considers that the Hittites 
hired them as mercenaries. 18 	This idea is, to say the least, very doubtful. 
If the Habiru are the Hebrews, as it is often held, it is difficult to see 
them soldiering in Asia Minor as early as the time of Mursilis. Gurney 
makes the following statement in connection with mercenaries: 
"For garrison duties there must have been a small standing army . 
containing a certain proportion of mercenary troops but we know little about 
its method of recruitment. .19 
By far the most significant event of the reign of Mursilis was his 
expedition to northern Syria and Mesopotamia. In respect to this adventure 
the Telipinus Proclamation gives the following information: 
9 
(28) And he went to Aleppo, and destroyed Aleppo, and brought captives 
and possessions of Aleppo to Hattusas. 
(29)Then afterwards he went to Babylon, and destroyed Babylon, and defeated 
the Hurrians, and carried captives and possessions of Babylon to Hattusas."2 0 
The expedition to northern Syria must have hadr!as its objective the 
reaffirming of Hittite control over the rebellious Aleppo. 	The fact that 
Mursilis destroyed Aleppo after his father had reduced it to some status 
of dependency indicates rebellion on the part of the dependent. Perhaps 
the failure of Roman policy towards Greece and the consequent sacking of 
Corinth by Mummius in 146 B.C., offers an interesting analogy. 	The whole 
affair presupposes a serious breach of conduct on the part of Aleppo. 
17. Hardy Op.cit.p.201. 
18. For a discussion of the Habiru see Unger,M.F; Israel and the Aramaeans of  
Damascus, (London, James Clarke and Co.Ltd.,1957),p.11-12. 
19.Gurney Op.cit.p.108 
20.Sturtevant and Bechtel. Op.cit. p.185. 
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The section quoted from the Telipinus Proclamation gives the 
impression that Mursilis, after destroying Aleppo, took captives and 
returned to Hattusas. 	Afterwards he went to Babylon. 	Even though the 
raid on Babylon may not have been a direct continuation from the punitive 
campaign against Aleppo, though it more than likely was, we may be reasonably 
assured that Mursilis operated against Babylon from military bases in 
northern Syria. 	The proximity of Aleppo to the Euphrates river suggests 
this. 	Mursilis would wish to harve a base close handy upon which to fall 
back should his expedition down the Euphrates lead him into difficulties. 
The wealth of the First Dynasty of Babylon and its decline in power 
must have been the inducement to the Hittite raider to undertake this 
perilous foray. 	The reasons for the raid and the reasons for its success 
are, I think, admirably summed up in this excerpt from the Cambridge Ancient 
History : 
"The last kings of the dynasty were far more attached to their temples 
than to the camp. 	They multiplied their gifts in gold and silver to 
their gods, they dedicated emblems, statues, thrones, maces, solar disks; 
sometimes they built towns or digged canals called after their own names. 
But they were unwarlike and were shadows of their great predecessor 
Hammurabi, and our knowledge of them decreases as the dynasty dr-Lws near 
its end... 
It was owing to this weakness that the ...Hittites suddenly appeared 
in Babylonia in a raid down the Euphrates, and were able to invade the 
land with impunity in the reign of the last king Samsu-ditana. 	The Chronicle 
describes the invasion with the words: 
"In the time of Shamash-ditana Hattu came to Akkad" 
This Hittite raid on Samsu-ditana down the Euphrates marks the end 
of the 1st Dynasty of Babylon. 	Samsu-ditana might call to his aid 'the 
great forces of Shamash and Marduk', but nothing could stay the fast flowing 
sands of his dynasty. He was prepared to meet his enemy only when he could 
look at him from the bastions of his city walls: so much perhaps one may 
glean from the following letter from him to Sippar: 'concerning what ye 
wrote to me, saying,"The corn which is in Sippar-Ya'rurum - it is not 
right that it be left on the land to the mercy of the enemy troops; let 
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the king our lord command that order be sent to us that the Shamash-gate 
be opened, and then this corn can be brought into the town". 	This is 
what you sent. 	As soon as they have finished the corn, which is the 
town-crops, open the Shamash-gate, and then until they have finished 
(bringing in) the corn which is the town-crops, seat the judges (i.e., 
in the gate), and let them not be negligent about guarding the gate:' 
If this letter is to be ascribed to the time of the Hittite raid, the 
reference to Sippar shows that the enemy certainly appears to be from the 
north rather than the south. 	It is clear that the harvesters went almost 
in fear of their lives in bringing in the grain from the adjacent fields, 
for the city gate, now closed, could only be opened when the wisest and 
most responsible burghers of the town were acting as sentinels." 21 
A Babylonian inscription informs us that the Kassite king, Agum II, 
brought Marduk back to Babylon after an absence of twenty four years. 
The narrative of the inscription tells us that Marduk had remained in the 
Hittite land for these twenty four years in order to keep an eye on the 
trade relations between the Hittites and the Babylonians. 22 
Before the success of Mursilis against Babylon the 1st Dynasty of 
Babylon had been weakened by the encroachments of the Kassites. 	Mursilis' 
raid further weakened an already tottering dynasty and the end of Samsu- 
ditana's reign saw the Kassites ruling all of Babylonia. 	The activities of 
21. C.A.H., (Cambridge, eambridge University Press, 1923), R.Campbell Thompson, 
Vol.1., chap.XV,i, p.561-562. 
22. Van der Meer, P; The Chronology of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt, 
(2nd ed, Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1955), p.22. But the Telipinus text says 
that Mursilis took "captives and possessions of Babylon to Hattusas" 
Marduk had no alternative but to stay with the Hittites. The trade- 
relations reason may be seen as an attempt to save face on the patt of the 
Babylonians. 	Following the death of Mursilis a condition near to 
anarchy prevailed in the Hittite kingdom. 	During the twenty four 
years referred t9, trade relations between the Hittites and the Babylonians 
must have been insignificant. 
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Mursilis most certainly hastened the process whereby the Kassites came 
to power in Babylonia. 	Agum II was a Kassite king. 	On the other hand 
Kassite infiltration, to some, extent at least, explains the victory of 
Mursilis in Mesopotamia. 
Van der Meer writes as follows : 
"According to ,atetof Telipinus, Mursilis I advanced on Babylon, 
took :Iptisoners and booty with him to Hattusas and captured Babylon. 
Among the booty were the figures of Marduk and Sarpanitum, which remained 
in Hattusas for twenty four years. 	In the inscription of Agum mentioned 
above he states that when the god Marduk, lord of Esagila, had decided 
to return to Babylon, he (Agum) went to the land of the Suti, to Hana, 
in order to bring Marduk and Sarpanitum to Babylon, where he caused them 
toenter the restored Esagila." 23 	Thus it would appear that in the period 
of anarchy, following the assassination of Mursilis, the Hittites lost a 
portion of this booty. 	They most likely lost it to the Hurrians who gave 
the Hittites much trouble during this period of domestic chaos. 
This precocious feat on be part of Mursilis did not result in any 
territorial acquisition for the Hittites. 	It was a plundering raid of 
a transitory nature since Murtilis at once marched away again and he did 
not hold Babylon under Hittite rule. 	Indeed, we do not know of any other 
Hittite attempt on Babylon. 	Northern Syria, and the Mitanni kingdom 
centred in the area of the Khabur river were to be the main areas vhich 
occupied Hittite arms in the south-east. 	But Mursilis had utilised the 
advantages offered by the site of Hattusas which suggested the line of 
expansion he took. - 
Dynastic strife and Hurrian inroads into Asia Minor made impossible 
for many years any 'follow-up' campaign against Babylonia which the Hittites 
may have had in mind. 	By the time order and stability had been recovered 
again in the Hittite kingdom the Kassites had firmly established themselves 
in Babylonia. 
23. Van der Meer. Op.cit. p.22 
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This first direct Hittite contact, about the year 1550 B.C.,with 
a people who possessed political practices markedly different from those 
of the Hittites may explain, to some extent at least, the transformation 
that Hittite political forms underwent in the New Empire. But not only 
is Babylonia to be taken into account in this connection. Now that the 
Hittites had gained access to northern Syria the influence of Egypt on 
Hittite political institutions must have become an important factor. 
The Hittites have now entered the complex of Ancient Near Eastern 
international affairs. 	Their success against Babylon must have heightened 
imperial ambitions. 	Any feeling of inferiority which the Hittites may 
have had in relationship •to a people who possessed a superior culture must 
have been drastically reduced. 
During this Babylonian adventure the Hittites again came into 
collision with the Hurrians. 	The casual way in which the Hurrians are 
mentioned in the Telipinus Proclamation is striking; but there is nothing 
strange about conflict with this people in northern Mesopotamia during 
the march to or from Babylon. According to the Telipinus text Mursilis was 
successful against the Hurrians who were soon to have their revenge. 
Hurrian-Hittite antagonism is to be one of the dominant features of Hittite 
imperial life for the next two centuries. 
At this stage it is appropriately convenient to discuss the role of 
the Hittites in northern Syria. 	Sir Leonard Woolley, one of the foremost 
scholars in Syrian studies, claims that when the Tell of Carchemish had 
attained a height of approximately fifteen metres the villagers built a 
wall around it. These wall-builders were a new folk; the Stone Age had been 
supplanted by the Bronze Age and there would seem to have been an influx 
of new blood. 	Woolley writes the following about the Hittite entrance 
into northern Syria : 
"At first the introduction of metal does not seem to have brought with 
it other very radical changes; but not very long before the fortification 
of the citadel, far-reaching innovations were introduced. The Bronze Age 
man who built the wall turned his clay vessels on the wheel in shapes 
unknown before; he seldom used paint, and then only in the simplest and 
rudest ways. He buried his dead in stone-lined cists, at full length, 
with an elaborate tomb furniture of vessels, arms and ornaments. These 
116 
cultural innovations, affecting just those customs which are most 
conservative, would seem to denote a new race. 	On the other hand, they 
do not appear to have been either suddenly or violently enforced, for 
the two burial customsoverlap and sometimes combine, whence it may be 
argued that the change in population was but partial, and that the old 
stockccontinued to live side by side with the newcomers, dominated by their 
superiority, driven to imitate their high culture, but still hankering 
always after their own traditions. 	Indeed, there is much to be said 
for the theory that throughout all history the Hittites were in a minority 
in north Syria, a fighting aristocracy alien to the land. 124 	Woolley 
recalls as an historical landmark the fact that the descent of Mursilis 
on Babylon implies a Hittite footing in northern Syria. (As evidenced in 
fact by the Aleppo episode.) 
Summing up his position Woolley claims that the developed early Bronze 
Age marked the introduction of a new element into northern Syria : 
"This we may call, at least provisionally, the Early Hittite; the 
Middle Period succeeding to it we do not know when, will last down to 
1200 B.C." 25 
Woolley in an earlier article modifies the above but the contention 
which is relevant to this study emerges more strongly : 
"Unfortunately, we find from the beginning of the Bronze Age to its 
end a steady uniform development in which there occurs no sudden outcrop 
of markedly new types such as should signalize the event of an alien people. 
Yet there can be no doubt that at the end of the Amarna period Carchemish 
was a Hittite town. 	Probably the explanation is that the Hittites.." 
were so small a ruling caste as to affect but little the civilization of 
the country as a whole; their innovations would be rather in the way of 
monumental buildings in their capital than of new types of pottery. 2126 
24. Woolley,C.L; Carchemish, (Report on the Excavations at Jerablus on 
Behalf of the British Museum,1931,)p.39. See also Sayce,A.H; The 
Hittites. The Story of a Forgotten Empire,( 5th ed, London, 1910),p.133 
25. Woolley C.L; Carchemish, (Report on the Excavations at Jerablus on 
Behalf of the British Museum,1931),p.40 
26. Woolley C.L; "Hittite Burial Customs", Annals of Archaeology and 
Anthropology, Vol.VI,(1914),p.93-94. 
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That a nation should be politically influential in an area for such 
an extensive period of time and so little influence its culture is a 
startling revelation of the imperial practices of the Hittites. 	They 
apparently did not colonize the area with their own people in order to 
hold it more firmly. 	The king of Aleppo must have retained considerable 
independence. 	What Woolley has said of the Hittites in connection with 
Carchemish may be said to be true of the Hittites in northern Syria 
generally. 	It was especially in those areas which lay beyond the geographic 
containment of the Anatolian highlands that the Hittites allowed special 
status to the conquered. 	Because of the factor of geographic isolation 
and the limited number of Hittites available for settlement in areas distant 
from Hattusas the Hittites were never able to bind the subjugated by ties 
of common culture and customs. 	This very inability to provide a superior 
cultural lead and hence create some measure of cultural contact between 
the rulers and the ruled must have kept alive a sense of difference, 
independence and nationalism in such centres as Aleppo. 	It is factors 
such as these which gave the Hittite Empire its instability. 	In such 
indirectly controlled and remote centres there can have been little 
consciousness of having belonged to a political unit known as the Hittite 
Empire. 	However, the Hittites did manage a spasmodic control of 
northern Syria from the time of Hattusilis I until 1200 B.C. 
They overcame the above deficiencies by the use of their innate 
political skill. 	The Hittites exploited the political conditions of 
northern Syria in relation to the other powers of the Near East. 	But 
as Woolley has implied, the roots of Hittite control cannot have struck 
deep in northern Syria. 	Should the chameleon-like nature of exploitable 
political conditions as a means of control cease to exist there was little 
else to hold the loyalty of the ruled. 
The campaigning of Mursilis in northern Syria and Mesopotamia was 
to prove his undoing. 	What must have been a comparatively long absence 
provided the opportunity for political intrigues in the Hittite court. 
The pleas of Hattusilis I were to no avail. 	The ruling family proved 
itself untrustworthy in the king's absence and the action of Mursilis' 
brother-in-law ushered in a period of turmoil which was to shrink the 
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Hittite homeland almost to its original size. 	The efforts over a 
period of two centuries were rendered null and void. 	For the time 
being it was proved beyond all doubt that the nature of Hittite political 
life made distant campaigning an impossibility if the king was to main-
tain his throne. 	Personal ambition must have its avenue of assertion 
even though it mightmean the total eclipse of the Hittite state : 
10 
(31)"And Hantilis was a cup-bearer, and he had Harapsilis (?), sister 
of Mursilis, in marriage. 
11. 
(32)And Zidantas comspired(?) with Hantilis, and they formed a traitorous 
plot. (33) They killed Mursilis; they shed blood.u27 
27. Sturtevant and Bechtel. Op.cit.p.185. 
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HANTILIS AND THE LESSER KINGS  
Retribution was meted out swiftly to Hantilis for his complicity 
in the successful plot to murder Mursilis. 	The one sentence of the 
Telipinus Proclamation concerning the reign of Hantilis which has 
survived intact is very revealing : 
12 
(35) "And Hantilis was afraid 	1  
And well might this king be afraid since his reign was distinguished 
by disaster. 
In the "narrative of his Accession" Hattusilis III wrote the following 
words : 
"Since Nerik had been in ruins since the days of Hantilis, I took 
and rebuilt it."2 
The treaty which Hattusilis III made with Tiliura contains the 
following lines : 
(I; 7-19) "The city of Tiliura was deserted from the time of Hantilis.. 
(11;1-5) who surrounded, they kept coming And Hantilis made of you 
an outpost. But at first Labarnas (and) Hattusilis used not to let them 
cross the River Kummesmaha." 3 
The people whom the Hittites are intent on confining to the other 
side of the Kummesmaha river are none other than the Kaska folk, or Gasgans 
as they are sometimes called. 4 	It is clear that Labarnas and Hattusilis I 
were able to confine the Gasgans to the western side of the Kummesmaha. 
Hantilis did not have this success. 	The lines quoted, which tell us that 
1. Sturtevant and Bechtel: A Hittite Chrestomathy, (Philadelphia,1935),p.185 
2. Garstang and Gurney; The Geography of the Hittite Empire, (London, W.1, 
British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara,1959),p.21 
3. Ibid p.119 
4. Ibid p.24. In the treaty which Hattusilis III made with Tiliura there 
occur a series of regulations in connection with the Gasgans (See p.119) 
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Hantilis made Tiliura an outpost against the Gasgans, indicate that 
the achievement of Hantilis in relation to the Gasgans was lesser 
than that of his two famous predecessors. 	Labarnas and HattusiIis 
had acheived more than the establishment of a mere frontier post against 
the Gasgans at Tiliura. 5 The implication is, that although Hantilis 
established an outpost in the attempt to alleviate the pressure of this 
northern menace the Gasgans were nevertheless crossing the Kummesmaha 
river. 	During the period of dynastic anarchy which Hantilis bequeathed 
to the Hittite kingdom even Tiliura was deserted. 
The Hurrians, under the ruling caste of the Mitanni, were pushing 
into the Hittite kingdom from the east. 	The Mitanni are becoming 
increasingly powerful and the might of the Egyptian empire was later 
to be expended against them. 	Dynastic turmoil coupled with the expansion 
of the Mitanni largely explain the series of disasters which befell the 
Hittite kingdom from the time of Hantilis to Telipinus. 	But the pressure 
exerted by the Gasgans must not be underestimated in explaining the 
temporary eclipse of the Hittites. 
After setting out on a military expedition to bring rebellious lands 
back to subjection, Hantilis apparently spoke these words to his troops: 
"Now this I did, and Zidantas.... I heard..." 
Hardy considers that this is all that we have left of the justification 
of Hantilis for the murder of his predecessor. 6 	This says more than the 
evidence allows and seems to be an unwarranted application of the so—called 
'conscience' of Hattusilis III to Hantilis whose crime was far worse than 
the understandable action of his more illustrious successor. Hantilis 
was possibly not the type to be smitten with remorse. 
This apart, we know that Hantilis dispatched warriors southwards toward 
the territory of the cities Hurpanas, Astatas and Carchemish. 	The mention 
of Astatas (on the Euphrates river in the region of Carchemish) and Carchemish 
as well as the fact that Hantilis went to Tegarama, indicates that the 
Hittites still claimed control of northern Syria and the avenue of 
approach to it. 7 	But if the tenor of this king's reign 
5. See map,p.i., for the position of Tiliura on the Kummesmaha river. 
6. Hardy,R.S;"The Old Hittite Kingdom",AJSL,LVIII,(1941),p.206 
7. Ibid p.206 
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and the undoubted superiority of the Mitanni in northern Syria in 
the not too distant future are taken into account it is more than 
likely that Hantilis met with reverses in the area beyond anti-Taurus 
to the south-east of Hattusas. 
It is not at all surprising to learn, in the light of what has 
been said, that Hantilis erected forts throughout the Hittite land and 
strengthened the fortifications of the Hittite capital itself. 8 We 
do not hear of any of his predecessors having had recourse to such . 
measures. 	We also learn that Hantilis, confronted by the Gasgans 
within Hittite territory, was forced to acknowledge this as a fait 
accompli. 	His inability to rid the land of these marauders is shown 
by the fact that he made settlements for them. 9 This is perhaps 
illustrative of political wisdom on the part of Hantilis. 	Rather than 
further endanger the Hittite kingdom in a series of wasteful and futile 
wars he accepted the presence of the Gasgans. 
There is yet one more piece of evidence which points to disaster 
as being the basically operative factor during the reign of Hantilis. 
In contradistinction to the people of Kalasmal 0 Hantilis neglected to 
perform certain purification rites. It was thought that this caused 
uncleanliness to be brought into the city and palace. 	Since our 
information about this neglect is derived from an 'historical-ritualistic' 
text it would appear that the priesthood explained some misfortune or 
another on the basis of the failure of Hantilis to fulfil his religious 
obligations. 11 	No doubt Hantilis was so preoccupied throughout his reign 
in stemming the mounting tide of disaster that he simply did not have 
the time to perform all his religious duties. 
This is really a case of the priesthood censuring the king for mis-
demeanours of a religious nature. 	That the priesthood should be so bold 
indicates that the Hittite king was not beyond criticism. 	He had duties 
to perform, and should be fail to perform them there were bodies capable 
of reminding him of his failure. 	This check on the activities of the 
monarch by way of criticism is one of the healthy features of the Hittite 
kingship. 	This type of criticism or check on the behaviour of a ruler 
8. Ibid.p.207 
9. Ibid. p.207 
10. Kalasma is situated to the south-east of Hattusas.see map,p.i. 
11. Hardy. Op.cit. p.207 
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which may have a constructive result must in the case of this particular king 
hay! heightened his insecurity. 	But there were other more dangerous 
and ruinous factors which made the Hittite kingship a position fraught 
with peril and uncertainty. 	These other factors must have had a great deal 
of scope immhich to work their worst during the reign of Hantilis. 
These factors, always latent became accentuated because Hantilis came 
to the throne in the way recounted. 	He set an example which others were 
bound to follow. 	The murder of Mursilis plus an unsuccessful reign 
proved the undoing of Hantilis. 	It is doubtful whether Hantilis could 
have made his way to the throne uncontested. 	While Mursilis was in 
Syria and Mesopotamia other leading Hittites must have entertained the 
same ruinous ambition. 	If the Zidantas, who succeeded Hantilis after 
murdering the latter'ssons and grandsons was the same Zidantas who con-
spired in league with Hantilis then one is forced to conclude that they 
came to some form of political understanding. 	Hantilis and Zidantas 
would have effected an alliance in order to counteract the similar ambitions 
of other leading Hittites. 	Their mutual desire for power threw them 
together because they realized that it was only through alliance that a 
measure of the desired power could be gained. 	Perhaps Zidantas was 
young and was prepared to wait to gain the supreme position of king. 
One can imagine that throughout his reign Hantilis had to contend 
with those who were prepared to act ashhe had acted. 	The action of Zidantas - 
suggests this. 	This ever present threat to the position of Hantilis 
must have consumed a great deal of his time. 	On this basis it is easy 
to understand the destruction of Nerik, Tiliura and the Hurrian success. 
The neglect of religious . obligations may also be explained in this way. 
Continual preoccupation with the maintenance of his own position precluded 
a single-minded dedication to the task of keeping the Hittite kingdom 
intact. 	The knowledge that all was not well at the Hittite court gave the 
Gasgans and the Hurri a chance that they were not slow to utilize. The 
very people whose activities gave them this chance would be the first to 
lay the blame at the door of Hantilis and self-righteously set about to 
undermine his position. 
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In &z:way it is an impressive witness to the astuteness of Hantilis 
that he should have become old and died an apparently natural death: 
18 
(63) "And when Hantilis had become old and was about to become a god, 
Zidantas killed Pisenis, the sons of Hantilis, along with his (i.e.Pisenis'?) 
sons, and he killed his foremost subjects." 12 
One might reasonably speculate that Hantilis had not kept his part 
of the bargain. 	Perhaps he had guaranteed the kingship to the younger 
Zidantas on his (Hantilis') death. 	But no doubt the range of Hantilis' 
ambition spread with the years and he now wished to keep the Hittite king-
ship in his own family. 	He accordingly designated Pisenis as his 
successor. 	Hence the action of Zidantas. 	But Zidantas did not stop 
there. 	He not only .eliminated all the other potential claimants to the 
throne who belonged to the family of Hantilis, but he carried out a Sullan- 
type proscriptionby having his foremost subjects murdered. 	Zidantas 
being a foremost Hittite was guarding against the possibility of his 
peers achieving what he had achieved. 	If the Athenian Cleisthenes intro- 
duced ostracism he may have been guided by some of the motives which 
determined the behaviour of Zidantas. 	But at least the means to the end 
employed by Cleisthenes were a little more pleasant. 
This killing of the foremost subjects must have been disastrous to 
the Hittites as a minority ruling caste. 	They could ill afford to waste 
ability at the top level. 	Admittedly Hittite controlled territory had 
at this stage shrunk in comparison to its extent at the time of Mursilis. 
But even so, such a purge amongst the leading Hittites must have considerably 
reduced the worth and effectiveness of the Hittite ruling caste for many 
years to come. 
The carnage and anarchy continue : 
19 
"And Zidantas became king.(66) And then the gods avenged the blood 
of Pisenis. (67) And the gods made Ammunas, his (i.e.Zidantas')son, his 
enemy; and he killed Zidantas, his father."13 
12. Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit. p.185 
13. Ibid p.187 
124 
This extract from the Telipinus Proclamation seems to indicate 
that Zidantas ruled for only a short time. 	The suggestion of a 
religiously based revenge, similar to the Aeschylean vendetta, may have helped 
to dictate the course of the politicaliturmoil during this period. 	But 
too little is known of this to enable any worthwhile conclusions to be 
drawn. 	That the Hittite kingdom should survive this almost frenzied 
wave of court murders is adequate testimony to the deep—rooted strength 
and resilience that the Hittite ruling caste must have possessed. 
The Telipinus Proclamation continues : 
20 
(69) "And Ammunas became king. (69) And then the gods avenged the 
blood of his father Zidantas;,they did not prosper(?) him (or), in his 
hands, the grain(fields), the orchards(?), the vinegards, the cattle, 
(and) the sheep." 
21 
(1) And the (following) countries became hostile to him, 	,Galiwyas, 
Adaniyas, Arzawiyas, Sallapas, Parduwatas, and Ahhulas; the infantry 
went on campaigns everywhere. (3) And they returned unsuccessful." 14 
During the reign of Ammunas the unpleasant fruits of dynastic chaos 
were really reaped. Areas such as Arzawa, and no doubt Sallapas,(see map) 
had been ruled by the Hittites since the time of Labarnas. 	There is 
evident in this extract an admission of total failure. 	The loss of 
Adaniyas in Kizzuwatna may be attributed to the activities of the Hurrians. 
By this time the Hittites must have lost all control of northern Syria. 
The loss of Adaniyas suggests this. 	It would be pleasant to think that 
Hittite desire for historical truth transcended considerations of national 
prestige. 	But as has been said before Telipinus was putting forth a 
contention: that palace murders and disputes surrounding the succession 
to the throne will inevitably result in disaster. 	This frank admission of 
imperial disaster was in the best interests of his contention. 	But even 
so, there is manifest the attitude that royalty is capable of failure. It 
is interesting to compare the Egyptian attitude in the inscriptions telling 
of the Battle of Kadesh. 
14. Ibid. p.187 
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The proclamation proceeds as follows : 
21 
(4) "When Ammunas too became a god, Zurusp chief of the Mesidi, 
in those days secretly sent (one) of his family, his son Taharwailis, 
a man of the golden spear; and he killed the family of Tittis 
along with his sons. 
22 
(8) And he sent Taruhsus, the runner(?), and he killed Hantilis along 
with his sons. (9) And Huzziyas became king." 15  
It is not definitely known who the Mesidi were. 	Hardy holds, and 
I think it is a likely view, that the Mesidi were connected with the army 
or else they were a type of police. 16 	It is more than probablg that under 
such conditions where there is rivalry among leading families, and kings 
are rising and falling quickly, that the army would become a powerful force 
which had more than strictly military interests. 	During this period of 
unrest and crisis the army most certainly would have been used for political 
purposes by those who aspired to the crown. 
As a result of the assassinations order by Zurus, the chief of the 
Mesidi, Huzziyas became king. 	The impression is given that Zurus was 
'in the pay' of Huzziyas and that he used his men in the interests of gaining 
the throne for Huzziyas. 	The logical completion of this set of conditions 
is that Zurus himself, a high ranking military officer, could well sieze 
the throne. 	The important factor is that we have here three families 
who had aspirations towards the throne. 	Two of these families must be 
eliminated. 	This is final and conclusive proof of the political rivalry 
that existed, not only between members of the nobility, but between the 
leading Hittite families or clans as such. 
If the Hittite kingdom had a genuinely feudal basis one may conclude 
that the members of the nobility would in many cases have a military 
following. 	Zurus may have been the head of such a military force which 
was enforcing the claims of Huzziyas to the throne. No doubt Tittis and 
Hantilis had similar military support. 	In fact this struggle amongst the 
15. Ibid p.187 
16. Hardy Op.cit.p.208 
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members of the nobility and their capabilityof making and unseating 
kings is proof of the feudal nature of the Hittite kingdom whereby the 
lords leased out land in return for military service. 	Ideally the 
land would be expected to provide contingents of soldiers for the king to 
whom he owed his land in the original instance. 	The power of the nobility 
or council of nobles over the king forced the latter to grant them privileges 
which made them so powerful as to make this period of anarchy possible. 
Instead of the individual contingents of soldiers owing serlitice and loyalty 
to the king, which was theoretically his due as a result of the lord- 
king contract, they gave it to those members of the nobility who retained 
them. 
Perhaps the family of Tittis and the family ofHantilis were members 
of a larger unit which we may call the Royal Family. 	The king 's kinsmen, 
who would in many cases have been the heads of their own families belonged 
to what has been called the "Great Family 17 	But these individual families, 
comprising the totality of the Royal Family, possessed sufficient strength, 
independent of the ruling family of the time, to enable them to make the 
attempt to replace the ruling family by their own family. 
Perhaps the family of Tittis was intimately connected with the family 
of Ammunas and therefore had some grounds for wanting their claimant to 
have the throne. 	Ammunas had recently died and Huzziyas would be intent on 
removing those who were closely connected with him. 	The family of Hantilis 
was most likely of direct descent from king Hantilis. 	Their ambition 
to regain the power once exerciseaby a member of the family is understandable. 
Hence their necessary extermination. 
During this period we have been witness to the violent struggles between 
the king and the nobility. Despite the efforts of Labarnas and Hattusilis I 
the nobility have not accepted the practice whereby the Hittite kingship was 
to be an hereditary office. 
17. Gurney, The Hittites,(2nd ed, Harmondsworth,Middlesex,Penguin Books Ltd., 
1954), p.67. 
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TELIPINUS 
Telipinus, if not the last monarch of the Old Kingdom, was certainly 
the last important king belonging to that period of Hittite history. 
Telipinus is important because of his edicts, contained in his proclamation, 
which attempted to give a greater measure of stability to the Hittite 
Royal House and ruling caste generally. 	Coming to the throne during a 
period when the assassination of leading Hittites was the rule rather than 
the exception Telipinus attempted to counteract this destructive tendency. 
He was statesmanenough ftot to be merely satisfied with securing his own 
position for the duration of his lifetime. He thought in terms of the 
future political and imperial destinies of the Hittites and he was not 
entirely unsuccessful in his attempts to create a greater harmony among 
• the leading Hittite families. Ironically, he himself usurped the kingship. 
His own proclamation frankly admits to this fact: 
22 
(a) And Telipinus had (as wife) Istapariyas, his (Huzziyas') eldest sister. 
(11) Huzziyas would have killed them, but his plan became known, and 
Telipinus drove them away. 
23 
(13) His (i.e.Huzziyas') brothers (were) five; and he (i.e. Telipinus) 
built them houses, (saying): 'Let them go (and) dwell (there); let them 
eat (and) drink and do not do them any harm. (15) And I declare: "They 
did me harm, and I do not do them harm". 
24 
(16) When I, Telipinus, had seated myself upon the throne of my father l , 
I went to Hassuwas on a campaign, *and I destroyed Hassuwas." 2 
1. As we do not know who the father of Telipinus was there is no means 
of testing the truth of this claim. 	But at any rate it may be con- 
strued as a justification for his action. 
2. Sturtevant,E.H. and Bechtel,G; A Hittite Chrestomathy, (Philadelphia, 
1935), p.187. 
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The reason for Huzziyas'animosity towards Telipinus is not given. 
But the political situation in Hattusas was such as to make a king more 
than wary of any potential !apposition to his position. If Telipinus at 
this stage gave proof of his undoubted later ability the plan of Huzziyas 
is readily understood. 	Perhaps Telipinus the reformer, becoming more and 
more exasparated with the nature of conditions at Hattusas, gave Huzziyas 
good reason to plan the early demise of himself and his wife. The state-
ment "Telipinus drove them away" implies the use of armed force. There 
may have been civil war in Hattusas. But the bloodshed ceased once Huzziyas' 
threat had been overcome. 
The conduct of Telipinus in relation to his would be assassins was 
exemplary. 	He exhibited the same attitude as Hattusilis I had exhibited 
to those who had planned him harm. 	The five brothers of Huzziyas were 
provided for by Telipinus and no harm was to be done to them. 3 	However, 
the case was different with Hattusilis. 	He was an established Hittite 
king nearing the end of his reign. 	This may partly explain his leniency 
to the subdued rebels. 	But Telipinus even though his father may have been 
a king before him was nevertheless a usurper, not an established king assured 
of his position at the time of his generosity towards the five brothers of 
Huzziyas. 	That such political generosity was dangerous is shown by a 
later section of the proclamation which will shortly be quoted. It would 
seem that Telipinus was early convinced that bloodshed in the Royal Family 
had to cease, even to the extent of being dangerously lenient. 	Thus 
Telipinus appears in the light of a dedicated reformer who was prepared 
to risk the hazards involved of convincing by his own personal example. 
But there was another consideration at stake of which he as an astute 
statesman must haVe been aware. 	If he had gained the throne by a series 
3. We may assume that Huzziyas had been killed. The fact that his five 
brothers were singled out as having been given substance indicates 
that they had been involved in Huzziyas' plot against Telipinus and 
his wife. 	Telipinus is intent on showing that further bloodshed will 
not solve the problem. 
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of murders and secured it by the same violent means, his reforms, which 
had an opposite object, would have appeared both inconsistent and insincere. 
Perhaps the abject failure of the Sullan legislation is partly to be 
explained on the basis that Sulla proposed behaviour contray to his own. 
Having become king Telipinus immediately undertook a military 
campaign to repair the rapidly declining imperial fortunes of the Hittites. 
Hefirst destroyed Hassuwas which must have revolted during the period of 
anarchy: 
(18)"And my infantry was in Zizzilippas, and in Zizzilippas a battle 
occurred. 
25 
(20) When at:that time I, the king, came to Lawazantiyas, Lahhas was 
hostile to me, and incited Lawazantiyas to rebellion.(21) And the gods 
delivered it into my hand'."4 
The mention of Lawazantiyas in this context is most informative. 
It has already been demonstrated that Lawazantiyas is in Kizzuwatna, near 
. to the city of Kummannl, 5  and actually on or near the main route from 
Hattusas to Syria. 	Goetze contends that it is not improbable that 
Zizzilippas is identical with Zazlippa which is in Kizzuwatna. Hassuwas 
appears with Tegarama and other places in text B0479. 6 Tegarama was also 
situated in this south-eastern area. (See map) 
Thus we may say that Telipinus, although he did not venture as far 
as northern Syria, was intent on keeping in Hittite possession the area to 
the south-east of Hattusas which gave the easiest access to northern Syria. 
If Lawazantiyas is to be placed near Kummanni, which is in the north-west 
of Kizzuwatna, then we again have proof that the Hittites most likely 
penetrated into Syria by taking a south-east route through the anti-Taurus 
range. 
4. Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit.p.189 
5. Goetze,A; Kizzuwatna and the Problem of Hittite Geography, (New Haven, 1940), 
p.71 Kummanni was situated in the north-west part of the passage way 
through anti-Taurus. 
6. Ibid p.72 
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The quoted section indicates that Lawazantiyas formerly owed 
allegiance to the Hittites. No doubt the Hurrians had taken advantage 
of Hittite weakness and incited Lahhas to forsake his obligation to 
Hattusas. 	The same may be said of Hassuwas and Zizzilippas. By inciting 
these cities to revolt the Hurrians were blocking the Hittite line of 
approach to an area in which they (the Hurrians) were rapidly becoming the 
ascendant people under the ruling Mitanni caste. 	But whatever the case 
may have been the Telipinus proclamation is here referring to a successful 
campaign conducted in the south-east. 7 
But this is not the only dealing which Telipinus had with Kizzuwatna. 
During the excavations carried out at Boghazkeui in 1934 a library cata-
logue was secured which, according to the excavators, contains the following 
item: 
"One tablet treaty: 'When Isputahsu, the king of Kizwatna, and Telipinus 
the Hittite king, concluded a treaty' Complete." 8 
Nothing else is know of this treaty. 	We only know that one was con- 
cluded. 
During an archaeological expedition to Cilicia in 1934 a bullamas 
found at Tarsus which bore the impression of a type of seal so far only 
known from the Hittite capital. The inscription on the bulla runs as 
follows: 
"Isputahsu, the great king, the son of Pariyawatru." 9 
It can be considered as certain that the Isputahsu of Kizzuwatna 
who made a treaty with Telipinus is to be equated with the owner of the 
Tarsus bulla. 	In all probability the name Tarsus occurs as uruT ar_ sa in the 
7. We do not know the outcome of the battle fought in Zizzilippas. But 
judging by the success in Hassuwas and Lawazantiyas we may infer that 
the same was true in connexion with Zizzilippas. 
8. Goetze,A;"Philological Remarks on the Bilingual Bulla from Tarsus" AJA, 
Vol.40,(1936) p.214. 
9. Ibid.p.210. See also Goetze,A; Kizzuwatna and the Problem of Hittite  
Geography, (New Haven, 1940),p.73. 
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Boghazkeui texts. 	In a passage referred to by Goetzel° the name 
uru A-da-ni-ya precedes that of Tarsus. 	We know that A-ta-ni-ya plays its 
part in the description of the frontier of Kizzuwatna. 11 The fact that 
Adaniya is most likely to be situated in Kizzuwatna will later be shown 
to be of considerable importance. 
Isputahsu, as we have noticed, is called 'great king'. 	This suggests 
that Isuputahsu was a king of considerable power. 	In the second half 
of the second millenium B.C. the great kings of the Near East jealously 
watched that nobody adopted this title who was not entitled to it. No 
doubt this applied to the time of Telipinus who ruled at the beginning of 
the latter half of the second millenium B.C. 	This title may have been 
assumed by the king of Kizzuwatna during the period of Hittite weakness 
prior to Telipinus' usurpation of the Hittite throne. 	Apart from the 
one reference which indicates that Lawazantiyas may have had some form of 
understanding with the Hittites previous to the time of Telipinus this 
mention of the Hittite treaty with Isputahsu is the first definite evidence 
we have of an agreement between the Hittites and Kizzuwatna. 	It would 
seem that the ruler of Kizzuwatna was just as entitled to call himself 'great 
king' as was the Hittite king. 12 	Indeed, there is no need to assume that 
because Isputahsu and Telipinus concluded a treaty that the former was necess- 
arily subjected to the latter. 	The treaty was most likely drawn up between 
the two kings on the basis of equality. The privileged status given to 
Kizzuwatna during the reign of Suppiluliumas, when the Hittites were much 
more powerful than they were in Oe time of Telipinus, accords well with 
such a view. 
10. Goetze,A; "Philological Remarks on the Bilingual Bulla from Tarsus", 
AJA, Vo1.40 (1936),p.213. 
11. It occurs in the treaty which Supplluliumas made with Sunassura of 
Kizzuwatna. 
12. Hardy,R.S; "The Old Hittite Kingdom",AJSL, LVIII,(1941)p.209. 
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It is not difficult to find adequate reasons for the conclusion of 
this treaty. 	The drive of the Hurrians towards the west into Anatolia 
and northern Syria would have been just as threatening to the people of 
Kizzuwatna as it was to the Hittites. 	For a period of approximately 
two centuries after the death of Telipinus the westward drive of the 
Hurrians brought king's with Hurrian names to the throne of Kizzuwatna 
and Hurrian gods were worshipped in the shrines of Kizzuwatna. 13 	Then 
of course there is the ever present Hittite consideration of keeping their 
south-east line of expansion clear of hazards. 	A mutual defensive and 
offensive alliance with Kizzuwatna would help to guarantee Hittite access 
to northern Syria. 	But there is yet another reason for the treaty between 
Telipinus and Isputahsu which does not seem to have been sufficiently 
stressed. 	It has already been noted that Adaniya is to be located in 
Kizzuwatna. 	Section twenty one of the Telipinus proclamation, already 
quoted, gives a list of the cities which revolted during the time of Ammunas. 
The sequence, Adaniyas-Arzawiyas, suggests that the borderland between 
Kizzuwatna and Arzawa was narrow if it does not indeed suggest the:actual 
contivity of these two countries at this time. 	The trouble which 
Suppiluliumas and Mursilis 1I were to have with Arzawa suggests that that 
country had control of substantial territory. 	Telipinus may have feared 
that Arzawa and Kizzuwatna would form a coalition against the Hittites. 
But still more would have feared an alliance between the Hurrians and the 
Arzawans. 	Then there was the even worse threat of the Arzawans, Kizzuwatneans 
and Hurrians acting in conjunction against the Hittites. 	In an attempt 
to prevent any of these possibilities from becoming actual Telipinus concluded 
a treaty with Isputahsu. 	Kizzuwatna would make an excellent wedge or 
buffer between the Arzawans and the Hurrians. 	Such tatics on the part 	of 
Telipinus were merely to obey the dictates of elementary strategy. 14 
13. Gar#ang:and.Gurney; The Geography of the Hittite Empire, p.53. See 
also Goetze,A; Kizzuwatna and the Problem of Hittite Geography,(New Haven, 
1940), p.5-6 and notes. 
14. See Garstang,J; "Hittite Military Roads in Asia Minor",AJA,XLVII,(1943).p.38 
But Garstang does not develop this idea fully as he perhaps should. 
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Telipinus also campaigned to the north and east of his capital 
with the object of pushing back the barbarian invaders. 	They were no 
doubt basically composed of the Gasgans. 	The Hittite king appears 
to have been successful in his bid to confine the barbarians and he 
perhaps recovered some of the lOst Hittite territory in these quarters. 15 
The following lines from the twenty second year of the Annals of Mursilis II 
attest to the activities of Telipinus against the Gasgans: 
Twenty Second Year 
Vs II.1"As soon as the Gasganixity saw me it hurried to help in its 
entirety.. 
2.and took....before me.... And they spoke as follows:'We do 
not want to let him 
3.1eave'. 	And because it was not possible to go up with war chariots 
4.1 led the troops on foot and.... 
5 	went up to the mountains on foot and the gods stood by me and 
I attacked 
6.and slew the enemy. 	Then I journey on and burnt the land of 
Tapananuwa 
7.Then I journeyed to Hatenzuwa, the city of the Zitharija, 
8. and burnt also this land. 	Then I remained in the same land 
9.And because since the days of the great king Telipinus no Hittite 
10.had been to those lands, I spent some time there." 16 
With trouble, threatening or real, on so many fronts Telipinus not 
unaturally sought the friendship of Isputahsu of Kizzuwatna who considered 
himself worthy of the title 'great king'. 
The reign of Telipinus was essentially a period of reconstruction 
and his external policy seems mainly to have been directed to the south-
east. 	He did not reconquer Arzawa or north Syria, but his dealings with 
Kizzuwatna indicate the partial restoration, at least, of Hittite imperial 
fortunes. 	His militgry campaigning to the north, east and south-east 
15. Gurney,O.R; The Hittites,(2nd ed,Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1954),p.25. 
See also Hardy, Op.cit. p.209. 
16. Goetze,A;"Die Annalen des Mursilis" , Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-
Aegyptischen Gesellschaft, XXXVIII,(1933). 
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which must have had as its objective the establishment of strong, reliable 
frontiers against the inroads of the Gasgans and the Hurrians, was so far 
successful as to enable him to deal with pressing domestic affairs which 
were inseparable from the imperial ambitions of Hattusas. 
Immediately following on from the recorded success against the 
rebellious Lawazantiyas the proclamation continues thus: 
(22)"And foremost (officials were) the commanders of a thousand,... 
and Karruwas; the chief of the overseers of the treasury, Inaras; the 
chiefs of the cup-bearers, Killas and Dattamimmas; the chiefs of the 
scepter-bearers, Zinwaselis and Lellis, great (men). (25) And they 
secretly sent to Tanuwas, the scepter-bearer. 
26 
(26)I, the king, did not know (it)....(27) When I, the king, heard, they 
brought ranuwas, Taharwailis, and Taruhsus; and the senate therefore 
held them for sentence(?); and I, the king, said: 'Why should they die? 
(29) 'They (i.e. the officials) shall hide their faces (?)' (29) I, the 
king, segregated them. (30) I made them farmers; I took their weapons 
from their right side, and I gave them yokes(?)" 17 
Although it is not directly stated this extract may be seen as 
evidence of a plot against Telipinus. 	The theme of the proclamation is 
the nobility's continued attempts to undermine the power of the reigning 
king. 	The opposition to Telipinus was obviously considerable. 	Many 
of the chief dignitaries of the Hittite kingdom, and no doubt their following, 
were involved in some treacherous activity or another. 	We have already 
met with Taharwailis and Taruhsus who succeeded in gaining Huzziyas the 
throne. 18 	It would appear that the supporters of Huzziyas had not been 
grateful to Telipinus for his previous leniency. 	One might speculate that 
the family which Huzziyas had been head of still commanded sufficient 
loyalty among the Hittite nobility to make another attempt on the Hittite 
throne a worthwhile proposition. 
17. Sturtevant and Bechtel. Op.cit.p.189. 
18. Ibid. p.187 (21:4 and 22:8,9.) 
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Tanuwas, Taharwailis and Taruhsus do not seem to have been high ranking 
Hittite dignitaries. 	Taruhsus was a runner and Tanuwas was an ordinary 
scepter-bearer. 	He is not listed as being one of the chiefs of the scepter- 
bearers. 	They were most likely assassins hired by the clique of nobles 
who were involved in the plot to overthrow Telipinus. 	Perhaps they are 
to be seen as the mechanics or the executors of the conspiracy. 	The nature 
of their role in the conspiracy may explain the leniency of Telipinus towards 
them. 	Gurney remarks upon this situation in the following way: 
"It appears that these men were acting under the orders of more important 
personages, and Telipinus, in his anxiety to curb the power of the nobles, 
ordained that the pankus must in future ensure that the instigator of a 
crime should suffer punishment in his awn person, even though he be a high-
ranking dignitary or even the king him'self." 19 
The next sections of the proclamation give a great deal of cogency to 
Gurney's suggestion. 
Bechtel and Sturtevant translate pankus as meaning senate. 20 The term 
senate implies a political body constituted by the nobility. But Gurney 
sees the term pankus as meaning the "whole body of citizens". 21 Hardy 
claims that as a judicial body, the pankus, in distinction to the Tuliyas 
(senate, council) which exercised judicial control over the royal family, 
tried and punished lesser figures as when Tanuwas, Taharwailis and Taruhsus 
were tried and sentenced. 22 	If the assembled citizen body did have judicial 
powers it is likely that it tried members of its own standing. 	Also, if 
the citizen body consisted of the totality of those capable of bearing arms 
and if it had judicial functions then there is an analogy to be drawn 
with Alexander's Macedonian army. 23 	The three hired assassins were more 
than likely Hittite soldiers who have been accused of treachery. 	They are 
here being tried by the Hittite army. Gurney continues: 
"It is not clear whether this represents a deliberate extension of the 
powers of the pankus or whether the king was merely recalling the assembly 
to duties which it had always possessed but which it had often feared to 
"24 perform. 
19. Gurney Op.cit.p.69 
20.Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit.p.198 
21.Gurney Op.cit.p.69 
22.Hardy, Op.cit.p.215 
23. See next page. 
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Footnote 23. 
It is extremely informative to quote Tarn on this point: 
"If Philotas, general of the Companions, were a traitor, it was 
necessary to strike hard and quickly. 	It was Macedonian custom that 
in a trial for treason, where the king was virtually a party, the 
State was represented, as it wasvhen the throne was vacant, by the 
Macedonian people under arms, the army; and Philotasinas properly put 
on trial before the army." 
See Tarn,W.W; Alexander The Great, (Boston, Beacon Press,1956,)p.63. 
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The former speculation seems more reasonable in view of the nature of the 
situation confronting Telipinus. 	He is attempting to lessen the power 
of the nobility. 	That is, he is trying to break the power of the 
Tuliyas, or council of nobles which has within it those:people who are not 
only threatening the stability of the Hittite kingdom but also the position 
of Telipinus. 	Perhaps Telipinus is here delegating power to the assembly 
which had formerly been held by the council 	The assembly 'must in future 
ensure that the instigator- of a crime should suffer punishment in his 
own person, even though he be a hgh-ranking dignitary or even the king 
25 himself. , 	The following section from the proclamation suggests that 
this may have been the case: 
33 
70 "If hereafter anyone does wrong, either the father of the house(?), 
or the chief of the palace servants,(or) the chief of the cup: c7bearers, 
(or) the chief of the Mesedi,(or) the chief of the exalted captains of a 
thousand,...., and do you, the senate have (him) brought before you and 
punish him. "25b 
The people referred to in this extract are obviously members of the 
Hittite nobility who are more than likely to be tried by the Assembly 
if they commit an offence against the state. 	The indication seems to 
be that Telipinus gave the assembly the power to try members of the 
nobility as well as members of their own rank. 	Should it ever be demon- 
strated that the nobility unduly oppressed those that they retained, which 
to a great degree must have been the bulk of the soldiery who comprised 
the assembly, the suggestion of an alliance between the ruling house and 
the assembly in opposition to the nobility or council will become more 
substantiated. 26 
25. Ibid p.69 
25b.Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit.p.193 	I have already indicated my 
preference for assembly rather than senate. For a further discussion 
of this extract see infra p.143 
26. For a different conclusion concerning the judicial functions of the 
assembly and council see Hardy Op.cit.p.214-215. 
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This is not to say that the Hittite council becameron—existent. 
It no doubt still retained its advisory power in relgtion to the king and 
the top—ranking Hittite officials would centinue to be drawn from it. 	But 
the members of the nobility who were accused of treasonous activity were 
no longer •to be tried by the body to which they belonged. 	The mutual, 
but at the same time conflicting, interests of the council members, would 
have precluded the likelihood of justice being scrupulously dispensed to 
those who belonged to the privileged fold. 	The assembly of warriors was 
less likely to be partial to the thwarting of justice in the interests of 
permitting the nobility to continue their course of irresponsible political 
ambition. 	Gaius Gracchus used much the same type of tactic in his 
attempt to raise the extortion court above corruption. 
Telipinus then comes to the maiT ,part of his proclamation: the 
statement of the solution to the problem. But immediately before this 
statement he again emphasizes the nature of the problem, but this time 
in unMistakable terms: 
27 
(31)"Now blood(shed) of the royal family has become common. (31) And 
Istarpariyas, the queen, died; and afterwards Ammunas, the king's son, 
died. (32) And men also are setting a stamp(?)(upon the situation):'See 
there: 	In Hattusas blood(shed) has become common."27 
Although it is not specifically stated, the conteEt in which the death 
of his wife and son are reported gives the impression that they may have 
met violent ends. 
41 
(34)Now I, Telipinus, have called an assembly at Hattusas.(34)From now on(?) 
let no one in Hattusas do harm to a son of the (royal) family, or thrust 
a dagger into him." 
28 
(36)"Let a prince, a son of the first (wife), be king. (36) If there is 
no prince of the first rank, let one who is a son of the second rank become 
king. (38) If, however, there is no prince, let them take a husband for her 
who is a daughter of the first rank, and let him become king. .28 
27. Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit.p.189 
28.Ibid p.(189 
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In the attempt to solve the problem of palace murders, which 
have been basically connected with the succession to the throne, 
Telipinus has enacted regulations to govern the succession. The law 
is an attempt to guard against contingencies that could arise, such as 
there being no son by the first wife or no son of a wife of the second 
rank. 	The flexibility of the law contains both advantages and dis- 
advantages. 
The advantages lie in the fact that the flexibility permits the 
rules governing the succession to cater for various situations should 
they ever occur. 	The absence of a law is not to be an opportunity and 
a stimulus to a potential usurper to gain the throne by violence. 
Secondly, it need not necessarily be the eldest son of the wife of the 
first rank or the eldest son of the wife of the second rank who succeeds 
to the throne. 	This of course means that there is a greater chance of 
a man of real ability becoming king. 
Perhaps the son of the wife of the first rank or second rank, as 
the situation dictated, who exhibited the greatest ability to rule was 
chosen. 	The situation may have been andogous to the way Augustus tested 
and tried his potential candidates for the position of Princeps, though 
otherwise the two situations concerning the succession are different. 
But the flexibility of the succession law runs to even greater lengths. 
Judging by the power of Queen Pudu-hepa, the wife of Hattusilis III, there 
would seem to have been only one wife of the first rank. 	But no doubt 
there were many wives of the second rank. Thus the number of people in 
line for the throne, if the first succession law was not operative, could 
have been numerous. Again, it may be argued, there was a greater chance 
of choosing a king of real worth. 
At the same time, however, this very flexibility makes possible the 
traditional political menace. 	The succession law offered wide scope for 
various treacheries which would have had as their objective the attainment 
of the kingship. 	The possibilities for fratricide could have been numerous 
on some occasions. 	Then there is also the possibility that an ambitious 
wife of the second rank might attempt to remove the sons of the wife of the 
first rank in the interests of one of her sons. 	Finally, the third law 
governing the succession offered possibilities for an ambitious nobleman 
with the means, such as a following of soldiers, to give effect to his 
ambition. 
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But be this as it may, the real point is that laws only work if a 
sufficient number of people wish them to work or if there is sufficient 
force applied to ensure that they are obeyed. 	The success of this law 
of Telipinus can only be determined in the light of later Hittite history. 
Generally speaking the law must be called a success. 	The law appears to 
have received its application on the death of Telipinus. 	His wife 
and son had died and Alluwamnas, in accordance with the third succession 
law, became the son-in-law of Telipinus and then king when his father-in-
law died. 29 	The history of the New Empire, especially from the time 
of Suppiluliumas, attests to the general success of Telipinus: law. In 
comparison with the Old Kingdom domestic turmoil in connection with the 
succession was negligible. 30 Either Telipinus had convinced the Hittite 
nobles that their attempts to gain the throne illegally would only end 
in the destruction of the Hittite state and hence themselves or else the 
kings of the New Hittite Empire were so strong as to be able to ensure 
that the legally entitled person gained the throne. The evidence points 
to the latter conclusion. 
•The increased power of the Hittite king and the stability which now 
generally surrounds the succession to the throne are to be largely explained 
in terms of Telipinus' policy. 	His law governing the succession could 
well have meant nothing if it had not been for one outstanding factor; 
namely, he appears to have successfully limited the power of the Hittite 
nobility. 	The princes in line for the kingship would have been members 
of the Hittite council. 	Those nobles not in the line of succession, 
but who may have entertained ambitions in that direction, would also have 
been members of the council. If my contention is correct, any noble 
who attempted to gain the throne illegally would not be arraigned before 
his own kind, but would be tried by the assembly where justice was more 
Jlikely to be done. 	This provision may have prevented many an attempt 
29. Gurney Op.cit.p.216 
30. The obvious exception to thts generalisation was the action of 
Hattusilis III who deposed his nephew Urhi-teshuhr. But the circumstances 
were extraordinary, in so far as Urhi-teshub greatly provoked his uncle, 
and Hattusilis was the brother of Muwatallis, the king who preceded 
his son Urhi-teshub. 
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on the part of the nobility to usurp the throne. 
Telipinus had in fact established a new dynasty. 	The hereditary 
principle is to operate within the family that he has brought to power 
by usurping the kingship. 	This is not merely to be seen as an attempt 
to satisfy the ambition of perpetuating the power of his family. But 
rather it is also to be seen as a statesmanlike effort to fulfil the 
need of the Hittite kingdom for stability in the ruling circle. Perhaps 
it is not ami-ss to remark that here we have personal or family ambition 
coinciding with the higher needs of state. 	Such coincidences have 
been all to rare in Hittite history up to this point. 
Telipinus then ordered that the families and soldiery of all future 
Hittite 'kings' through all time' were to be united so that the consequent 
strength would enable the hostile countties to be held in subjection: 
29 
(40)"Whoever after me through all time shall become king, in those 
days let his brothers, his sons, his relatives—in—law,-the members of his 
family, and his soldiers be united; and you shall come (and) with (your) 
strength hold the hostile country in subjection. 2431 
His proclamation' did not set forth a policy which was devised to 
meet a momentary need, but rather, as befits true statesmanship, it was 
an attempt to encompass the future and guide and direct along ordered 
lines the future of the Hittite kingdom. 
The proclamation then concerns itself with what appears to be advice 
to future kings: 
(43)"But do not speak thus:'I grant complete pardon,'(while)however, 
you pardon nothing and actually order(his) arrest."32 
One of the objectives of such advice must have been to minimise the 
likelihood of injustice. 	People were to be sure of their position in 
relation to the king. 	The word of the king must be—above reproach. 
His actions must not be underhand. 	Duplicity and intrigue could lead to 
a situation which seriously threatened the monarch's position. 	If the 
king was open and consistent in his conduct he would not arouse the resentment 
of his subjects. 
31. Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit.p.189,191.' 
32.Ibid p.191 
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The next sections of the proclamation zegulate the behaviour of 
the king in relationship to the fuling family: 
(45)"Clo not kill any member of the (royal) family; it leads to disaster. 
30 
(46)Whoever hereafter becomes king, and plans injury of brother or 
sister-you(are) his senate-speak to him frankly: 'Reed in the tablet the 
tale of blood(shed) (48) Formerly in Hattusas blood(shed) became common; 
and at that time the gods exacted of the royal family the penalty for it'. 
31 
(50) Whatever (king) does harm among (his) brothers and sisters, risks 
his royal head; call the Assembly. (51) If at that time he carries 
out his plan, let him atone with his head." 33 
If it becomes known that the king plans to injure his brother or his 
sister his council of_ royal advisors is to remind him of the penalty for 
such a crime. 	But if the king, after the warning of the councillors, persists 
in his plan to injure one of the royal family and actually does so the 
council or senate is to call the Assembly and the king is to atone with 
his head. 	It was to be the body of citizens at large which passed sentence 
of death if the king did not heed the council 	There is one very good 
reason why the Assembly should have the ultimate power in connection with 
the above situation. 	Certain members of the council could be in line for 
the succession to the kingship. 	Such interested parties might profit if 
the present king was unjustly executed. 	Hittite history has so far proved 
that the Hittite nobility was exceedingly envious of the king's position 
and would not stop short of murder to gain'it. 
The fact that emerges from this section is that the Assembly met when 
summoned by the council. 	This dependency of the Assembly on the council 
perhaps pertained to matters other than deciding the fate of the king. It 
would be interesting to know if the council neglected to call the Assembly 
when. it was legally obliged to do so. 	But later Hittite history indicates 
that the nobility, and thus the council, did not possess the power it 
undoubtedly had in the Old Kingdom. 
33. Ibid. p.191 
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But on no account was the king to be killed secretly. 	Again we - have evidence that Telipinus was attempting to guard against injustice 
and furtive behaviour with its attendant uncertaintly, complications, 
intrigues and confusion. 
(52) "But let them not kill (him) secretly, in the manner of Zurus, 
Tanuwas, Taharwailis, and Taruhsus. 	(54) Let them not contrive harm 
for his house, his wife, (and) his children. 	(55) If a prince does 
wrong let him atone even with his head. (55) However, let them not 
contrive harm for his house and his children. (56) In whose ever behalf 
princes are destroyed (it does) not (apply) to their htluses, their fields, 
their vineyards, their barns, their slaves, their cattle,(and) their sheep. 
32 
..(60) However, it (is) not right to give away the person (?) (or) 
property of the princes. 34 (61) Whoever institutes these injurious plans 
(whether) Lu.Mes...,fathers of the house (?), chief of the palace servants, 
chief of the Mesedi, or chief of the cup—bearers, because they desire 
to take the holding of the prince, they say: 'Such and such a city would 
become mine,' and they contrive harm for the lord of the city." 35 
When the king or prince has paid the supreme penalty the matter is 
to end there. On no account is there to be a chain reaction.of killings 
within the royal family which had formerly so weakened the Hittite kingdom. 
Also the property of the deceased prince is tobe in no way impaired. 
Nor is it to be given away. 	This proviso is proof of the political 
subtlety of Telipinus. It indicates his awateness that it was necessary 
to guard against the abuse of the law regulating the conduct of kings 
and princes. 	We have here the elimination of the profit motive which 
could well stimulate the instigation of "trumped up charges" against a 
king or prince. 	This was a very necessary and intelligent check on a 
34. Telipinus is here referring to those princes who have suffered the 
.death penalty for their misdemeanours. 
35. Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit.p.191 
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situation which gave scope.for members of the nobility to level false 
accusations against a member of the ruling house in the interests of 
furthering their own material advancement. 	It is informative to see 
that it was the leading dignitaries of the kingdom whom Telipinus 
considered would be most likely to contrive harm for a king or prince. 
This law was specifically directed against the nobility who comprised 
the council. 	If a member of the nobility attempted to have one of 
the royal family executed for his own gain this must have been seen as 
treason; and if my contention is correct he would have been tried by 
the assembly. Similarly, it'is no cause for wonder that the Assembly 
rather than the council should try members of the royal family. 	Telipinus 
obviously considered that it was the Hittite nobility who stood to gain 
if the king or a prince was murdered. 
In the next section Telipinus names the positions of the people 
he is addressing. 	Quite obviously the totality of the people present 
falls into two distinct political bodies; an assembly of lesser Hittites 
and a-council comprised of the chief officials: 
33 
(66)"And now from this day in Hattusas, do you, palace servants, Mesedi, 
golden grooms, cup—bearers, salashiyas,(and) exalted captains of a thousand, 
,remember this matter. (68) Moreover, let Tanuwas, Taharwailis, and Taruhsus 
be a sign for you."36 
These people must have belonged to the Hittite Assembly. 	They are 
warned against becoming the executors of the treacherous plans of the 
nobility. 
The proclamation continues : 
(70) If hereafter anyone does wrong, either the father of the house,(7) or 
the chief of the palace servants, (or) the chief of the cup—bearers,(or) the 
chief of the Mesedi,(or) the chief of the exalted captains - of A thousand,...., 
and do you, the senate, 37 have (him) brought before you and punish him" 38 
36. Ibid p.193. 
37. I have already pointed out that pankus, according to Gurney and Hardy, 
should most likely be rendered as assembly rather than senate. 
38. Sturtevant and Bechtel Op.cit.p.193. 
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The people named here would have belonged to the Hittite council. 
As in the days of Hattusilis I the council met with the Assembly to 
hear the formal proclamation of the king, even though the former body 
may have advised the king in some of the matters contained in the 
proclamation. 	If the above argument is correct in connection with 
Telipinus delegating judicial power to the Assembly which was formerly 
held by the council then these council members are to be tried, should 
the occasion arise, not by their fellow members but by the Assembly. 
I would conclude in the following way. 	The king was not a law 
unto himself. 	If he harmed a member of the ruling Kouse he was to be 
tried by the Assembly if the council's initial.warning had failed. The 
council did not try him because some of its members may have profited 
by his death, politically or materially, perhaps both. Secondly, the 
council did not try their own kind because of the possibility that 
justice would be thwarted to ensure the continuation of the group interests. 
Thus although the council may still have acted in an advisory capacity 
to the king, and although it may have had the power of convening the 
Assembly, there is evidence to suggest that Telipinus seriously limited 
the power of the nobility. 	The relative stability of the domestic history 
of the Mew Empire and the consequent imperial success of a more sustained 
mature are suggestive of •the success of Telipinus' policy in relationship 
to the Hittite nobility. 
There is yet one other interesting point which arises from the Telipinus 
proclamation: 
49 
(19)"And a case of murder is as follows. (19) Whoever commits murder, 
whatever the heir himself of the murdered-man says; if he says:'Let him 
die', he shall die; but if he says: 'Let him make restitution,' he shall 
make restitution. (21) At such a time, however,let no(plea be made) to 
the king."39 
39. Ibid p.193 
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This indication that private vengeance, or the blood feud was 
still in existence during the reign of Telipinus comes as a startling 
contrast to the undoubted attempts of Telipinus to establish law and 
order. The practice of private vengeance was apparently such a strong 
custom among the Hittites that Telipinus at this stage of Hittite 
social development either did not wish to abolish it or could not do so 
with safety. 	But the alternative of restitution is indicative of a 
tendency towards greater social and hence poltlical stability. 	Perhaps 
Telipinus introduced this alternative. 	It would certainly be in keeping 
with the general tenor of his policy. 	The isolated mention of a 
law governing social behaviour in a proclamation dealing essentially 
with political matters suggests that it may have been seen as an 
innovation of real importance. 
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THE HITTITE LAW CODE 
The Hittite law code is one of the most informative of the state 
documents that have survived to us.' 	The sections relating to officialdom 
and feudal duties are particularly rerevaritto this thesis. Other sections 
are not as directlyrerevant but often make clearer.the type of people 
that the Hittites were and this can be extremely useful as a guide to 
speculation when other evidenced_s lacking. 
Because Telipinus essentially concerned himself with a policy of 
domestic consolidation and reconstruction 1:have thought it necessary 
to include a chapter on the law code. 	Since the Hittite code was often 
amended and no tangible information regarding the authorship exists it 
is impossible to assign any precise date to the code. 2 	But the great 
political and administrative ability of Hattusilis I and Telipinus 
suggests that much of the law code was compiled during their reigns. 3 The 
important point is that the Hittite code was continually being adapted 
to meet new needs. 
The power of the written word has always been dangerously formidable. 
People have continually exhibited a tendency to accept an attitude, idea 
or decree as being irrefutable and beyond criticism simply because it has 
been written down and has the sanction of officialdom. 	It is so much 
1. For a discussion of the tablets containing the law code see GurneyjO.R; 
The Hittites,(2nd ed, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd,1954)p.88; 
Neufeld,E; The Hittite Lam, (London, Luzac,1951)p.73-77 
2. For theories regarding the date of composition of the law code see Gurney, 
Op.cit.p.26; Neufeld, Op.cit. p.1107115; Cavaignac,E; Les Hittites, 
(L'Orient ancien illustre,Paris, Maisonneuve,1950),p.57; Contenau,G; La 
civilzation deshittites et des hurrites du Mitanni, (2nd ed,Paris,Payot,1948) 
p.114-115; Hrozny,B;Ancient History of Western Asia, India and Crete,(New York, 
Philosophical Library Inc,translated by Jindrich Prochazka, 1953,)p.141 
3. Neufeld,Opcit.p.115,note 104, considers that Teliplbus' restoration of law 
and order could not have been achieved solely by a proclamation before the 
assembly but must have been based on a long term policy necessitating a 
revision of pre-existing customary laws in which he attempted to bring about 
an increase in mercy and an improvement in the standards of justice. He 
concludes that Telipinus attempted to realize a new ideal in justice based 
on a definite link between claims and duties. 
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easier to comfortably acdept other people's thinking, especially that of 
the expert, than to come to individual conclusions which may or may not 
be the same. Hence a codified body of law with its official stamp of 
approval can easily become anachronistic. 	This is especially a danger 
if the laws are considered as being a gift from the gods. There is very 
little trace of the divine element in the Hittite law code. ThUs it could 
not be expediently argued that an amendment to the law code was tantamount 
to sacrilege. 	Hittite politics of the Old Kingdom indicate that the idea 
of change was a reality and a necessity to the Hittites. An awareness 
of new conditions demanding new or modified laws explains the amendments 
to the Hittite law code. The capacity to change and amend in pedalos 
has been seen in the political testament of Hattusilis I and especially 
in the legislation of Telipinus. 
No legal documents have been found in the Hattic, Luwian, Palaic or 
Hurrian language. They are all written in the Hittite language. This 
in itself is proof of the importance that the Hittites attached to their 
law code. 	As a nation of rulers they insisted that this instrument of 
rule be couched in their own language. 	Their contrasting attitude to 
religion is informative. It is really a question of what the Hittites 
considered to be their chief concern. 	But the Hittite insistence on 
the use of their own language in the writing of their law does not mean 
that the Hittite insisted that this law be applied to all and sundry. 
The chapter devoted to Hattusilis I has dealt with the existence of different 
- legal systems of a local nature. 4 
Section five of the Hittite code further proves the existence of 
different penalties in different areas. 
"If anyone kills a Hittite merchant, he shall give 100 minas of silver 
and pledge his estate as security. If (it happens) in the country of 
Luwiya or in the country of Pala, he shall give 100 minas of silver and 
replace his goods; if (it happens) in the Hatti land, he has (also) to 
make amends for the merchants himself." 5 
4. Supra p.97 
5. Pritchard,J.B; (ed),Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old  
Testament, (2nd ed, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1955), 
p.189 of the Hittite Laws translated by Goetze. But it must be admitted that 
this law does not necessarily prove the existence of local judicial practices 
in Luwiva and Pala in distinntinn tn Wittitp iudirial nrantinPA. If may 
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simply be an attempt on the part of the law-giver to lay down penalties 
in accordance with the various trade situations. 	The specifying of 
.a merchant in this particular law seems to indicate that this may have 
been the case. 
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The fact that the countibbs of Luwiya and Pala are specified is 
interesting. 	These two countries possibly had a predominantly 
Indo-European population if the terms Luwian and Palaic as Indo-European 
dialects may be used as evidence to this effect. 	Perhaps the Hittites 
were intent on preserving the local laws of those racially akin to them 
in the interests of making these other Indo-European tribes privileged, 
and thus loyal, groups. 	But the different provision in connection with 
the merchant in Luwiya and Pala need not necessarily be the law of Luwiya 
and Pala incorporated in the Hittite law code. 	It is rather to be seen 
as a Hittite law to cover the merchant in a different trade situation. 
(See footnote 5) 
Laws 19A,B, 20 and 21 indicate the inferiority of Luwian's,both free-man 
and slave, in relationship to the corresponding Hittite. 6 Especially seriotas 
is thecrime embodied in section 19A: 
"If any Luwian steals a person-man or woman from Hattusas and carries 
him to the country of Arzawa, but his master traces him out, he shall 
forfeit his estate." 
It is understandable that the Hittites should impose a severe penalty 
upon a subject who commits an offence in the capital; especially if the 
offence was committed against a Hittite. 
Law 19B illustrates the inferiority of the Luwian in relationship 
tof.the Hittite: 
"If in Hattusa any Hittite steals a Luwian and carries him to the 
country of Luwiya, they would formerly give twelve persons, now he shall 
give six persons and place his estate as security." 
The penalty is lighter for the Hittite. 	Laws 20 and 21, which are 
concerned with slaves also illustrate the inferiority of the Luwian. One 
can only conclude that the penalties laid down varied in accordance with 
the importance of the locality in which the offence was committed and the 
status of citizenship possessed by the offender and victim. The Hittites 
obviously saw themselves as a caste apart. 
The last provision of law 23 is of considerable interest: 
'..If a slave runs away and goes to any enemy country, whoever brings him 
nevertheless back, shall receive him(the slave) himself."7 
6. Pritchard,(ed) Op.cit.p.190 
7. Ibid.p.190 
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Apart from the reward being equated to the risk involved this law 
has imperial overtones. The interests of state security and the danger 
of adding to the enemies ranks are here being catered for. 
The Hittites, not unnaturally, insisted upon complete obedience to 
those in authority. 	If a ruling minority does not gain obedience on 
the home front little success can be expected with people outside the 
inner circle. 	Section 173 contains the following provisions: 
"If anyone rejects the judgmentof'theicing, his house shall remain 
a shambles. If anyone rejects the judgment of a dignitary, they shall 
cut off his;:head. 	If a slave rises against his master, he shall go into 
the pit."8 
Gurney considers that "house" should possibly be translated as "household? 
If this is thezcase this is practically the only surviving trace of collective 
responsibility in the Hittite law code. 10 Eleewhere the onus is placed 
on the individual responsible for the crime. 	That collective responsibility 
should survive in relation to an offence againstlhe king is proof enough 
of the importance attached to any flouting of his judgements. 	Section 
126 is reflective of the same attitude towards authority as represented 
by the king: 
"...If anyone steals a bronze spear in the gate of the palace he shall 
die"11 	Disregard for a symbol of palace authority must have been seen 
as an affront to royalty. 	Hence the unnusual severity of the penalty. 
The Hittite law code emphasizes compensation inlAind or money, rather 
than retribution, as a penalty. 	Retribution is the practice whereby the 
victim revenges himself upon the wrongdoer. 	If the victim dies the vengeance 
becomes the obligation of his relatives. 	There thus arises a blood feud 
8. Ibid p.195 
9. Gurney Op.cit.p.93 note 2. 
10.The exception to this rule is containdd in law 49. See Pritchard (ed)Op.cit. 
p.191: "If a hipparas man steals, there will be no compensation. If 
he is considered a felon, the community to which he belongs will make 
compensation. 	If one would indict them for theft, all of them 
were criminals or would have to be considered as thieves" 
To the best of my knowledge the meaning of hipparas is still a matter 
of dispute. 
11.Pritchard(ed) Op.cit.p.194. 
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which can lead to many deaths. 	This institution of blood vengeance 
which can be traced back to the beginning of social development, and 
which as an act of justice is an obvious manifestation of the principle 
of retribution, existed at some time among the Hittites. 12 
But very little trace of the principle of retribution or private vengeance 
can be found in the Hittite law code. 13 
12. See Sturtevant,E.H. and Bechtel,G; A Hittite Chrestomathy (Philadelphia, 
1935),p.193. But the alternative of restitution is offered. 
13. Laws 197 and 198 in Pritchard (ed) Op.cit.p.196 seem to reflect the 
development from the practice of private vengeance to institutionalized 
or state justice : 
197."If a man seizes a woman in the mountains, it is the man's crime 
and he will be killed. But if he seizes her in (her) house it 
is the woman's crime and the woman shall be killed. 	If the 
husband finds them, he may killithem, there shall be no punishment 
for him." 
198."If he brings them to the gate of the palace and declares: 
'My wife shall not be killed and thereby spares his wife's 
life, he shall also spare the life of the adulterer and shall 
mark his head. 	If he says:, 'Let them die both of them:'... 
The king may order them killed the king may spare their lives." 
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The desire and the traditional right of the family to seek vengeance 
does not die easily. 	But during the time of the laws the central 
authority and social forces were strong enough to suppress private 
vengeance. 	The degree of progress from the principle of blood 
vengeance to the higher social technique of the surrender of persons 
in disch:arge of guilt is very great. 14 
In short, the Hittite state has sought to make illegal the vendetta 
with its consequent social instability which inevitably impairs the 
harmony of the state. 	Justice has become a matter of official, rather 
than private, dispensation. 	The importance which the Hittites attached 
to guaranteeing the unimpaired course of justice is made clear by law 38: 
"If men are implicated in a law suit and an avenger comes for them, 
(if) then the defendants *t enraged and (one of them) strikes the avenger 
so that he dies, there will be no cmmpensation." 15 
The death penalty is rarely stipulated as a punishment. It was 
only operative in cases involving defiance of authority and sexual offences. 
In the great majority of such cases the king was the ultimate authority. 
He had the power either to grant reprieve or to command the sentence of 
death. 16 	The power to grant pardons appears to have been the prerogative 
of the crown. 	Thus punishment actually threatened by the law Was often 
more severe than the punishment actually inflicted. 	Thus the king 
had scope for the application of leniency beyond the mere confines of 
the law. 	The king then, possessed a very powerful weapon. 	He commanded 
the power of life or death. 	The king could take extenuating circumstances 
into account and judge accordingly. 	There is something essentially 
casuistic about much of Hittite law. We have here proof of the Hittite 
capacity for flexibility. 	Despite the indication given in their religious 
texts the Hittites apparently realised that there was more to successful 
government than the mere application of formulae solutions which tend to 
push the problem out of perspective in order to allow an ill-fitting 
application. 	With them the problem dictated the nature of the solution. 
14. Neufeld. Op.cit. p.130. For examples of the surrender of persons as the 
penalty for homicide see laws 1-4 in Pritchard (ed) Op.cit.p.189. 
15. Pritchard (ed) Op.cit. p.190 
16. See Pritchard (ed) Op.cit. Laws 187,188,198,199, p.196 
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If this view is extreme it must at least be conceded that the Hittites 
were not so governed by an adherence to the letter of the law as to 
preclude a modification of it should a situation arise which demanded 
that the law be amended. 
But what explains the raity of the death penalty and the scope 
given for its commutation ? 	The answer is to be found in the essential 
respect that the Hittite had for the individual and his rights. The 
existence of a council and an assembly which qualified the powers of 
the king attest to this. The nature of Hittite origins must be taken 
into account here. 	The large numbers of laws concerned with theft 
do not necessarily indicate a national Hittite weakness, but rather they 
may testify to the sanctity of private ownership. 
Gurney makes the following interesting remark : 
"An outstanding feature of Hittite legal procedure is the immense 
trouble taken to ascertain the facts. 	We possess highly detailed 
minutes of inquiry in cases of peculation and neglect of duty..." 17 
A portion of the text runs as follows: 
"Regarding the stores which[the queen]entrusted to 'Great-is-the-Storm-
God', son of Ukkuras the 'leader of ten' - to wit,[charioi utensils of 
bronze and copper, garments and materials, bows, arrows, shields,[clubs], 
civilian captives (!), oxen, sheep, horses and mules - the stores which 
he had issued to anybody he had not sealed, and he had no dusdumis and 
no lalamis (two words of unknown meaning). So the queen said: 'Let the 
'golden pages' and the chamberlains of the queen and Great-is-the-Storm-
God and (?) Ukkuras the leader of .ten go and swear solemn oaths in the 
temple of Lilwanis." 
After the sworn statements Great-is-the-Storm-God is then questioned: 
"Thus said Maruwas:'One pair of mules you gave to Hillarizzi'. Great-
is-the-Storm-God replied: 'The mules belong to Hillarizzi; I took them 
and gave them back safe and sound(?)' 
Thus said Maruwas :'You gave mules to Piha-...' Great-is-the-Storm-God 
replied: 'They were not from the stable.' 
17. Gurney Op.cit.p.93 
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Thus said Yarrazalmas the 'golden page': 'Zuwappis sold a 
horse and got a talent of bronze.' 	Great-is-the-Storm-God replied: 
'He told me it was dead!'" 18 
Gurney concludes that "the text shows a spirit of careful and 
unbiased investigation which may perhaps be taken as typical of Hittite 
administration as a whole." 19 	But while this is true Gurney misses 
the point in one important respect. If the defendant, Great-is-the-Storm-
God, is found guilty he will obviously be punished. 	What is of great 
importance is the "careful and unbiased investigation" to determine the 
fate of one person. t If the importance of the individual is conceded 
as existing among the Hittites respect for his life naturally follows. 
I feel sure that this factor lad much to do with the nature of Hittite 
politics. 
The fact that the penalties contained in the Hittite code of laws 
illustrate an evolution to leniency 2° is an important reflection of a 
characteristic of the Hittite people which has a direct bearing on their 
attitude to the subjects of their empire. 	Just as the law code is free 
of cruel, barbaric penalties and evolves towards less severe punishments 
so was the Hittite disposition towards the conquered free of those atrocities 
which desevedly earned for the Assyrians the title of "scourge of the east". 
The Hittites early reached the stage whereby alternatives other than violence 
were considered as workable political and imperial techniques. 
The general trend of the law indicates a concern with reparation of 
damage that has been done. 	Punishmentfor the offence seems often to 
be a secondary consideration. 	makes the interesting observation 
that the central conception of Hittite law "is that the fulfilment of one's 
obligations is required for maintaining the equilibrium of mutuality." 
He enlarges upon this idea by contending that the legal procedures function 
in the first instance to secure reparation that will re-establish smooth 
relations between the parties and thus maintain the social balance. The aim 
18. Ibid p.94 
19. Ibid p.94 
20. See Pritchard(ed) Op.cit. Later version of laws 3 and 4,1ater version of 
law 9 and 15,p.189. Seeds() the later version of law 44,p.191. Compare 
laws 166 and - 167,2p195. 
21. Ibid See the 1ater-Versio0s:of-J:ews 5 ancl 1Q;-15..189 
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is to achieve a decision acceptable to all parties, not to ‘adjudicate 
upon.conflicting rights according to the letter of the law. There is 
as object the resolving of tensions rather than the deciding of legal 
issues as such.. The courts were not arenas for forens'i -c debate but agencies 
of arbitration for effecting compromises. Thus since appeasement of 
the parties is fundamental penalties and punishments became secondary 
and reparation primary. 22 
In short, the law code aspired to the attainment of harmony and 
balance between the members of the state who became involved in disputes. 
This attitude, clearly manifest in the law code, must to some extent have 
made itself felt in Hittite political and imperial activities. 	The 
effecting of compromises to give some degree of satisfaction to the parties 
concerned takes time, thought and discussion. 	In the interests of gaining
stability within the state the Hittites did not arbitrarily apply a few 
limited rules to govern the outcome of all disputes. 	They were aware 
that a variety of situations demanded a corresponding variety of solutions 
if satisfaction and hence balance between the conflicting parties were to 
be achieved. 	Punishment was only justifiable if it achieved this harmony. 
The main importance of the Hittite law code for the purposes of this 
study lies in the information which it gives in regard to the feudal nature 
of the Hittite kingdom. 	Generally speaking, land ownership among the 
Hittites entailed the rendering of services. But the details of ownership 
and the exact nature of the services expected are by no means clear. 
For example, it is not clear whether one type of holding was the responsibility 
of the "man of the weapon", a soldier who received the holding on terms of 
military service, or the responsiblity of a "tool-man", a craftsman. 23 
22. Neufeld. Op.cit.p.100 
23. See Gurney Op.cit.p.102-103. Neufeld. 0o.cit. p.156 prefers soldier 
to craftsman as do Sturtevant and Bechte1.0p.cit.p.221. But aetze in 
Pritchard (ed) Op.cit. laws 40,41,47, p.190-191, takes an opposite 
stand. 	I have chosen to follow Goetze's more recent translation of 
the law code even though it does not necessarily follow that recency is 
to be equated with correctness. 
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But despite such confusion several salient factors of considerable 
importance emerge. ' 
Law 39 indicates that the possessor of fields had to perform 
service to the liege lord who no doubt let certain sections of his 
property on that understanding: 
"If the inhabitant - of a town has possession of another (inhabitant) 
fields, he shall also perform (the - repective) service to the liege lord. 
If he allows fields to lie idle, another man may take the fields, but 
he must not sell them. H24 
The activities of the Hittite nobles implies that they possessed 
retainers who were bound to give military service 25 to the lord in 
return for receiving a livelihood from him. 	Under these conditions 
the lord would be expected to provide a contingent of soldiers for the 
king when it was required. 	That this system was subject to abuse has 
already been sufficiently demonstrated. 
It is impossible to conceive of the powerful role played by the 
nobility in Hittite politics unless ownership of land on the part of the 
nobles, with retainers owing them military service, is assumed. 	Law 
176B perhaps indicates that the nobility 'owned' people: 
"If anyone buys a craftsman, either a potter, a smith, a carpenter, 
a leatherworker, a:fuller, a weaver or he buys a maker of kapalli garments, 
he shall give 10 shekels of silver."26 
• Law 42 is also suggestive in this respect: 
"If anyone hires a man and he goes to war and dies, if the hire 
has been given, there will be no compensation. If his hire has not been 
given, he shall give one person and as hire he will give 12 shekels of 
silver, and as the hire of a woman he shall give 6 shekels of silver." 27 
24. Pritchard (ed) Op.cit. p.190 
25. See Sayce, The Hittites: The History of a Forgotten Empire, (5th ed,London, 
1910), p.213. See also Rostovtzeff,M: A History of the Ancient World, 
(Vol.1, 2nd ed, Oxford,Clarendon Press,1930),p.67, who suggests very 
much the same idea, and Hrozny,B; Ancient History of Western Asia, India  
and Crete,(New York Philosophical Library Inc. translated by Jindrich 
Prochazka,1953),p.139. 	• 
26. Pritchard (ed) Op.cit.p.195 
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This law is more than likely to do with a lord hiring people for 
war in order to make up the numbers which the king expects from him. 
The law seems to aim at ensuring that the offspring and wife of the 
soldier will receive some form of compensation should the soldier die. 
Hence punishment is imposed for not paying in advance; 	that is, before 
the hire&man leaves for war with its danger to life. 
Law 40 attests to the fact that a socman may be assigned to a 
craftsman's fields if the. latter disappears. 	As welllas continuing 
to render his service as a socman he must also :begin . . to render the 
craftsman's service. 	If he refuses this the people of the town were 
to work the fields. No doubt the lords of the town who owned or controlled 
the fields leased them to people who thus became their retainers: 
"If a craftsman disappears (and) a socman is assigned (in his stead), 
(if) the socman says: 'This is my craftsman's fee, but this (other one) 
is my socage,' he shall receive for himself a sealed deed concerning the 
fields; then he has (legal) possession of the craftsman's fee and shall 
also perform the socage. 	If he refuses the craftsman's service, they 
will declare the fields of the craftsman vacant and the people of the town 
shall work them. If the king gives deportees, they shall give him the 
fields and he shall become a (landed) craftsman."28 
Hittite state law is here simply concerned with ensuring that the 
services, due to the Hittite"king through the medium of the nobility, 
continued to be forthcoming. 	If these services included military service, 
as they more than likely did, it is small wonder that Hittite law did 
everything to prevent a falling off in them. 	It is important to note 
the power of the king in the assigning of land. 	If he ruled that a deportee 
was to be assigned to the vacant land that no doubt overode the preceding 
proviso whereby the people of the town were to work the land. 	This may 
have aimed at limiting the power of the nobility. 	It would be interesting 
to know if this was a relatively late development in Hittite law. 
28. Ibid p.190-191. 
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Provision 41 is the same as provision 40 except that it deals with 
the disappearance of a socman. 	But in this case, if the craftsman refuses 
to perform the socage "they take the fields of the socman for the palace, 
and the socage expires." 29 	This is direct proof that the king directly 
controlled the use of land. 	No doubt the king ; then appointed people 
to work the land that he controlled. 	The people who were assigned to 
this land would owe service to the king. 	That these services would 
have included military service is not only to be assumed but firmly held 
since the Hittite state was essentially military based. 	When one considers 
the consistent trouble which the nobility with their retained soldiery 
offered the king it is axiomatic that the king must have had his own 
soldiery dependent upon him for their livelihood. 
Law 46 contends with the problem of evading services : 
"If in a village anyone holds fields under socage as inheritance—
if the fields have been given to him, he shall render the services; if 
the fields have been given to him only to a small part, he shall not render 
the services, they shall render them from his father's house..."3° 
The expected services would be in proportion to the land owned. It is 
unlikely that a family, in the interests of evading the services, would 
be able to find a member of the family willing to own all the land on the 
basis that he performed everybody's services. 	The individual referred to 
who only ownstr,,part of the land does not evade all services. He simply renders 
tham as a member of the family. 
Section 47A and the later version, 475, are interesting enough in 
themselves, but they are even more informative in comparison with each 
other. Law 47A gives further proof that the king owned land: 
"If anyone holds fields as a gift from the king, he shall not render 
the services."31 
This power of bestowing favours is illustrative of the powerful position 
• 
of the Hittite king. If one receives favours there is a sense of dependency. 
This earlier version of law 47 gives the impression that a gift of land 
from the king always meant exemption from rendering the services. 	But 
47B, the later version of 47A, reflects a different situation: 
29. Ibid p.191 
30. Ibid p.191 
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"If anyone holds field (and) fallow as a gift from the king and if 
the king exempts him, he shall not render the services.... If anyone 
holds field (and) fallow as a gift from the king he shall render the 
services connected with the field. 	If he is exempted by order of the 
palace, he shall not render the services." 32 
Thus the receiving of land from the king did not always mean that 
the holder was exempted from rendering the services. The king could give, 
the king could withold. 	In this way the sense of dependency on the 
part of the land-holder would have been intensified. 	In times of national 
emergency the services would no doubt be required. 
Other extracts in law 47B point to an increase in the power of the 
monarchy: 
"If anyOne , buys all the field (and) fallow of a craftsman and the 
owner of the field (and) fallow perishes, he shall perform the socage 
which the king imposes upon him."33 
There is no such allusion to this power of the king in laws 40 and 
41 which deal with similar situations. 
The extract from law 47B continues as follows: 
"But if the owner of field (and) fallow is alive or the house of the 
owner of field (and) fallow is continued either in this country or in 
another country, he shall not perform socage." 34 
Thus the selling of property did not gain exemption from the services 
for the person who sold the property. 	This of course guards against 	the 
danger of evasion of service which law 46 may have made possible on some 
occasions. 
The new role of the Hittite king in laws dealing with feudal dues 
may have had as its objective the limiting of the power of the nobles. 
Perhaps it was the nobility who received land as a gift from the king. If 
they abused this gift which formerly entailed freedom from service it is 
likely that the king would wish to acquire the judicial power which enabled 
him to demand the services. 	The monarchy's control of allocation of 
service to the craftsmen could very well have had the same end in view. 
32. Ibid p.191 
33. Ibid p.191 
34. Ibid p.191 
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Law 47B belongs to the time of a strong monarch who enacted this 
legislation to lessen the stranglehold that the nobility had on the 
control of feudal dues. 	In order to have at his disposal the largest 
army possible the king began to play a more active role in the determination 
of dues technLally owing to the crown but often olIssipated by the nobles 
for their own ends. 	In the previous chapter we have seen that Telipinus 
Made conscious efforts to curb the destructive activities of the nobility. 
While these later laws are perhaps not to be assigned to Telipinus it was 
possibly his policy in relation to the nobles that suggested their en- 
actment to a later Hittite king. 	I have little hesitation in assigning 
such a law as 47B to the time of Suppiluliumas or Mursilis II when Hittite 
power reached its peak. 	These two kings have little or no trouble with 
the nobles and both needed large armies for their imperial achievements. 
The provision ebbeidied in law 51 indicates the same tendency to 
utilize all possible services which must have included military service: 
"Formerly the house of a man who had become a weaver in Arinna (was), 
• exempt. Now (only) his own house (is) exempt, but his associates and 
his relations perform socage and render the services. 	In Zippalantiya 
it is just the same."35 
35. Ibid p.191 
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CONCLUSION  
The majority of the history of the Hittite Old Kingdom has 
witnessed a struggle between the king and the nobility. Labarnas 
and especially Hattusilis I and Telipinus attempted to confine and 
restrict the ruinous activities of the nobles. 	The imperial ambitions 
of the Hittites were incompatible with the domestic situation as we 
have seen it in the Old Kingdom. 	It was during the time of anarchy, 
caused by the rivalries and intrigues of leading Hittites, that Hittite 
controlled territory shrank in size. 	Before there could be a Hittite 
empire which possessed any genuine stability it was vital that the kings 
of the Old Kingdom should direct their energies to the task of ending 
domestic intrigue and confusion. 	Since the power of the nobility 
appears to have been customary and based upon traditional right the 
process of circumscribing this power was inevitably slow. 
But Telipinus appears to have been basically successful since 
from his time the Hittite kings no longer have to contend, to the same 
extent at least, with the disloyalty of the nobles. 	The testament of 
Hattusilis I and the proclamation of Telipinus essentially work towards 
the elimination of this problem. 	The Hittite law code also offers 
evidence which points in the same direction. 	The fact that the Hittites 
successfully held an extensive empire, for those times, from Suppiluliumas 
down until the end of Hattusilis III's reign is sufficient indication 
that the power of the nobility had been considerably curbed. 
Gurney makes the following interesting statement: 
"During the later Empire tabarna is usually replaced by a title 
meaning 'My Sun'. This must have been properly a form of address used 
by the king's subjects, and was certainly borrowed from the contemporary 
kingdoms of Mitanni and Egypt together with the winged sun as a symbol 
of royalty. The oriental conception of a king endowed with superhuman 
powers also makes its appearance during the imperial age. 	It expresses 
itself in the phrase 'Hero, beloved of the god (or goddess)..', which . 
follows the name of all the later kings, and in a passage such as the 
following from the autobiography of Hattusilis III : 
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'The goddess, my lady, always held me by the hand; and since I 
was a divinely favoured man, and walked in the favour of the gods, I 
never committed the evil deeds of mankind. '1 
Moscati considers that it was in the age of Suppiluldumas that the 
Hittite kingship evolved in the direction of that of the great oriental 
monarchies. 2 	When talking of the monarchy and divinity in relationship 
to the Egyptians and Mesopotamians Moscati contends that we sbouTd.not 
underestimate the different situation of nomads. 	He considers that 
among nomads the likelihood of the deification of the ruler and the 
absolute authority which it presupposes are much reduced. "Whether he 
be the sheikh of tribal origin, controlled by a council of elders, or 
the elected leader of a restricted class of nobility, the nomad chief is 
very far from the ruler of a settled people. 	But it is a fact that the 
latter strongly attracts the former: for example, the Hittite sovereign 
of the New Empire differs from that of the old by his adoption of the 
Egyptian divine symbol, and his own deification after death."3 
Thus, in conclusion, there is reason to think that the Hittite monarchy 
of the New Empire pertained in some respects at least to the absolutism 
of the oriental monarchies of the ancient near east. 	If the Hittite 
kingship gained in ,vower to this extent one must presuppose that the power 
of the nobility had been effectively reduced. 	It would seem, then, 
that the policy of Hattusilis I and Telipinus in relationship to their 
nobility was so far successful as to make possible the increased power 
of the king during the New Empire. 	This in its turn in many respects 
explains the imperial success of such monarchs as Suppiluliumas and Mursilis II. 
1. Gerney,O.R; The Hittites,(2nd ed,Harmondsworth,Middlesex,Penguin Books Ltd, 
1954), p.64-65. 
2. Moscati,S; The Face of the Ancient Orient, (English translation, Vallentine, 
. 	Mitchell and Co.Ltd.,1960),p.161 
3. Ibid p.296. 
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CHRONOLOGY 
Van der Meer says that since "there exists no list of the 
Hittite kings which gives the number of their regnal years, we 
can only look about for points of contact of some of the Hittite 
monarchs with their contemporaries in West Asia and Egypt.-
Fortunately we have one such point of contact for the Hittite Old 
Kingdom. 
This point of contact is the raid of Mursilis I against 
Babylon. 	This took place during the reign of Samsiditana 
whom, Van der Meer considers reigned from 1564 to 1534. 	He places 
the date of the raid at about 1550 B.C. 2 We know that Mursilis 
was murdered not long , . after his return from the raid. The dates 
for the Old Kingdom have to be reconstructed from that of the death 
of Mursilis. If a king has had a successful reign it is perhaps 
reasonable to assign him a rule of thirty years. 	That is, he may 
have remained on the throne for approximately a generation. But 
this more than likely is not the case for those Hittite kings of the 
Old Kingdom who ruled during the period of anarchy. 
Let us assume that Mursilis reigned from about 1580 B.C. to 1550 
B.C. 	His predecessor, Hattusilis I, being a successful monarch, perhaps 
ruled from approximately 1610 B.C. to 1580 B.C. 	The predecessor of 
Hattusilis I, Labarnas, likewise enjoyed a relatively stable reign. 
He ruled from about 1640 B.C. to 1610 B.C. 	In this way we may go 
back to Pitkhanas and Anittas. 	Van der Meer considers that they lived 
in the first half of the eighteenth century. 3 	This can be proved by 
their contemporaneity with the Assyrian prince Sarru-ken and his son 
Puzur-Assur. 	Chronological data from Assyria enables an accurate 
dating of the Assyrian rulers. 
1. Van der Meer,P; The Chronology of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt, 
(2nd ed, Leiden, E.J.Bri11,1955), p.90. 
2. Ibid p.90 
3. Ibid p.91 
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If we say that Anittas died in approximately 1750 B.C. we have over 
a gap of a century between the death of Anittas and the accession of 
Labarnas in 1640 B.C. 	Pu—sarrumas, and perhaps Tudhaliyas I, reigned 
during the intervening century. 	It is unlikely that these two kings 
reigned for the duration of a century. 	Therefore it may be suggested 
that the dates for Anittas and Pitkhanas be further lowered. On the 
other hand there may have been other Hittite kings, of whom we do not 
know, who reigned for a portion of this intervening century. 
From the death of Mursilis to the accession of Telipinus the 
Hittite kingdom was torn with internal strife. 	During this period of 
anarchy we know of four kings. 	There was considerable activity during 
the reign of Hantilis, the successor of Mursilis. 
The sources do not indicate that he met a violent death despite 
the fact that his reign was marked by disaster. 	If we assign to him 
twenty years as a ruler, he reigned, according to this scheme, from 
1550 B.C. to 1530 B.C. 	We know very little of the reign of Zidantas, 
the successor of Hantilis, other than that he-was murdered. 	If he 
ruled for five years he was on the throne from 1530 B.C. to 1525 B.C. 
The activities of his successor Ammunas were quite extensive but met 
with little success. 	If he ruled for fifteen years he was the Hittite 
king from 1525 B.C. to 1510 B.C. 	We know very little of the reign of 
Huzziyas. 	By giving him five years he reigned from 1510 B.C. to 1505 	B.C. 
With the coming of Telipinus, who drove Huzziyas from the throne, order 
was re—established in the Hittite kingdom. 	He therefore may have ruled 
for thirty years or even longer. 	Thus he was more than likely on the 
throne from 1505 B.C. to 1475 B.C. 	But since he campaigned successfully 
in the south—east and pursued a successful domestic policy he may have 
ruled for a longer period of time. 	Because of this his death is more 
likely to have been closer to 1470 B.C. 
With the period of the New Empire we are on firmer chronological 
ground. 	The Hittites become an international power. This results in 
more points of synchronistic contact- between the Hittites and the other 
nations of the ancient near east. 	Tudhaliyas II is seen as the founder 
of the New Empire. He reigned from approximately 1460 B.C. to 1440 B.C. 
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Thus there is a ten year gap between Telipinus and Tudhaliyas II. 
This was more than likely bridged by the reign of Alluwamnas, the 
son-in-law of Telipinus. 	Alluwamnas therefore ruled from 1470 B.C. 
to 1460 B.C. 
Gurney considers that there was an intervening period of forty 
years between the death of Telipinus and the accession of Tudhaliyas 11. 4 
With the exception of the historically known Alluwamnas he fills this 
gap with three kings whose existence is uncertain. 	These three kings 
are Hantilis II, Zidantas II and Huzziyas II. 	With the exception of 
the occurrence of Ammunas their order and names are similar to the 
three of the four kings who reigned during the period of anarchy 
following the death of Mursilis. 	This fact in itself is enough to 
make their authenticity suspect. 	But if these three shadowy kings, 
of whom we have no positive knowledge, did exist, it presupposes that 
not all went well after the reconstruction policy of Telipinus. However, 
the history of the New Empire points to the conclusion that the policy 
of Telipinus successfully outlasted his own lifetime. 	Therefore the 
very existence of these three kings, ruling for a period of thirty years 
according to Gurney, 5 is to be seriously doubted. 	Gurney's dates 
for the Hittite kings would seem to be too high. 	The lower chronology, 
as proposed by Van der Meer, Albright, and others successfullybridges 
the gap between Alluwamnas and Tudhaliyas II. 	Thus the presence of 
Hantilis II, Zidantas II and Huzziyas II is no longer necessitated. 
4. Gurney,O.R; The Hittites, (2nd ed, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin 
Books ltd, 1954),p.216 
5. Ibid p.216 
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